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· Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington 
10-945 
Ruling Below: Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 621 FJd 296 
(3rd Cir. 2010), cert. granted 131 S.Ct. 1816 (U.S. 2011). 
In March of2005, plaintiff Albert Florence's vehicle was stopped by a New Jersey state trooper. 
The officer discovered a bench warrant for Florence issued for failure to pay a fine. Florence 
presented the officer with a letter showing this fine had been paid. The officer arrested Florence 
and took him to a county jail where Florence underwent a strip search and visual inspection. 
Florence was held at the county j ail for six days until he was transferred to a correctional facility 
in the county in which the warrant was issued. He underwent a similar search at this facility and 
was placed with the general prison population until he was taken before a magistrate judge the 
following day. The judge immediately ordered Florence's release upon discovery the warrant 
had been dismissed. Shortly after his release, Florence filed suit against the facilities, among 
other municipal entities. Florence asserted numerous constitutional claims including a Fourth 
Amendment challenge to the strip search procedure. The District Court concluded that the 
blanket strip search policies failed the balancing test under Bell v. Wolfish and found for 
FloreilCe. In 2010 the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the blanket strip search policies were 
justified in light of the security risks presented at the facilities and that deference was owed to 
prison officials in such security matters. 
Question Presented: Whether the Fourth Amendment permits a jail to conduct a suspicionless 
strip search whenever an individual is arrested, including for minor offenses. 
Albert W. FLORENCE 
v. 
BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF the COUNTY OF BURLINGTON; 
Burlington County Jail; Warden Juel Cole, Individually and officially as Warden of 
Burlington County Jail; Essex County Correctional Facility; Essex County Sheriff's 
Department; State Trooper John Doe, Individually and in his capacity as a State Trooper; 
John Does 1-3 of Burlington County Jail & Essex County Correctional Facility who 
performed the strip searches; John Does 4-:5 Essex County Correctional Facility; Essex 
County Sheriff's Department, Appellants in 09-3603 Board of Chosen Freehold~rs of the 
County of Burlington; Warden Juel Cole, Appellants in 09-3661. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
Filed September 21, 2010 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This interlocutory appeal requires us to 
decide whether it is constitutional for j ails to 
strip search arrestees upon their admission to 
the general popUlation. Although the 
question is one of first impression for this 
COUli, the Supreme COUli's decision in Bell 
126 
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 
L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), and the many cases that 
followed it inform our analysis. 
In Bell, the Supreme Court rejected a Fourth 
Amendment challenge to a policy of visual 
body cavity searches for all detainees-
regardless of the reason for their 
incarceration-after contact visits with 
outsiders. The Court applied a balancing test 
and concluded that the visual body cavity 
searches were reasonable because the 
prison's security interest justified· the 
intrusion into the detainees' privacy. 
Since Bell was decided, ten circuit courts of 
appeals applied its balancing test and 
uniformly concluded that an anestee 
charged with minor offenses may not be 
strip searched consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment unless the prison has 
reasonable suspicion that the anestee is 
concealing a weapon or other contraband. 
Things changed in 2008, however, when the 
en banc Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit reversed its prior precedent and held 
that a jail's blanket policy of strip searching 
all arrestees upon entering the facility was 
reasonable even in the absence of 
individualized suspicion. A year later, the en 
banc Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
also reversed its prior precedent and upheld 
a blanket policy of strip searching all 
anestees before they enter San Francisco's 
general jail population. . 
Confronted with a clear dichotomy between 
the en banc decisions of the Ninth gnd 
Eleventh Circuits on the one hand and the 
numerous cases that preceded them on the 
other, we must determine which line of 
cases is more faithful to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Bell. 
1. 
A. 
We begin with the facts sunounding the 
arrest and detention of lead Plaintiff Albert 
Florence. On March 3, 2005, a New Jersey 
state trooper stopped the car in which 
Florence was a passenger and anested him 
based on an April 25, 2003 bench wanant 
from Essex County. The warrant charged 
Florence with a non-indictable variety of 
civil contempt. Though Florence protested 
the validity of the wanant by insisting he 
had already paid the fine on which it was 
based, he was arrested and taken to the 
Burlington County Jail (BCJ). 
According to Florence, he was subjected to a 
strip and visual body-cavity search by 
conections officers at BCl During the jail's 
intake process, Florence was directed to 
remove all of his clothing, then open his 
mouth and lift his tongue, hold out his arms 
and tum around, and lift his genitals. The 
officer conducting the search sat 
approximately arms-length in front of him, 
and directed Florence to shower once the 
search was complete. Florence was held at 
BCJ for six days. 
During Florence's sixth day at BCJ, the 
Essex County Sheriff s Department took 
custody of him and transported him to the 
Essex County Correctional Facility (ECCF). 
Florence alleges that he was subjected to 
another strip and visual body-cavity search 
upon his anival at ECCF. As described by 
Florence, he and four other detainees were 
instructed to enter separate shower stalls, 
strip naked and shower under the watchful 
eyes of two corrections officers. After 
showering, Florence was directed to open 
his mouth and lift his genitals. Next, he was 
ordered to tum around so he faced away 
from the officers and to squat and cough. . 
After donning ECCF-issued clothing and 
visiting a nurse, Florence joined the general 
jail population until the following day, when 
the charges against him were dismissed. 
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After his release, Florence sued BCJ, ECCF, 
and various individuals and municipal 
entities (collectively, the Jails) under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. While Florence asserted 
numerous constitutional claims, the only 
claim germane to this appeal is his Fourth 
Amendment challenge to the strip search 
procedures at BCJ and ECCF. 
B. 
On March 20, 2008, the District Court 
granted Florence's motion for class 
certification, defining the plaintiff class as:. 
All arrestees chm'ged with non-
indictable offenses who were 
processed, housed or held over at 
Defendant Burlington County Jail 
. and/or Defendant Essex County 
Correctional Facility from March 3, 
. 2003 to the present date who were 
directed by Defendants' officers to 
strip naked before those officers, no 
matter if the officers term that 
procedure a "visual observation" or 
otherwise, without the officers first. 
articulating a reasonable belief that 
those arrestees were concealing 
contraband, drugs or weapons[.] 
Florence v. Ed of Chosen Freeholders of 
the County of Burlington, 2008 WL 800970, 
at *17 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2008). 
Following discovery, the parties filed cross 
motions for summary judgment. In 
reviewing the motions, the District Court 
first considered whether the intake 
procedures at each facility rose to the level 
of a "strip search." Florence v. Ed of 
Chosen Freeholders of the County of 
Burlington, 595 F.Supp.2d 492, 502 
(D.N.J.2009). To resolve this question, the 
District Court reviewed the Jails' written 
search policies as well as the deposition 
testimony of correctional officers and the 
wardens at each facility. Ultimately, the 
District Court concluded that, while there 
were facts in dispute-such as whether non-
indictable male arrestees at BCJ were 
required to lift their genitals during the 
search-these disputes were immaterial 
because even the undisputed procedures of 
instructing arrestees to remove all of their 
clothing and subject their naked bodies to 
visual inspection "rose to the level of a strip 
search" under the Fourth Amendment. Id at 
502-03 ("Whatever the case may be, a 
discrepancy of this sort does not necessarily 
provide a genuine issue of material fact. . . . 
'It's just common sense. Take off all your 
clothes. You're strip[ ] searched. '" (quoting 
Plaintiffs' counsel». 
The District Court found that BCl's 
"blanket" strip search policy "entails a 
complete disrobing, followed by an 
examination of the nude inmate for bruises, 
marks, wounds or other . distinguishing 
features by the supervising officer, which is 
then followed by a supervised shower with a 
delousing agent." The Court found that 
ECCF utilized similar strip- search and 
supervised-shower procedures; however, the 
ECCF procedures were slightly more 
intrusive because "Essex officers carefully 
observed the entire naked body of the 
inmate, including body openings and inner 
thighs." Having thus defined the Jails' 
respective search policies, the District Court 
concluded that the procedures failed the Bell 
qalandng test and observed that "blanket 
strip searches of non-indictable offenders, 
performed without reasonable suspicion for 
drugs, weapons, or other contraband, [are] 
unconstitutional." Based on this holding, the 
District Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion 
for summary judgment on the unlawful 
search claim, b'ut denied the Plaintiffs' 
request for a preliminary injunction. The 
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Court denied Defendants' cross-motion 
which sought qualified and Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. 
Following the decision, the Jails moved the 
District Court to certify its summary 
judgment as an appealable order pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The District Court 
agreed that the order "involve [ d] a 
controlling question of law as to which there 
is· substantial ground for difference of 
opinion," and we granted permission to 
appeal. The District Court certified the 
following question for our review: "whether 
a blanket policy of strip searching all non-
indictable anestees admitted to a jail facility 
without first articulating reasonable 
suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution as applied to 
the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment." "In reviewing an 
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b), this court exercises plenary review 
over the question certified." 
II. 
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons .. 
against umeasonable searches and 
seizures." To enforce this guarantee, 
government officials are limited to only 
those searches which are reasonable. 
Reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment is a flexible standard, "not 
capable of precise definition or mechanical 
application," Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 
1861. "In each case it requires a balancing 
of the need for the particular search against 
the invasion of personal rights that the 
search entails." 
Detention in a coneetional facility "canies 
with it the circumscription or loss of many 
significant rights." "The curtailment of 
certain rights is necessary, as a practical 
matter, to accommodate a myriad of 
institutional needs and objectives of prison 
facilities, chief among which is internal 
security." Because privacy is greatly 
curtailed by the nature of· the prison 
environment, a detainee's Fourth 
Amendment rights are likewise diminished. 
While the Supreme Court has "repeatedly 
held that prisons are not beyond the reach of 
the Constitution[,] "it has also emphasized 
that the judiciary has a "very limited role" in 
the administration of detention facilities, 
Indeed, detention facilities have been 
described as "unique place[ s] fraught with 
serious security dangers," the management 
of which "courts are ill equipped to deal 
with[.J"Therefore, authorities are entitled to 
considerable latitude in designing and. 
implementing prison management policies. 
As the Supreme Court cautioned in Bell: 
"[p ]rison administrators . . . should be 
accorded wide-ranging deference in the 
adoption and execution of policies and 
practices that in their judgment are needed 
to preserve internal order and discipline and 
to maintain institutional security." In· 
addition to pnson administrators' 
"professional expertise," separation of 
powers and federalism concems support 
"wide-ranging deference" to the decisions of 
prison authorities. 
A. 
Having explained the general standards that 
govem our inquiry, we tum to the Supreme 
Court's pathmarking decision in Bell v. 
Wolfish. Although there are factual 
differences between Bell and the instant 
case, they are sufficiently similar to wanant 
a detailed review of Bell. 
In Bell, pretrial detainees and convicted 
prisoners confined at the Metropolitan 
Conectiorial Center (MCC)-a federally 
operated short-term custodial facility-filed 
suit challenging numerous prison practices 
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and conditions of confinement. Although the 
pnmary purpose of MCC was to house 
pretrial detainees awaiting trial on federal 
criminal charges, the facility also housed: 
witnesses in protective custody, .contemnors, 
inmates awaiting sentencing or 
transportation to federal prison, inmates 
serving relatively short sentences, and 
inmates lodged under writs of habeas corpus 
issued to ensure their presence at trial. The 
population at MCC was quite transient, with 
50% of its inmates spending fewer than 30 
days at the facility and 73 % of the 
population spending fewer than 60 days at 
MCC. 
Among the conditions of. confinement 
challenged by the inmates at MCC was the 
policy of strip and visual body-cavity 
searches after contact visits with outsiders. 
Under that policy, all persons housed at 
MCC-regardless of the reason for their 
detention-were "required to expose their 
body cavities for visual inspection as a part 
of a strip search conducted after every 
contact visit with a person from outside the 
institution." For males, this required 
"lift[ing] [the] genitals and bend[ing] over to 
spread [the] buttocks for visual inspection." 
"The vaginal and anal cavities of female 
inmates also [were] visually inspected." 
Inmates were not touched by officers during 
the searches. 
The district court in Bell upheld the strip 
searches but held the visual body cavity 
searches unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the 
. Second Circuit affinned, finding that the· 
"gross violation of personal privacy inherent 
in such a search cannot be outweighed by 
the government's security interest in 
maintaining a practice of so little actual 
utility." 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
the visual body-cavity searches were 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. As 
a preliminary matter, the Court assumed 
without deciding that both convicted 
prisoners and pretrial detainees retain some 
Fourth Amendment rights upon commitment 
to a correctional facility. It then explained 
that, in each case, the test of Fourth 
Amendment . reasonableness requires "a 
balancing of the need for the particular 
search against the invasion of personal rights 
that the search entails," and instructed courts 
to consider four factors in assessing 
reasonableness: "the scope of the- particular 
intrusion, the manner in which it is 
conducted, the justification for initiating it, 
and the place in which it is conducted." 
In applying the balancing test to the search 
policy, the Supreme Court cited MCC's dual 
objectives of detecting and deterring 
smuggling of weapons and other contraband, 
recognizing that "[s]muggling of money, 
drugs, weapons, and other contraband is all 
too common an occurrence." The Court 
upheld the policy despite the absence of any 
evidence of smuggling problems at MCC as 
the record contained only one instance 
where an inmate was caught with 
contraband in a body cavity. Neverth~less, 
the Court found the lack of evidence 
supported the prison's interest in the policy 
because it was "more a testament to the 
effectiveness of this search technique as a 
deterrent than to any lack _ of interest on the 
part of inmates to secrete and import such 
items when the opportunity arises." . 
Significantly, Bell included just one 
sentence discussing the scope of the privacy 
intrusion, in which the Court stated that it 
"d[id] not underestimate the degree to which. 
these searches may invade the personal 
privacy of inmates." And though it 
acknowledged that correctional officers may 
sometimes conduct the searches in an 
impermissibly abusive fashion, the Supreme 
Court did not address that issue; rather, it 
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limited its review to the policy as a whole, 
"deal[ing] . . . with the question whether 
visual body-cavity inspections as 
contemplated by the MCC rules can ever be 
conducted on less than probable cause 
grounds." The Court answered that question 
in the affirmative. Moreover, the Court 
rejected the district court's consideration of 
alternative, less-intrusive means of detecting 
contraband. Even assuming the availability 
of such alternatives, the Court deferred to 
MCC's choice of security procedure because 
it had not been shown to be "irrational or 
unreasonable." 
B. 
In the years following Bell, ten circuitcourts 
of appeals applied the Supreme Court's 
balancing test to strip searches of individuals 
arrested for minor offenses and found the 
searches unconstitutional where not 
supported by reasonable suspicion that the 
arrestee was hiding a weapon or contraband. 
In general, these courts concluded that the 
extreme invasion of privacy caused by a 
strip andlor visual body-cavity search 
outweighed the prison's minimal.interest in 
searching an individual charged with a 
minor crime shortly after arrest. The critical 
factor in balancing the competing interests 
was the belief that individuals arrested for 
minor offenses presented a relatively slight 
security risk because they usually are 
arrested unexpectedly whereas the contact 
visits in Bell may have been arranged 
specifically for the purpose of smuggling 
weapons or drugs. 
Recently, the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits, 
sitting en banc, reversed their prior 
precedents and held that Bell authorizes a 
policy of blanket strip searches' for all 
arrestees entering the general population of a 
jail. 
In Powell [v. Barrett], the Eleventh Circuit 
reviewed a policy of strip searching all 
arrestees' at the time of intake implemented 
by the Fulton County Jail in Georgia. The 
policy required that all persons entering the 
jail's general population be strip searched 
regardless of the crime charged and without 
any individualized suspicion. Powell, 541 
FJd at 1301. The booking process required 
groups of 30 to 40 arrestees to enter a large 
shower room, simultaneously remove all of 
their clothing, place it in boxes and then 
shower. "After the group shower each 
arrestee either singly, or standing in a line 
with others, is visually inspected front and 
back by deputies. Then each man takes his 
Clothes to a counter and exchanges his own 
clothes for a jail jumpsuit." The Eleventh 
Circuit discussed in great detail the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the searches at 
issue in Bell, . which demonstrated the high 
level of intrusiveness that the Supreme 
Court countenanced as reasonable. The 
Eleventh Circuit also noted the paltry record 
of body-cavity smuggling at MCC as 
evidence of the significant deference 
provided to prison administrators by the 
Court in Bell. In light of these points, the 
Eleventh Circuit determined that most courts 
(and its own prior precedent) misinterpreted 
Bell to require reasonable suspicion for strip 
searches of minor offenders. It opined that 
the decisions requiring reasonable suspicion 
failed to give appropriate deference to the 
judgments of prison administrators and 
ignored the fact that in upholding visual 
body-cavity searches, the Supreme Court in 
Bell neither required individualized 
suspicion of smuggling nor differentiated 
the degree of suspicion required based on 
the type of offender. 
The Powell court also disagreed with the 
majority view that security interests at the 
time of intake are less important than those 
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arising after an inmate's contact visit with 
an outsider, describing "an inmate's initial 
entry into a detention facility" as "coming 
after one big and prolonged contact visit 
with the outside world." The court asserted 
that . the "need for strip searches at all 
detention facilities, including county jails, is 
not exaggerated. " Citing other cases, the 
court noted the problem of gang violence in 
prisons and observed that gang members 
might "coerce, cajole, or intimidate lesser 
violators into smuggling contraband into the 
facility." In light of these security concerns, 
the Eleventh Circuit held that "a policy or 
practice of strip searching all anestees as 
part of the process of booking them into the 
general population of a detention facility, 
even without reasonable suspicion to believe 
that they may be concealing contraband, is 
constitutionally permissible" at least where 
the search is no more intrusive than the 
search in Bell. 
Like the. Eleventh Circuit in Powell" the 
Ninth Circuit in Bull v. City and County of 
San Francisco reversed prior precedent and 
upheld the San Francisco Sheriffs policy 
authorizing strip searches of all anestees 
before they are placed in the general 
population of a county jail. Bull, 595 FJd at 
966. In rejecting its prior requirement of 
reasonable suspicion for anestee strip 
searches, the Bull court relied on much of 
the same reasoning as the Eleventh Circuit 
in Powell, including its view that decisions 
interpreting Bell v. Wolfish to require 
reasonable suspicion to strip search minor 
offenders were analytically flawed. The 
Ninth Circuit concluded that "the scope, 
manner, and justification for San Francisco's 
strip search policy was not meaningfully 
different from the scope, manner, and 
justification for the strip search policy in 
Bell." Based on the record presented, the 
justification for searching anestees at the 
time of intake was even higher than the 
justification for the. post-contact visit 
searches in Bell because San Francisco had 
amassed a record demonstrating "a 
pervasive and serious problem with 
contraband inside San Francisco's jails" as 
well as instances of contraband smuggled 
within body cavities. 
C. 
Mindful of the newly-minted circuit split we 
have described, we proceed to apply Bell's 
balancing test to the question certified for 
interlocutory appeal in this case. The Jails 
rely heavily on Powell in support of their 
argument that strip searches satisfy the 
reasonableness standard of Bell. They argue 
that the searches serve the valid prison 
interests of "eliminating weapons and drugs 
from the jail environment, serving to 
mitigate gang violence and preventing 
disease," and that these concerns apply to 
indictable and non-indictable anestees alike. 
On behalf of the Plaintiff class, Florence 
counters that the District Court properly 
applied Bell, and that we should adopt the 
reasonable suspicion requirement applied by 
the majority of our sister circuits. Florence 
also challenges the legitimacy of the gang, 
health, and contraband concerns as 
justifications for the strip search of non-
indictable arrestees as unsupported by the 
record and argues that there are less 
intrusive alternatives to satisfy the Jails' 
security interests. 
Like the Supreme Court in Bell, we assume 
detainees maintain some Fourth Amendment 
rights against searches of their person upon 
entry to a detention facility. To determine 
whether the strip search procedures at BCJ 
and ECCF violate the FOUlih Amendment, 
we first consider the scope of the searches at 
Issue. 
We have previously recognized that a strip 
search constitutes a "significant intrusion on 
an individual's privacy." Here, the strip 
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search policies require the arrestees to 
undress completely and submit to a visual 
. observation of their naked bodies before 
taking a supervised shower. We do not 
minimize the extreme intrusion on privacy 
associated with a strip search by law 
enforcement officers; however, the searches 
at issue here are less intrusive than the visual 
body-cavity searches considered by the 
Supreme Court in Bell. In fact, they are 
closer· to the strip searches upheld. by the 
lower court in Bell. 
The searches were also conducted in a 
similar manner and place as those in Bell-
by correctional officers at a detention 
facility. The policies governing strip 
searches at BCJ require that they be 
conducted "in private . . . under sanitary 
conditions . . . [and] in a professional and 
dignified manner." Moreover, the searches 
are relatively brief, such that between the 
search and supervised shower, an arrestee is 
not required to remain naked for more than 
several minutes. Because the scope, manner, 
and place of the searches are similar to or 
less intrusive than those in Bell, the only 
factor on which Plaintiffs could distinguish 
this case is the Jails' justification for the 
searches. 
Detention facilities are "unique place[s] 
fraught with serious security dangers." We 
have recognized that New Jersey jails, like 
most correctional facilities, face serious 
problems caused by the presence of gangs. 
The Jails cite three specific security interests 
to justify strip searches: (1) the detection 
and deterrence of smuggling weapons, drugs 
or other contraband into the facility, (2) the 
. identification of gang members by observing 
their tattoos, and (3) the prevention of 
disease, specifically Methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). Of these 
three, the potential for smuggling of 
weapons, drugs, and other contraband poses 
the greatest security threat. 
It is self-evident that preyenting the 
introduction of weapons and drugs into the 
prison environment is a legitimate interest of 
concern for prison administrators. 
Prevention of. the entry of illegal weapons 
and drugs is vital to the protection of 
inmates and prison personnel alike. 
Like the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts 
of Appeals, we conclude that the security 
interest in preventing smuggling at the time 
of intake is as strong as the interest in 
preventing smuggling after the contact visits 
at issue in Bell. We reject Plaintiffs' 
argument that blanket searches are 
unreasonable because . j ails have little 
interest in strip searching arrestees charged 
with non-indictable offenses. This argument 
cannot be squared with the facts and law of 
Bell. First, the Bell court explicitly rejected 
any distinction in security risk based on the 
reason for detention. Instead, the security 
risk was defined by the fact of detention in a 
correctional facility. 
Second, Bell did not require individualized 
suspicion for each inmate searched; it 
assessed the facial constitutionality of the 
policy as a whole, as applied to all inmates 
at MCC. MCC housed pretrial detainees, 
convicted inmates, and even non-offenders 
held as material witnesses, all of whom were 
included in the plaintiff class. 
We also disagree with Plaintiffs' contention 
that the risk that non-indictable offenders 
will smuggle contraband is low because 
arrest for this category of offenses is often 
unanticipated. Even assuming that most such 
arrests are unanticipated, this is not always 
the case. It is plausible that incarcerated 
persons will induce or recruit others to 
subject themselves to arrest on non-
indictable offenses to smuggle weapons or 
other contraband into the facility. This 
would be especially true if we were to hold 
that those incarcerated on non-indictable 
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offens~s are, as a class, not subject to search. 
For that reason, we agree with the concern 
expressed by the Eleventh Circuit in Powell 
that gang members would be likely to 
exploit an . exception from security 
procedures for minor offenders. 
A similar risk was recognized· by the 
Supreme Court in Block v. Rutherford, 
where the Court upheld a prison policy 
denying contact visits to, pretrial detainees 
regardless of the crime charged. 468 U.S. 
576, 589, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 
(1984). In Block, the district court permitted 
the denial of contact visits for high risk 
detainees, but required the jail to provide 
visits for pretrial detainees "concerning 
whom there is no indication of drug or 
escape propensities." The Supreme Court 
rejected the lower court's characterization of 
a blanket ban on contact visits as 
disproportionate to the risks posed by low 
level detainees. In doing so, the Court 
reasoned that inmates would likely take 
advantage of any gap in security: "[i]t is not 
umeasonable to assume, for instance, that 
low security risk detainees would be enlisted 
to help obtain contraband or weapons by 
their fellow inmates who are denied contact 
visits." 
It is also important to note that the 
opportunity for smuggling during. the 
contact visits in Bell was low. As described 
by the district court in that case, "inmates 
and their visitors are in full view during the 
visits and fully clad. The secreting of objects 
in rectal or genital areas becomes in this 
situation. an imposing challenge to nerves 
and agility." Despite these obstacles to an 
inmate obtaining contraband from a visitor 
and hiding it in a body cavity, the Supreme 
Court still found that MCC's interest in 
detecting and deterring this low risk of 
smuggling outweighed the privacy intrusion. 
If it is reasonable to assume that a prisoner 
will try to arrange for a visitor to deliver 
. contraband during a contact VISIt, it is 
equally reasonable to assume that a detainee 
will arrange for an accomplice on the 
outside to subject himself to arrest for a non-
indictable offense to smuggle contraband 
into the facility. Thus, the Jails' interest in 
preventing smuggling at the time of intake is 
just as high as MCC's interest after the 
contact visits in Bell. 
The Plaintiff class argues that the Jails 
cannot rely on an interest in preventing 
smuggling because they have not presented 
any evidence of a past smuggling problem 
or any instance of a non-indictable arrestee 
attempting to secrete contraband. It is true 
that the Jails' justifications for strip searches 
would be stronger if supported by evidence 
regarding discovery of contraband on 
indictable and non-indictable offenders 
during intake, and the incidence with which 
gang members are arrested for non-
indictable offenses. Nonetheless, our 
interpretation of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Bell leads us to conclude that the 
Jails are not required to· produce such a 
record. 
In Bell, the single instance of attempted 
smuggling did not undermine MCC's 
justification for the search. Quite to the 
contrary, the Court considered the absence 
of a record to be evidence of the policy's 
successful deterrent effect. Likewise here, 
strip searches at the time of intake also have 
significant deterrent value. If non-indictable 
offenders were not subject to automatic 
search it would create a security gap which 
offenders could exploit with relative ease. 
The Bell court did not require a record of 
smuggling to justify MCC's interest in 
preventing it (in fact, there was no time for a 
long history of smuggling to have developed 
as the Bell plaintiffs filed their case only 
four months after MCC opened). The 
Supreme Court declared that "[s ]muggling 
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of money, drugs, weapons, and other 
contraband is all too common an 
occurrence" at detention facilities. In 
addition to the sole instance of smuggling in 
the.record, Bell relied upon cases concerning 
other detention facilities for the proposition 
that inmates attempt to secrete items in their 
body cavities. 
Finally, we also find significant that the 
Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized 
that cOUlis must defer to the policy 
judgments of prison administrators. 
Moreover, we have stated that "deference is 
especially appropriate when a regulation 
implicates prison security." This emphasis 
on ,deference further supports the 
proposition that the absence of evidence of 
smuggling at a paliicular correctional 
institution does not demonstrate the 
umeasonableness of a policy implemented 
to prevent smuggling. A detention facility 
need not suffer a pattern of security breaches 
before it takes steps to prevent them where 
those steps are neither "ill'ational [n] or 
umeasonable. " 
Plaintiffs assert that the Jails' interest in 
preventing smuggling could be achieved 
through means less intrusive than strip 
searches. Specifically, Plaintiffs point to the 
Body Orifice Scanning System (BOSS 
Chair), "[a] non-intrusive scanning system 
designed to· detect small weapons or 
contraband metal objects concealed in oral, 
anal, or vaginal cavities," a security method 
already used by ECCF. In Bell, the Supreme 
Court rejected the district court's reliance on 
·the less-intrusive means of metal detection 
in evaluating searches at MCC. The COUli 
found metal detection to be less effective 
than the visual search procedure and 
deferred to the prison administrator's 
decision to use the visual search method. 
Florence's argument regarding the BOSS 
Chair fails for the same reasons. Aside fi.-om 
the fact that there is no evidence regarding 
the efficacy of the BOSS Chair in detecting 
metallic objects, it would not detect drugs 
and other non-metallic contraband. 
Accordingly, the decision not to rely 
exclusively on the BOSS Chair is not 
umeasonable. 
As asselied by the Jails, a blanket policy 
will help to avoid potential equal protection 
concerns in the strip search process as it 
removes officer discretion in selecting 
which all'estees to search. The potential for 
abuse in a "reasonable suspicion" scheme is 
high, partiCUlarly where reasonable 
suspicion may be based on such subjective 
characteristics as the arrestee's appearance 
and conduct at the time of all'est. Subjecting 
all all'estees to the same policy promotes 
equal treatment. 
In sum, balancing the Jails' security interests 
at the time of intake before arrestees enter 
the general population against the privacy 
interests of the inmates, we hold that the 
strip search procedures described by the 
District Court at BCJ and ECCF are 
reasonable. Accordingly, we will reverse the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment 
on Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment strip 
search claim and remand for fuliher 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.9 
POLLAK, District Judge, dissenting. 
I. 
I respectfully disagree with the court's 
opinion. I think Judge Rodriguez's decision 
should be affirmed, and I would expressly 
predicate the order of affirmance on his 
comprehensive, finely crafted, and 
characteristically thoughtful opinion. 
II. 
In upholding as constitutional strip searches 
of persons detained on non-indictable 
offenses and with respect to whom there is 
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no individualized ground for suspicion that 
they may be bringing contraband into a 
detention facility, the court finds the en bane 
opinions of the Eleventh Circuit, Powell v. 
Bm'fett, 541 F.3d 1298 (l1th Cir.2008), and 
of the Ninth Circuit, Bull v. City and County 
of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th 
. Cir.2010), persuasive. For my part, I find 
greater wisdom in Judge Barkett's dissent in 
Powell and Judge Thomas's dissent in B1;lll. 
Judge Thomas's Bull dissent frames the 
issues this way: 
The majority sweeps away twenty-
five years of jurisprudence, giving 
jailors the unfettered right to conduct 
. mandatory, routine, suspicionless 
body cavity searches on any citizen 
who may be arrested for minor 
offenses, such as violating a leash 
law or a traffic code, and who pose 
no credible risk for smuggling 
contraband into the jail. Under its 
reconfigured regime, the majority· 
discards Bell's requirement to 
balance the need for a search against 
individual pnvacy and instead 
blesses a uniform policy of 
performing body cavity searches on 
everyone arrested and designated for 
the general jail population, 
regardless of the triviality of the 
. charge· or the likelihood that the 
arrestee is hiding contraband. 
The .rationale for this abrupt 
precedential departure is founded on 
quicksand. Indeed, the govemment's 
entire argument is based on the 
logical fallacy cum hoc ergo propter 
hoc-happenstance implies causation. 
The government argues that 
contraband has been found in the San 
Francisco jails. Thus, the 
govemment reasons, individuals who 
are arrested must be smuggling 
contraband into the jail. Therefore 
the govemment concludes it must 
body cavity search everyone who is 
arrested, even those who pose no risk 
of concealing contraband, much less 
of trying to smuggle contraband into 
the jail. 
This reasoning finds no support from 
the record in this case. Although 
there is evidence of some arrestees 
attempting to conceal· contraband 
during their arrest, there is not a 
single documented example of 
anyone doing so with the intent of 
smuggling contraband into the jail. 
More importantly, for our purposes, 
ther.e is not a single example of 
anyone from the class defined by the 
district court who was found to 
possess contraband upon being strip 
search. Not one. 
Bull; 595 F.3d at 990. 
In his District Court opinion, Judge 
Rodriguez makes a point which gives 
special cogency to Judge Thomas's "Not 
one": 
[I]t is worth noting that neither 
county submits supporting affidavits 
that detail evidence of a smuggling 
problem specific to their respective 
facilities. 
Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 595 
F.Supp.2d 492,513 (D.NJ.2009).1 
Judge Barkett's Powell dissent sums up the 
issues with special force: 
Like the majority, I recognize and 
appreciate the deference due to jail 
administrators as they fulfill their 
charge of ensuring security in jails, 
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· not only for the jail officials but also 
for the inmates. At the same time, 
"convicted prisoners do not forfeit 
all constitutional protections by 
reason of their conviction and 
confinement in prison." This 
principle applies with at least as 
much force to individuals detained 
prior to their trial on petty 
misdemeanor charges such as failing 
to pay child support, driving without 
a license, or trespassing. These 
protections, such as the right to be 
free from degrading, humiliating, 
and dehumanizing treatment and the 
right to bodily integrity, include 
protection against forced nakedness· 
during strip searches in front of 
others. 
Powell, 541 F.3d at 1315. 
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"High Court to Examine Strip Searches 
for Minor Offenses" 
CNN 
April 4, 2011 
Bill Mears 
A New Jersey man who says he was 
subjected to two humiliating strip searches 
over unpaid traffic fines will have his appeal 
heard by the Supreme Court, an important 
test of police detention powers in the post 
9/11 security-conscious environment. 
The justices Monday accepted Albert 
Florence's -petition, and will hold oral 
arguments in the fall. 
At issue is a challenge to a county's rules 
allowing routine, suspicionless strip 
searches of everyone arrested for even minor 
offenses, regardless of the circumstances. 
Florence was a passenger in his family's 
sport utility vehicle when it was stopped by 
a New Jersey state trooper in March 2005. 
His then-pregnant wife was driving and their 
4-year-old daughter was in the back seat as 
they headed to dinner with Florence's 
mother-in-law. 
Since Albert Florence was the registered 
owner, the officer ran his identification and 
discovered a bench warrant for failure to pay 
a fine. He had already paid the money, and 
carried a letter attesting to that fact, since he 
claimed he had been stopped -on several 
previous occasions. 
Neveliheless, Florence this time was 
handcuffed and arrested, and then taken to 
the jail in Burlington County, in the southern 
part of the state. 
Court records show Florence was subjected 
to an invasive strip and visual body-cavity 
search. He was then held for six days in the 
county lockup before being transferred to a 
Newark correctional facility, where he was 
SUbjected to another identical search before 
being placed m the general prison 
population. 
The next day a judge freed Florence, 
confirming what he had insisted all _ along, 
that the fine had been paid. 
He then sued, but a federal appeals cOUli in 
Philadelphia last year ruled the search policy 
proper. 
In the appeal to the -Supreme Court, 
Florence's lawyers wrote, "Strip searches 
deprive an individual of the most tangible 
protection of his intimate personal privacy-
his clothing .... It is unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment for jail officials to 
engage in the deep intrusion into personal 
dignity of a strip search of every single 
individual admitted into the facility, no 
matter what the circumstances." 
They also pointed out that Florence's 
alleged offense, failure to pay a fine, is not 
considered a criminal offense in the state 
and would not normally result in 
incarceration. His family said their efforts to 
free Florence were thwarted by repeated 
bureaucratic run-arounds. 
State officials in their reply drew a 
distinction between a strip search policy for 
those initially arrested and for those later 
entering the general prison population. Such 
"intake" searches m'e justified, said the state, 
when applied consistently to every inmate 
and for proper reasons, including "both 
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· health threats and the increasing need to 
identify gang members upon their entry into 
the institution." 
Federal courts before the September 11, 
2001, attacks had been at odds over the 
constitutionality of strip searches. The 
Constitution's Fourth Amendment protects 
against "unreasonable searches and 
seizures. " 
The Supreme Court in 1979, in what is. 
called the Bell precedent, upheld the kind of 
search Florence had undergone for those 
prisoners who had contact visits with 
outsiders. Using a balancing test, the justices 
said the prison's security interest justified 
intrusion into the inmates' privacy. 
But subsequent appeals courts have found 
those arrested for minor offenses may not be 
strip searched unless authorities have a 
"reasonable suspicion" that the person may 
be concealing a weapon or contraband such 
as drugs. 
In 2008, however, appeals courts in Atlanta 
and San Francisco found searches of every 
inmate coming into the prison population are 
justified, even without specific suspicions. 
Those opinions were the first of their kind 
since the 9/11 attacks and, along with 
Florence's case, now give the high court the 
chance to clarify an issue that a number of 
civil and human rights proponents have tried 
to highlight. 
Local jails in New Jersey at the time of 
Florence's arrest were subject to federal 
monitors after allegations that minority 
motorists and their. passengers were being 
unfairly targeted for police stops and arrests. 
Stops of that nature are not at issue in the 
current appeal. Florence, who is African-
American, is not alleging any racial 
discrimination by the state or individual 
officers. 
The case is Florence v. Board of Chosen 
Freeholders of the County of Burlington, 
New Jersey (10-945). 
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"N.J. Man and 2 Counties Battle over 
Constitutionality of Blanket Strip-Searches for All 
Inmates" 
The Star-Ledger 
April 24, 2011 
Jason Grant 
[A] strip-search and, to a lesser extent, the 
strange and somewhat confounding 
circumstances that surrounded [Albert] 
Florence's six-day detention in 2005 have 
led to a potential landmark civil rights case 
to be argued this fall before the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
* * * 
The case of Albert W. Florence against 
Essex and Burlington counties stands ona 
precipice: ... Legally, the Supreme COUli's 
ruling is expected to set clear national law .. 
. on an issue that has split the country's 
federal appeals courts: Whether detention 
facilities can. strip~search a noncriminal 
offender without having a "reasonable 
suspicion" that the person might be 
concealing something. 
* * * 
On one hand, Essex and Burlington counties 
will argue that the Supreme COUli should 
continue with its recent trend of giving more 
deference to detention facility officials to 
run their houses as they see fit. Essex and 
Burlington will contend that safety is 
paramount and ·that anyone who enters the 
four walls of their jails and prisons must be 
strip-searched, no matter the circumstances, 
in order to pinpoint gang members through 
spotting their tattoos, identify and prevent 
the spread of staph infections, and, most 
notably, prevent the smuggling in of 
weapons, drugs or other contraband. 
On the other hand, attorneys for Florence 
will argue the Fourth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution, which protects citizens 
again unwarranted searches and seizures, 
calls for a different balancing of the rights of 
the government against the intrusion into 
one's privacy. As Susan Chana Lask, the 
civil rights attorney who has handled 
Florence's case for six years, said recently, 
"How reasonable does everyone think it is to 
get hauled off to jail for a traffic ticket and 
get strip-searched?" 
Lask argues vehemently that what happened 
to Florence could "happen to anyone" and 
that those accused· of being noncriminal 
offenders should be treated differently than 
murder suspects and other alleged serious 
criminals. A proper balancing under the 
Fourth Amendment, Lask says, calls for 
detention facilities to make a "reasonable 
suspicion" determination before strip-
searching a low-level offender. Plus, Lask 
says, "there's a practical fix, which is to 
physically separate the noncriminal 
offenders (in the facilities) from the 
murderers and the rapists." 
Meanwhile, the stakes for Essex and 
Burlington counties are particularly high. 
While Florence at first brought his case 
individually, his lawsuit was later certified 
as a class actio~ by the federal trial cOUli, 
which rUled in Florence's favor, finding his 
strip-searches to be unconstitutional. That 
means if Florence wins at the Supreme 
. COUli, the class of previously strip-searched 
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noncriminal offenders at the Essex and 
Burlington jails-a group that has been 
. estimated to be 10,000 people-can ask for 
damages, usually in the range of $1,000 to 
$2,000 a person, lawyers say. 
The Traffic Stop 
On March 3, 2005, a state police officer in 
Burlington County pulled over Florence's 
wife, April, for driving 82 mph in a 65-mph 
zone. The police officer ran the vehicle's 
registration and arrested Albert Florence, the 
passenger, after learning that there was an 
Essex County warrant for his arrest, 
according to court records and state police 
spokesman Stephen Jones. 
Suddenly, Florence was on his way to the 
Burlington County Correctional Facility, 
even though he quickly gave officials a 
piece of paper that bore "a raised seal from 
the State of New Jersey" and showed "that 
all judgments against plaintiff were satisfied 
and no warrant existed against him," 
according to his lawsuit. 
Indeed, the warrant for Florence had been 
dismissed in 2003, court filings show and 
the lawyers in the case say. 
* * * 
. Once incarcerated, Florence ... spent five to 
six days in the Burlington County jail as a 
"holdover" inmate, waiting to be transferred 
to Essex County. At a sparsely attended 
news conference organized earlier this 
month by Lask, Florence described the first 
strip-search he endured-the one done in 
Burlington-as a "horrible moment." He 
was ordered to "while nude, open his mouth, 
lift his tongue, hold his arms out, tum fully 
around, and lift his genitals," said his 
lawsuit complaint. 
.. ; To top it off, [Florence] said, he was 
eventually transferred to the Essex County 
Correctional Facility,where he said he 
suffered an even worse strip-search than the 
one in Burlington. 
* * * 
Florence only stayed a day in Essex County 
before he saw a magistrate judge who 
quickly released him based on the warrant 
having been dismissed. 
At the trial level, one issue hotly contested 
before U.S. District Court Judge Joseph H. 
Rodriguez was whether Florence was, in 
fact, strip-searched-or instead was only 
subjected to "clothing exchanges" linked to 
mandatory inmate showers. Several jail 
officers testified that they didn't consider 
Florence'.s treatment to be a strip-search, 
said J. Brooks DiDonato, a veteran lawyer 
who is defending Burlington County. But 
Judge Rodriguez disagreed. 
* * * 
I~ The Beginning 
* * * 
According to cOUli and police records, and a 
Burlington County filing in his lawsuit, 
. Florence had a serious confrontation with 
the law in 1997. Documents obtained by The 
Star-Ledger from the Maplewood Police 
Depmtment, and interviews with a 
Maplewood official, reveal that on Dec. 18, 
1997, Florence was arrested and accused of 
speeding off from a traffic stop in a 1994 
Honda Accord "that was used as a weapon 
to attempt to' injure" a Maplewood police 
officer. 
Court filings and police repOlts show that 
Florence was charged with criminal offenses 
including aggravated assault, obstruction of 
the administration of law, eluding/failure to 
stop, and possession of a weapon (the Honda 
Accord) for unlawful purpose. 
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A Burlington County court filing also says 
that, on or about May 4, 1998, Florence in 
turn pleaded guilty to the lesser indictable 
offenses of hindering prosecution and 
obstruction of the administration of law. He 
served probation after the plea, according to 
the court filing, and he may have been 
ordered to pay fines. 
The Burlington legal brief says that on April 
25,2003, an arrest warrant was issued on the 
hindering-prosecution charge, but four days 
later, Florence satisfied the requirement of 
his probation and the warrant was dismissed. 
* * * 
'Reasonable Suspicion' 
The Supreme Court issue ansmg from 
Florence's lawsuit is one that appeared 
settled for many years Under a 1979 decision 
called Bell v. Wolfish. Then-Associate 
Justice William Rehnquist wrote in Bell that 
a visual body-cavity search of a detained 
person was warranted after the inmate had 
contact with an outside visitor, regardless of 
why the person was incarcerated. 
After Bell was decided, 10 U.S. appeals 
courts interpreted Bell to meari that a 
detention facility could not strip-search a 
person brought in on minor offenses, unless 
the facility had a "reasonable suspicion" that 
the person was concealing something. 
Since 2008, though, at least three U.S. 
appeals courts have now disagreed with that 
view of Bell, including the 3rd Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Philadelphia, which last year 
heard Florence's case and decided that a jail 
had a powerful interest in keeping its 
premises free of weapons and drugs. The 
court ruled that all people introduced to the 
general popUlation of a facility can be strip-
searched. 
Writing for the majority, Judge Thomas M. 
Hardiman said that a blanket strip-search 
policy had an important "deterrent effect." 
He added, "It is plausible that incarcerated 
persons will hiduce or recruit others to 
subject themselves to. alTest on non-
indictable offenses to smuggle weapons or 
other contraband into the facility." 
Jonathan Turley, a well-known George 
Washington University constitutional law 
professor, said the court's argument about 
people getting arrested for low-level 
offenses and smuggling in contraband for 
others struck him as particularly "fancifu1." 
He also said the "small percentage" of 
inmates who "actually introduce 
contraband" by hiding it in their bodies 
means that "claims of imminent threats 
aren't supported by the data." 
But the Burlington lawyer, DiDonato, said 
people smuggling contraband in their bodies 
into jails is "a far more commonplace 
incident than most people could imagine." 
He sees safety in jails and prisons as 
paramount, he said. "If I were admitted to 
the general population of a facility for an 
offense like an unpaid fine," DiDonato said, 
"I would want to be sure that the people I 
was sharing a cell with had been strip-
searched-whether'! . was rightfully or 
wrongfully incarcerated." . 
Phillips, the Supreme Court litigator for 
Essex County, who has argued more cases 
before the high court than any other private 
practitioner alive, contends that physically 
separating the noncriminal offenders in 
. facilities from those accused of serious 
crimes "would be an administrative 
nightmare for most places" and could mean 
"doubling the costs." 
* * * 
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"No Crime, but an Arrest and Two Strip-Searches" 
New York Times 
March 7,2011 
Adam Liptak 
Albert W. Florence believes that black men 
who drive nice cars in New Jersey run a risk 
of being questioned by the police. For that 
reason, he kept handy a 2003 document 
showing he had paid a court-imposed fine 
stemming from a traffic offense, just in case. 
It did not seem to help. 
In March 2005, Mr. Florence was in the 
passenger seat of his BMW when a state 
trooper pulled it over for speeding. His wife, 
April, was driving. His 4-year-old son, 
Shamar, was in the back. 
The trooper ran a records search, and he 
found an outstanding warrant based on the 
supposedly unpaid fine. Mr. Florence 
showed the trooper the document, but he 
was arrested anyway. 
A failure to pay a fine is not a crime. It is, 
rather, what New Jersey law calls a 
nonindictable offense. Mr. Florence was 
nonetheless held for eight days in two· 
counties on a charge of civil contempt 
before matters were sorted out. 
In the process, he was strip-searched twice. 
"Tum around," he remembered being told 
while he stood naked before several guards 
and prisoners. "Squat and cough. Spread 
your cheeks." 
The treatment stung. "I consider myself a 
man's man," said Mr. Florence, a finance 
executive for a car dealership. "Six-three. 
Big guy. It was humiliating. It made me feel 
less than a man. It made me feel not better 
than an animal." 
The Supreme Court is likely to decide this 
month whether to hear Mr. Florence's case 
against officials in New Jersey over the 
searches, and there is reason to think it will. 
The federal courts of appeal are divided over 
whether blanket policies requiring jailhouse 
stdp-searches of people arrested for minor 
offenses violate the Fourth Amendment. 
Eight courts have ruled that such searches 
are proper only if there is a reasonable 
suspicion that the arrested person has 
weapons or contraband. 
The more recent trend, from appeals courts 
in Atlanta, San Francisco and Philadelphia, 
. is to allow searches no matter how minor the 
charge. Some potential examples cited by 
dissenting judges in those cases: violating a 
leash law, driving without a license, failing 
to pay child support. 
Although the judges in the majority in Mr. 
Florence's case,the one heard in 
Philadelphia, said they had been presented 
with no evidence that the searches were 
needed, they nonetheless ruled that they 
would not second-guess corrections officials 
who said they feared that people like Mr. 
Florence would smuggle contraband into 
their jails. 
The most pertinent Supreme Court decision, 
Bell v. Wolfish, was decided by a 5-to-4 vote 
in 1979. It allowed strip-searches of people 
held at the Metropolitan Correctional Center 
in New York after "contact visits" with 
outsiders. 
On the one hand, such visits are planned and 
may provide opportunities for smuggling 
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contraband in a way that unanticipated 
arrests do not. On the other, as Judge Marvin 
E. Frankel of Federal District Court in 
Manhattan wrote in the case in 197'7, contact 
visits take place in front of guards. "The 
secreting of objects in rectal or genital areas 
becomes in this situation an imposing 
challenge to nerves and agility," Judge 
Frankel wrote. 
The recent decisions allowing strip-searches 
of all arrestees have said they were 
authorized by the Supreme Court's Bell 
decision. In the Atlanta case, Judge Ed 
Carnes said that new inmates enter facilities 
there after "one big and prolonged contact 
visit with the outside world." 
In Mr. Florence's case, the majority used 
,interesting reasoning to justify routine strip-
searches. 
"It is plausible," Judge Thomas M. 
Hardiman wrote, "that incarcerated persons 
will' induce or recruit others to subject 
themselves to arrest on nonindictable 
offenses to smuggle weapons or other 
contraband into the facility." 
Mr. Florence's lawyer, Susan Chana Lask, 
said that would make' sense if her client were 
"Houdini in reverse"-a master of becoming 
incarcerated 'though blameless, in the hope 
of passing along contraband t6 confederates 
waiting for him inside. 
In his dissent in Mr. Florence's case, Judge 
Louis H. Pollak, a former dean of Yale Law 
School, was also skeptical of the majority's 
theory. "One might doubt," he wrote, "that 
individuals would deliberately commit 
minor offenses such as civil contempt-the 
offense for which Florence was arrested-
and then secrete contraband on their 
persons, all in the hope that they will, at 
some future moment, be arrested and taken 
to jail to make their illicit deliveries." 
In urging the Supreme Court not to hear Mr. 
Florence's case, officials from Burlington 
County, N.J., allowed that "perhaps 
petitioner's frustration is understandable." 
But jails are dangerous places, the brief said. 
"It might even be argued that those arrested 
on nonindictable or other 'minor' offenses 
would be particularly anxious," the brief 
reasoned, to make sure that everyone around 
them was thoroughly searched. 
Mr. Florence)s son has drawn a lesson from 
what he saw from the back seat in 2005. "If 
he sees a cop and we're together," Mr. 
Florence testified in 2006, "he still asks, 
'Daddy, are you going to jail?'" ' 
* * * 
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Smith v. Louisiana 
10-8145 
Ruling Below: State v. Smith, 45 So. 3d 1065 (2010) cert. granted, 10-8145,2011 WL 2297807 
(U.S. June 13,2011). 
Juan Smith was convicted of five murders and sentenced to life in prison in 1995. The results of 
that trial were used in a second trial where Smith was convicted for additional, separate murders 
and sentenced to death. Smith is now arguing that the prosecution in the first trial failed to tum 
over potentially exculpatory evidence to the defense in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court denied Smith post-conviction relief without issuing an opinion. 
Questions Presented: (1) Is there a reasonable probability that, given the cumulative effect of 
the Brady and NapuelGiglio violations in Smith's case, the outcome of the trial would have been 
different? (2) Did the Louisiana state courts ignore fundamental principles of due process in 
rejecting Smith's Brady and NapuelGiglio claims? 
Juan SMITH, Petitioner, 
v. 
Burl CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Respondent. 
No. 10-8145 
October Term, 2010 
December 20, 2010 
On Petition for a Writ of Celiiorari to the Louisiana Supreme Court 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Procedural History 
* * * 
B. Statement of Facts· 
Events Leading Up to Trial 
On February 4, 1995, sometime in the 
evening after 8:00 pm, Tangie Thompson, 
her boyfriend, Andre White and her three-
year-old child were killed in their residence 
on Morrison Road in New Orleans, 
Louisiana. 
Another seemingly unrelated. murder 
occurred on March 1, 1995. On that evening, 
sometime after 8:30 p.m., three armed 
gunmen entered the home of Reba Espadron 
on North Roman Street in New Orleans. Six 
people were ordered by three armed black 
men to lie on the floor. Five people were 
shot multiple times and died as a result. Four 
victims were found inside the home and . 
another was found outside, toward the back 
of the house. One of the victims, Shelita 
Russell, was severely injured but conscious 
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after the attack. She was interviewed by 
police, and this interview was never turned 
over to the defense. Ms; Russell died several 
days after the offense as a result of her 
wounds. 
Reba Espadron and Reginald Harbor, who 
were in a back bedroom of the house during 
the incident, were not injured. Larry Boatner 
also survived-he was not shot, but suffered 
a laceration to his head when one of the 
gunmen struck him on the head when he did 
not comply with the gunman's demands. All 
survivors were interviewed by the New 
Orleans Police Department and provided 
statements detailing the incident. 
Larry Boatner told police that he opened the 
door to the Espadron residence and saw 
three mmed black men get out of a white 
four-door car with a loud muffler and enter 
the Espadron residence. The men demanded 
money, and one man hit Boatner on the 
head. The gunmen made the occupants of 
Espadron's home lie down on the floor and 
then started shooting. In an interview with 
the police, Boatner described the guns used 
by the perpetrators as an AK assault rifle, a 
Tech-Nine handgun, and a silver handgun, 
hqt could not supply any other information 
on the guns or the perpetrators. In fact, 
Boatner told police he was "too scared to 
look at anybody," and thus could not 
provide a more detailed description of the 
assailants. 
Phillip Young also survived the shootings, 
but was identified as one of the perpetrators 
of the shootings because he was unknown to 
Reba Espadron and Larry Boatner. Young 
was shot in the incident and was initially 
unable to give police any information about 
what had OCCUlTed due to his severe injuries. 
Police recovered a beeper from Young, and 
learned the message "187" had been sent to 
Young's beeper from Kintaid Phillips' 
address ShOlily before the murders. 187 is 
the police code used for murder in 
California, and is a commonly used slang 
term for murder. 
Police interviewed Michelle Branch, Phillip 
Young's girlfriend, about her knowledge of 
the Roman Street murders.' The Michelle 
Branch interviews were never disclosed to 
defense counsel. Ms. Branch told police that 
Phillip Young used her car on March 1, 
1995, the day of the Roman Street murders, 
and that Young never returned with her car. 
Ms. Branch described her car as a "light 
yellow" LeBaron which at night "would ' 
look white." Michelle's car "didn't have a 
muffler." Michelle also told police that she 
had received phone calls telling her that 
Kintaid Phillips was driving her car in the 
Calliope Housing Projects after the Roman 
Street shootings. Ms. Branch also told police 
she heard rumors that Kintaid Phillips was 
responsible for the Roman Street murders. 
Pursuant to this information, police 
conducted an extensive police investigation 
into the Roman Street murders, wherein they 
focused their attention on Kintaid Phillips 
and his known associates, including 
Donielle Bannister. However, neither Reba 
Espadron nor Larry Boatner could identify 
anyone from thirteen photographic line-ups 
that included all known associates of 
Phillips and Bannister.' Notably, Juan 
Smith's photograph was never included in 
the photographic line-ups as an associate of 
Phillips and Bannister. Both the Morrison 
Road and Roman Street cases stalled as, 
police could not gather enough evidence to' 
arrest the main suspects in either of the 
cases. 
* * * 
While incarcerated for [ an] attempted 
murder charge, Robeli Trackling shared a 
cell with Eric Rogers at the Orleans Parish 
Prison. On May 19, 1995, Eric Rogers gave 
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a police statement in which he stated that 
Robert Trackling had confessed to Rogers 
about his involvement in the MOlTison Road 
and North Roman Street murders. The State 
never disclosed Trackling's involvement to 
the defense. Trackling was never charged 
with the Roman· Street murders despite his 
own admission' that he committed these 
crimes. Instead, he entered into an 
agreement with Assistant District Attorney 
Rodger Jordan which provided Trackling 
with a very favorable deal in exchange for 
his testimony against Juan Smith in the 
Morrison Road trial. 
Even as the State concealed Tracking's 
involvement in the Roman Street murders, 
New Orleans Police Depmiment Detective 
John Ronquillo developed a photographic 
lineup that included Juan Smith based upon 
Tracking's statement. Detective Ronquillo 
presented the lineup to Reba Espadron, who 
was unable to identify Juan Smith as one of 
the perpetrators. A few days later, on June 7, 
1995, an article appeared in the Times 
Picayune that included a photograph of Mr. 
Smith and Kintaid Phillips, stating they were 
wanted for the Morrison Road murders. 
Police approached Larry Boatner with a 
photographic line-up containing Juan 
Smith's picture. Boatner ultimately 
identified Mr. Smith from the photo line-up, 
but the State failed· to disclose the true 
circumstances that led to Juan Smith's 
identification. 
When Detective Ronquillo approached Mr. 
Boatner with the photographic line-up, Mr. 
Boatner was housed in a psychiatric wm'd at 
Charity Hospital, where he was . being 
treated for alcohol abuse. When Boatner 
. viewed the line-up he knew that the 
suspected perpetrator's photograph was 
included. Boatner told staff at Charity 
Hospital that he heard from friends that 
police had identified the suspected killers in 
the Roman Street murders, but that they 
were not yet in custody. At the time Boatner 
made the statement, only the New Orleans 
Police Department knew Trackling had 
implicated Juan Smith and Kintaid Phillips 
for the crime; Boatner could only have 
learned this information from Espadron, 
who had been previously pressured by 
Detective Ronquillo to identifY Juan Smith 
as one of the perpetrators. Boatner was thus 
pressured to identify someone he knew the 
police believed was responsible. 
The day he made the identification, Boatner 
told medical staff that he felt confused, 
overwhelmed and afraid. He also 
complained that he was being harassed by 
Detective Ronquillo ,to make an 
identification of the Roman Street 
perpetrator. 
* * * 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 
1. There is a Reasonable Probability that the 
. Cumulative Effect of the Brady, Napue and 
Giglio Violations in this Case Would Have 
Changed the Outcome of the Proceedings 
A. The History of Brady Violations III 
Orleans Parish 
* * * 
In the instant case, much like the Corey 
Miller and Shareef Cousin cases, prosecutor 
Roger Jordan conce(j.led important 
eyewitness statements that were clearly 
eXCUlpatory. In Mr. Smith,'s case, the State 
failed to disclose information that the 
testimony of its only eyewitness, Lany 
Boatner, was false and riddled with 
inconsistencies. The State also concealed 
police interviews of several other 
eyewitnesses stating that all of the gunmen 
wore masks, evidence that was inconsistent 
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with Larry Boatner's eyewitness 
identification and subsequent trial 
testimony. In addition, the prosecution 
allowed several other witnesses to testify 
falsely. 
B. The Trial 
* * * 
At trial, Reba Espadron testified that she had 
never seen Juan Smith before and that 
throughout the shooting the only man she 
had seen had his face covered, wore a hat to 
cover his hair, and only revealed his eyes. 
She stated that this gunman was holding a 
"big handgun." 
Detective John Ronquillo testified that on 
June 28, 1995, at around 2:55 p.m., he 
showed Larry Boatner a photographic lineup 
at Charity Hospital. According to Ronquillo, 
he met with Boatner for about fifteen 
minutes. Ronquillo stated he did not force or 
coerce Boatner to make the identification. 
Ronquillo testified that he showed Boatner 
the photographs aIid Boatner reportedly 
immediately picked out Juan Smith's 
photograph. 
On cross-examination, Detective Ronquillo 
agreed that Boatner was the only eyewitness 
to have identified Juan Smith. Ronquillo 
stated that Boatner was supposed to meet 
with him at Reba Espadron's home on June 
3, 1995 to view the line-up, but that Boatner 
didn't show up. Ronquillo denied that 
Boatner ever told him that friends had given 
him information about who might have 
committed the shootings. Ronquillo testified 
that Boatner told him on June 28, 1995, that 
he had seen Juan Smith's photograph in the 
newspaper. Ronquillo believed it was the 
June 4th Times Picayune. 
Larry Boatner was the only witness who 
could testify that Juan Smith was one of the 
armed men responsible for the killings at 
Roman Street. During the trial, Boatner 
testified that he was· at the house on March 
1, 1995. According to Boatner, Juan Smith 
was the first man to enter the home, and 
Boatner was positive that Mr. Smith was not 
wearing a mask. Boatner testified that Juan 
Smith was face-to-face with him while Mr. 
Smith held a gun to Boatner's head. He 
stated that he definitely saw Juan Smith's 
face. Boatner stated that Mr. Smith ordered 
him to get on the floor. When asked about 
one of the other men who had a AK -47, 
Boatner did not know whether that other 
man was wearing a mask or not. 
Boatner said he checked himself into 
Charity Hospital to stop drinking on June 
26, 1995. While at Charity Hospital, Boatner 
met wi~h Detective John Ronquillo and one 
'of the nursing staff members. Boatner 
claimed that Detective Ronquillo showed 
him a line-up and that he immediately 
picked Juan Smith, claiming "I'll never 
forget Juan's face, never." In the courtroom, 
Boatner then identified Juan Smith as the 
man who put a .9mm to his head, stating, 
"like I say, I'll never forget him." Boatner 
also stated that the armed gunman had a 
mouth full of gold. 
On cross-examination, Boatner stated that he 
had told the police on March 1 st "how his 
hair was and I told him about the golds in 
his mouth." He also recalled that the 
gunman was heavy set. Boatner admitted 
that in the photographic line-up he could not 
see any gold in Mr. Smith's teeth. 
* * * 
. C. Post-Conviction Evidentiary Hearings 
* * * 
[During evidentiary hearings on Petitioner's 
Brady, Napue, and Giglio claims] Frank 
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Larre, Mr. Smith's trial lawyer, was shown 
Petitioner's Exhibit 1 (in globo documents 
obtained from the District Attorney's file in 
Mr. Smith's case) as well as Petitioner's 
Exhibit 2 (in globo documents obtained 
from the New Orleans Police Depatiment). 
Mr. Larre testified that he was not provided 
these documents prior to or at any time 
during the trial. 
a. Eyewitnesses Dale Mims and Shelita 
Russell 
Mr. Larre testified he was never given a 
police interview of eyewitness Dale-Mims in 
which Mims stated that on the night of the 
offense he heard multiple shotgun blasts and 
then saw four black males wearing masks 
and carrying rifles drive away in a white 
four-door Buick Oldsmobile car. Mr. Larre 
stated that he could have used this interview 
to impeach Larry Boatner's testimony that 
the men were not wearing masks and that he 
was hit with a handgun. 
On January 13, 2009, the State called Dale 
Mims as a witness. Mr. Mims testified that 
immediately after hearing gunfire he saw 
two men run out of Reba Espadron's home 
and get into a four-door white car. The car 
then passed in front of Mr. Mims' house and 
he saw three men inside it. He further 
testified that at least two or maybe all three 
men were wearing masks when they exited 
the home. 
On cross examination Mr. Mims gave 
further details of what he recalled-that he 
saw two men o'utside and when they passed 
his house there were three men: 
Q. There were three? 
A. Yes. Like I said, the AKA'S 
stopped shooting. I saw the two 
guys, one on either side with the 
guns get in the car. Then I heard the 
twelve gauge going off in the 
background. 
The defense called Detective Ronquillo to 
testify regarding his interview with Dale 
Mims shortly after the shooting. According 
to Ronquillo, Mims told him all of the men 
were wearing ski masks and carrying rifles. 
He couldn't see any of the men's faces. 
Defense counsel also testified he was never 
given a police interview of another 
eyewitnesses, Shelita Russell, who died later 
at the hospital. Ms. Russell told the police at 
the crime scene that she was in the kitchen 
and that the first gunmen who entered the 
house had a black cloth across his face. Mr. 
Larre testified that he could have used Ms. 
Russell's statement to impeach Larry 
Boatner's testimony that Juan Smith was not 
wearing a mask after identifying him as the 
first person through the door. 
b. Larry Boatner's Prior Inconsistent 
Statements to Police 
Mr. Frank Larre testified that the State never 
provided him with multiple statements Larry 
Boatner made to police, many of which 
contradict his testimony at trial. Specifically; 
the State never disclosed a statement made 
the night of the murders that he could not 
"supply a description of the perpetrators 
other than they were black males"; his next 
statement that he was "too scared to look at 
anybody"; and his pretrial statement that he 
could not identify any of the weapons other 
than to state they were an "AK type assault 
rifle, one Tech nine type handgun, and a 
silver colored handgun.'; 
Mr. Larre also testified as to how he would 
have used these undisclosed police 
interviews to suppOli Mr. Smith's defense 
during his trial: 
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Well, it would have totally 
contradicted what Mr. Boatner was 
testifying to under my cross 
examination. It certainly was a 
previous statement that is 
inconsistent to what he was saying in 
court. It would have been very, very 
exculpatory: 
c. Circumstances Surrounding Boatner's 
Identification of Petitioner 
On January 13, 2009, Frank Larre testified 
that he was unaware that Larry Boatner was 
being harassed by an NOPD Detective into 
making identification in the Roman Street 
case, as indicated by notes in Boatner's 
Charity Hospital records. 
When Mr. Larre was questioned about how 
this information might have changed his 
actions at trial, he stated that he would have 
attempted to locate witnesses mentioned in 
the records, and, if unsuccessful, would have 
attempted to introduce the Charity Hospital 
records as "defense evidence showing that 
the police had reports indicating that there 
were claims of police harassment to identify 
the witness." 
Petitioner called Janie Mills as a witness on 
January 14, 2009. At the time Larry Boatner 
identified Mr. Smith, Ms. Mills was a 
Psychiatric Technician at Charity Hospital 
on the floor which housed Mr. Boatner. Ms. 
Mills reviewed Mr. Boatner's medical 
records and was able to identify the 
handwriting and signature of the individual 
who stated that Mr. Boatner was "being 
harassed by an NOPD Detective Steve 
Ruffilo to identify a suspected perpetrator or 
perpetrators that were allegedly involved in 
shooting incident last March." Ms. Mills 
identified the individual as social worker 
Anna Blossom. She further testified that Ms. 
Blossom is now deceased. 
d. Additional Evidence that Larry Boatner 
Testified Falsely at Petitioner's Trial 
At trial, Larry Boatner testified that he saw 
Juan Smith's photograph on June 7, 1995, 
on the front page of the Times-Picayune and 
recognized him as one of the assailants. That 
testimony bolstered his later identification of 
Mr. Smith from a photographic lineup. 
Detective Ronquillo'S notes and testimony 
showed that Mr. Boatner claimed to have 
seen Mr. Smith's photograph on June 4, 
1995. Ronquillo also confirmed that Reba 
Espadron told him on June 10, 1995, that 
when she last spoke to Mr. Boatner on June 
4,1995, he told her the same thing. In fact 
Mr. Smith's photograph did not appear in 
the newspaper until June 7, 1995, three days 
after Mr. Boatner claimed he saw it. 
In the hearing, Mr. Boatner testified that he 
gave police a height and weight description 
of the man he alleged was Mr. Smith. 
During the. trial, however, Detective 
Ronquillo testified at the trial that he never 
gave a height or weight description he was 
focused on the gun. Moreover, Detective 
Archie Kaufman agreed that Boatner never 
gave any description of height or weight. 
Amazingly, Mr. Boatner testified at the 
hearing that there may have been only two 
men in the house. "I don't know how many 
people was in there. But, I know at that time 
it was two, for sure, like I said. It was Juan 
. and someone else." In all of his police 
interviews and at trial he testified to and 
described three men. 
e. The Confession of Robeii Trackling 
On January 13, 2009, Petitioner called Eric 
Rogers, a cellmate of Robert Trackling, to 
whom Trackling confessed about his 
participation in Roman Street. Rogers 
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testified that after Trackling confessed to 
him, Rogers made a statement to Detective 
Byron Adams of the NOPD. Rogers stated 
that before he gave his official, tape-
recorded statement, he was informally 
interviewed by Detective Adams. In this 
informal, unrecorded statement, Rogers 
testified that he told police "Trackling told 
me that him, Banister [sic], and McGee [sic] 
had committed the crime." In fact, Rogers 
stated that Trackling never mentioned Juan 
Smith in his confession, nor did Trackling 
tell Rogers that Short Dog was Juan Smith. 
According to Rogers, after he gave police 
this initial statement, Detective Adams 
indicated that Juan Smith was involved in 
the Roman Street incident and asked Rogers 
to implicate Mr. Smith .... 
Rogers further testified that the first time he 
had heard the name Juan Smith or Short Dog 
was from Detective Adams, and that he did 
not know either Juan Smith or Short Dog. 
Nevertheless, because Detective Adams 
offered Eric Rogers a reduced sentence in 
his own offense, Rogers gave police a 
statement that implicated Short Dog in the 
Roman Street murders. Rogers testified that 
he was never interviewed by Juan Smith's 
lawyer about his knowledge of the Roman 
Street incident. 
Frank Larre was called by Petitioner on 
January 13, 2009, and testified that the State 
had not informed him that Robert Trac1ding 
had confessed to Eric Rogers about his 
participation in Roman Street. Mr. Larre 
frniher testified as to how he would have 
used Trackling's confession to further his 
defense of Mr. Smith: 
Well, I could use it to show that 
some people said there were four 
people, that there was a chaos going 
on and nobody really knew what' 
happened, especially since we have 
witnesses that said that they had 
masks on their faces. And, 
obviously, since this guy' has 
confessed, I would suggest that he 
would know who was in the car and 
who did the shooting, and he denies 
that it was Short Dog. 
Moreover, Mr. Larre "would have used it for 
impeachment in cross examination." 
f. Phillip Young's Improved Medical 
Condition 
On January 13, 2009, Petitioner called 
Barbara Riley, the head nurse at the Rehab 
Institute of New Orleans at the time when 
Phillip Young was receiving treatment at 
that facility after the Roman Street incident. 
Mrs. Riley remembered Phillip Young, and 
testified that Young "did not speak" but was 
able to communicate by shaking his head 
yes or no when asked questions. When 
questioned by the State about whether 
Young suffered from amnesia, Ms. Riley 
responded, "No, I recollect aphasia, a lack of 
speech." 
* * * 
On January 22, 2009, Petitioner called 
Detective John Ronquillo, who verified that 
he interviewed Phillip Young at the Rehab 
Institute of New Orieans. Petitioner 
presented handwritten notes to Detective 
Ronquillo, which Ronquillo confirmed he 
had written c1.uring the course of the 
interview .... 
Mr. Larre testified that he was never 
provided . with Detective Ronquillo's notes 
regarding his interview with Phillip Young 
during which Young indicated that Short 
Dog was not responsible and did not go to 
the house on the night of the offense. Mr. 
Larre then described that he would have 
used this information as indicating that an 
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admitted participant in the offense "[ d] enies 
that Short Dog, who was alleged to have 
been my client, participated in the robbery 
and murder and did not shoot him." 
In the instant case, the sum of the Brady and 
Napue/Giglio violations completely changes 
the lens through which the State's case 
against Mr. Smith can be viewed. In light of 
the Brady evidence, Larry Boatner's 
testimony, which provided the only evidence 
linking Mr. Smith to the. murders, is· 
untrustwOlihy and unreliable. Not only is 
Boatner's· testimony refuted by his own 
undisclosed previous statements to police, 
but it is also impeached by other undisclosed 
eyewitness statements. FUliher, the 
suppressed evidence establishes that Phillip 
Young, an alleged perpetrator in the offense, 
asserted that Petitioner was not involved in 
the offense. In withholding this information 
from defense counsel, the State prevented 
the defense from subjecting its case against 
Mr. Smith to any meaningful adversarial 
treatment. Because the suppressed evidence 
was material and prevented the jury from 
fully evaluating the integrity of the state's 
case, Mr. Smith's conviction is unreliable 
and should be reversed. 
II .. The Louisiana State Coulis Ignored 
Fundamental Principles of Due Process in 
Rejecting Smith's Brady and Napue/Giglio 
Claims 
In the thirty years after Mooney v. Holohan, 
294 U.S. 103 (1935)(per curiam), this Court 
. identified an important class of due process 
rights now commonly referred to as the 
Brady doctrine. This series of cases has 
uniformly condemned the prosecution's 
presentation of evidence that is false, that is 
known to create a false impression, as well 
as the suppression of evidence that IS 
favorable or exculpatory to the defense. 
* * * 
The Louisiana state courts have abdicated 
their responsibility in failing to address the 
. due process violations present in Petitioner's 
case. After Petitioner's state post-conviction 
petition was filed, four days of evidentiary 
hearings were held at the order of the trial 
court judge. During the evidentiary hearings, 
Petitioner was able to present for the first 
time celiain favorable evidence that· the 
prosecution never disclosed either before or 
during trial. Despite this, the trial court 
orally issued its ruling denying relief at the 
close of the fOUlih day: 
BY THE COURT: I am ready to rule 
in the case. I don't have to take any 
time for this. I have been listening to 
this for quite a while. I am denying 
post-conviction relief. 
The FOUlih Circuit Court of Appeal and the 
Louisiana Supreme Court both declined to 
review Petitioner's claims. All three state 
courts denied Petitioner . relief without 
making any factual findings or providing 
any reasons for their ruling. As a result, the 
suppressed evidence that Petitioner 
presented has· never received meaningful 
consideration by the Louisiana state cOUlis. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, Mr. 
Smith respectfully moves the Court to grant 
review of this matter and reverse Mr. 
Smith's conviction. 
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STATEMENT 
The Petitioner seeks to overturn convictions 
of five counts of first degree murder based 
on allegations that the state courts 
disregarded this Court's decisions in Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Napue v. 
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), and Giglio v. 
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), when 
they denied. his application for state post 
conviction relief. He points to particular 
incidences of purported evidence 
suppression as the factual basis for his 
claims, the aggregation of which he suggests 
warrants the vacating of his convictions. He 
bolsters this suggestion with a proposition 
that any conviction out of the Orleans Parish 
District Attorney's Office mandates 
reversal, particularly if a specific assistant 
district attorney formerly employed with the 
office tried the case. However, the 
Petitioner's suggestions are unsubstantiated, 
and the mere aggregation of individually 
meritless suggestions cannot prove, as the 
Petitioner claims, a cognizable violation of 
Brady, Napue, or Giglio. 
The Petitioner argues that this Court should 
grant his Petition fora Writ of Certiorari 
because the state courts summarily denied 
his applications for relief. However, the state 
district judge, who presided over the 
Petitioner's trial; heard from ten witnesses 
over a four day post-conviction hearing and 
found, as a matter of law, that the Petitioner 
failed to meet his burden of proving that his 
convictions were obtained in violation of the 
Constitution of the United States. Further, 
although the Petitioner claims that the 
Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal 
and the Louisiana Supreme Court "declined 
to review [his] claims," in fact, those courts 
did review, and summarily deni~d, his 
applications for supervisory review, which 
were appended with copies of the relevant 
transcripts and exhibits. Considering the 
unmeritorious nature of the Petitioner's 
claims, the decisions of the state courts are 
reasonable applications of decisions of this 
Court and consistent with the usual course 
of judicial proceedings. As such, the instant 
petition should be denied. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
[The Court recounted the entry of the 
gunmen, the orders to lie on the floor, and 
the shooting.] 
. . . [When officers arrived,] Phillip Young, 
one of the assailants, who was conscious but 
unable to move, was lying face down in the 
living room with Robert Simon lying 
partially on top of him. When emergency 
medical personnel arrived, they rolled 
Robert Simon's body off of Phillip Young, 
who was clutching a .25 caliber pistol in his 
left hand. The EMS personnel pried the 
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loaded and cocked weapon from Young's 
grip. As the officers secured the premises, 
they found Larry Boatner in: the bathroom. 
He had not been shot bl1-t was suffering from 
a severe head laceration. Officers Narcisse 
and Lavasseur discovered the body of Ian 
Jackson in the alley. 
. . . Detective Ronquillo presented a 
photographic lineup to Larry Boatner from 
which Boatner identified Juan Smith as one 
of the assailants. 
REASONS 
PETITION 
* * * 
FOR DENYING THE 
The Petitioner claims that this Court should 
grant his Petition, for a Writ of Certiorari 
because (1) the state courts summarily 
denied his applications for relief, which, 
petitioner appears to contend, is inconsistent 
with' the usual course of judicial 
proceedings; (2) the State withheld material 
information in violation of this Court's 
holding in Brqdy v. Maryland; and (3) 
prosecutors knowingly permitted Larry 
Boatner to testify falsely at trial, in violation 
of his due process rights. 
I. The state courts' determinations were a 
result of accepted ,and usual course of 
judicial proceedings. 
Petitioner is aggrieved because the state 
district judge "orally denied relief . . . 
without issuing a written opinion, making 
any factual findings, or providing any 
reasons for [his] ruling." However, the state 
district judge, who presided o'ver the 
Petitioner's trial, heard from ten witnesses 
over a four-day post-conviction hearing and 
found, as a matter of law, that the Petitioner 
failed to meet his burden of proving that his 
convictions were obtained in violation of the 
Constitution of the United States. Further, 
although the Petitioner claims that the 
Louisiana Fourth Circuit COUliof Appeal, 
and the Louisiana Supreme Court "declined 
to review [his] claims" in fact, those courts 
did review, and summarily denied, his 
applications for supervisory review, which 
were appended with copies of the relevant 
transcripts and exhibits. 
The rules of the Supreme Court of Louisiana 
and the Louisiana Courts of Appeal provide 
that a grant or denial of an application for 
writs at the higher state courts rests within 
the judicial discretion of the courts, which 
may act peremptorily on an application. This 
Court has recently noted, in the context of 
federal habeas petitioners, that every federal 
Court of Appeals has recognized that 
"determining whether a state corui's 
decision resulted from an unreasonable legal 
or factual conclusion does not require that 
there be an opinion from the state court 
explaining the state cOUli's reasoning." 
Accordingly, the summary denial of the 
Petitioner's state court applications cannot 
be said to be inconsistent with the usual 
course of judicial proceedings. 
II. The Petitioner's state post conviction 
application was properly denied because the 
Petitioner failed' to meet his burden of 
proving that his conviction was obtained in 
violation of Brady v. Maryland and its 
progeny. 
The Petitioner's claims that the State 
withheld evidence seem to fall into three 
categories: (1) the withholding of evidence 
regarding eyewitness identification; (2) the 
withholding of evidence of Phillip Young's 
improved medical condition; and (3) the 
withholding of evidence regarding Robert 
Trackling's involvement in the murders. 
Initially, the Petitioner fails to demonstrate 
"a reasonable probability that, had the 
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evidence been disclosed to the defense, the 
result of the proceeding would have been 
different. Further, viewing the undisclosed 
evidence collectively, the Petitioner cannot 
prove a Brady violation by the mere 
aggregation of individually meritless claims. 
To prevail on a Brady claim, a petitioner 
must show that (1) the prosecution 
suppressed or withheld evidence that was (2) 
favorable to the accused and (3) material to 
either guilt or punishment; and although the 
Brady doctrine mandates disclosure of 
certain evidence, it does not require the 
prosecution to open its files to the defense. 
However, the mere possibility that 
undisclosed information might have helped 
the defense or affected the outcome does not 
establish the materiality of that information. 
Rather, undisclosed information is material 
only where the nondisclosure deprives the 
defendant of a fair trial. As this Court has 
stated, "[E]vidence is material only if there 
is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the 
result of the proceeding would have been 
different." A "reasonable probability" is a 
probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome. 
A. Withholding of Evidence Regarding 
Eyewitness Identifications 
i. Evidence Allegedly Undermining the 
Credibility of Larry Boatner 
The Petitioner claims that prosecutors 
withheld favorable evidence that, if 
disclosed before trial, could have been used 
to undermine the credibility and reliability 
of Lany Boatner's photographic and in court 
identifications of the petitioner as the 
shooter. ... 
* * * 
Aside from merely recording ... contentions 
and highlighting his trial counsel's post-
conviction testimony that he was not 
provided with any of the information in 
question, the Petitioner makes no attempt to 
argue the materiality of the complained-of 
discrepancies or to articulate specifically 
how the State's disclosure of the withheld 
documents would have created a reasonable 
probability of a different verdict. Instead, the 
petitioner merely notes that Boatner was the 
only eyewitness to the crime and 
conclusorily presumes that Boatner's trial 
testimony would somehow have been 
"impeached" and "refuted" had the jury 
been presented with such discrepancies, 
leaving entirely to the imagination the form 
that such impeachment and refutation would 
take. Nevertheless, a· review of the 
. petitioner's contentions, when measured 
against the facts of the case, exposes the 
fatal flaws present in argument that would 
might tend to suppOli them. 
a. Boatner's statement to Detective 
Ronquillo on the night of the incident that he 
could not supply a description of the 
shooters 
. First, the Petitioner contends that Lany 
Boatner provided a statement to Detective 
Archie Kauffman that indicated that Boatner 
could not describe any of the perpetrators. 
Subsequently, however, Boatner gave a 
statement . . . that Boatner "could not 
describe any of the subjects, other than the 
subject who put the gun. in his face," who 
had "golds in his mouth," and whom he in 
fact later identified as the Petitioner. 
The non-disclosure of this first statement, 
petitioner alleges, rises to the level of a 
Brady violation. However while testifying 
during the post-conviction hearing, 
Detective Ronquillo stated that, while 
Boatner had initially told him that he could 
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not describe any of the perpetrators except 
that they were black males, Boatner later 
gave a formal recorded statement in which 
he told Detective Kaufman: "I can tell you 
about one [of the subj ects], the one who put 
the pistol in my face." Although Boatner 
emphasized that he could only describe that 
one subject, he noted that the subject had 
gold teeth. Boatner' s description very 
closely matched that of the Petitioner. 
Ronquillo attributed Boatner's initial 
reluctance to provide a description to his 
being "shook up" after the incident, . . . 
Ronquillo noted, however, the accurate 
description of the Petitioner Boatner had 
earlier provided. Accordingly, the State's 
disclosure of Detective Ronquillo'S 
supplemental report would not have served 
to impeach the credibility of Larry Boatner's 
identification in that regard. 
b. Boatner's statement to Detective 
Ronquillo that he had been too scared to 
look at anyone during the incident 
Second, the Petitioner represents to this 
Court that Boatner initially told Detective 
Kaufman that he had been too scared to look 
at anybody during the incident. Contrary to 
the petitioner's mistaken reading of 
Boatner's statement to Kaufman, Boatner 
clearly indicated that he was too scared to 
look at anybody after he and the other 
victims had been ordered to the floor, which 
does . not conflict with his statement and 
testimony that he was able to see and 
describe the petitioner prior to that moment. 
Moreover, Boatner indicated that he was too 
scared· to look at any of the perpetrators 
other than the petitioner, whom he 
encountered unexpectedly after opening the 
front door and whose face he therefore could 
not help seeing. These statements are 
entirely consistent with Boatner's post-
conviction testimony, in which he explained 
that he closed his eyes after being ordered to 
the floor by the petitioner, and that he did 
not open them "until the gunshots." 
Therefore, because Boatner's statements and 
testimony were consistent, non-disclosure of 
the statements did not violate Brady. 
c. Boatner's pre-trial statement that he could 
not identify any of the weapons used 
Third, the Petitioner's argument regarding 
Boatner's description of the weapons used 
during the crime also bears no fruit. Boatner 
consistently described the petitioner as 
carrying a handgun. In fact, at trial Boatner 
testified, consistent with his police 
statement, that the .9 mm gun the petitioner 
carried was "a silver gun." When asked 
whether it was a handgun, Boatner replied 
affirmatively. He confirmed that fact on 
. cross-examination at the post-conviction 
hearing, stating that the gun in the 
petitioner's hand was "a nine millimeter 
chrome." 
d. Charity Hospital records documenting 
Boatner's complaint that he was being 
harassed by a detective 
Fourth, the Petitioner alleges that Boatner's 
undisclosed Charity Hospital records show 
that his photographic identification of the 
Petitioner as a perpetrator was the product of 
"harassment" by Detective Ronquillo earlier 
that morning, and thus was unduly 
suggestive and/or unreliable. However, he 
provides no factual or legal support for his 
unwarranted inferential leap that any 
possible harassment by Detective Ronquillo 
in some way rendered Boatner's 
identification of the petitioner unduly 
suggestive or otherwise affected its 
reliability. He does not so much as specify 
the nature of the supposed harassment as it 
pe1iained to Boatner's eventual 
identification. 
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At the pre-trial hearing on a motion to 
suppress Boatner's identification, Boatner 
himself testified that Detective Ronquillo 
neither forced nor coerced him to make an 
identification, nor promised him anything in 
exchange for his identification, nor 
suggested that he select the petitioner. 
Hearing that testimony, the trial judge 
denied the motion to suppress. 
Subsequently, at the post-conviction 
hearing, Boatner reiterated that testimony 
and reaffirmed that he was not .visited by 
detectives prior to the date ort which he 
made his identification. Janie Mills, the 
psychiatric aid who tended to Boatner 
during his stay at Charity, also testified at 
the pre-trial motion hearing, as. a defense 
. witness, that Detective Ronquillo did not 
suggest to Boatner whom he should select 
from the photographic arrays. She further 
testified at the post-conviction hearing that 
Boatner did not appear to be distressed 
while talking to detectives during his 
identification. Detective Ronquillo testified 
at the post-conviction hearing that he had no 
recollection of visiting Boatner in the 
. hospital prior to the date and time he made 
his identification of the petitioner. 
e. Unidentified records allegedly 
demonstrating that Boatner knew that police 
had already identified the petitioner as a 
perpetrator of the North Roman Street 
murders 
Fifth, the Petitioner alleges that, contrary to 
his testimony at trial, Boatner made 
statements to both Espadron and Detective 
Ronquillo that he observed a pil)ture of the 
petitioner in The Times-Picayune on June 4, 
1995, when in fact that picture did not 
appeal' in the paper until June 7, 1995. It is 
true that the picture did not appear until June 
7, 1995. It is also true that Mr. Boatner. 
testified accurately and truthfully at trial that 
he observed the picture in the paper on June 
7, 1995. The significance, if any, of this 
discrepancy is unclear, and the petitioner 
makes no effort to illuminate it. To the 
extent it might have served to call into 
question the credibility of Boatner as a 
factual witness, it is to be remembered that, 
to a man who narrowly escaped a brutal 
assault that left five of his friends dead, a 
date would likely be· an inconsequential 
detail in the face of once again being 
confronted with the image of the man who 
very nearly took his life. Nevertheless, it 
was for a jury to judge Boatner's total 
credibility, and nothing about his minor 
discrepancy as to dates would hCj.ve 
undermined confidence in the outcome of 
the proceedings. Thus, the unidentified 
records allegedly memorializing this 
discrepancy were not subject to Brady. 
f. Shelita Russell's pre-death statement that 
the first gunman who entered the house 
(identified by Boatner as the petitioner) 
wore a mask 
Sixth, the Petitioner argues that information 
in a "daily" entry in Detective Ronquillo'S 
supplemental police report noting Shelita 
Russell's purported pre-death statement that 
the first subject who entered the North 
Roman Street residence had a black cloth 
across his face, would contradict Larry 
Boatner's trial and post-conviction 
testimony that the petitioner-who he 
maintains was the first perpetrator to enter-
did not have his face covered. The notation 
in question reads, "Said-in kitchen saw 
people barge in-one-black color across 
face-first one through door-[No fmiher 
statement]." The petitioner's trial counsel 
testified at the post-conviction hearing that 
had he been provided with Russell's 
statement he would have used it to 
"reinforce the fact that Mr. Boatner could 
not have identified anyone," thus 
undermining his identification of the 
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petitioner. However, even if favorable, the 
petitioner fails to demonstrate the 
materiality of Russell's statement. Had the 
trial court admitted Russell's statement, the 
petitioner must still show a reasonable 
probability that its admission would have 
served to discredit Boatner's testimony 
regarding the petitioner's appearance to such 
an extent that confidence in the outcome. 
would be undermined. 
. .. The jury could easily have taken into 
account that Boatner was in immediate 
proximity to the petitioner-unlike Russell, 
who was cowering in a room at the back of 
the house-when he entered the residence 
and that the face of co-perpetrator Phillip 
Young, who was left severely injured inside 
the house, was not covered. Thus, the 
petitioner cannot demonstrate a reasonable 
probability that the admission of Shelita 
Russell's undisclosed statement would have 
. resulted in the jury's discrediting Boatner's 
testimony. 
g. Statements by Reba Espadron and 
neighbor Dale Minis to investigators 
Seventh, the petitioner alleges that 
undisclosed police and newspaper reports 
show that Reba Espadron and neighbor Dale 
Mims gave statements to police that they 
observed four masked gunmen enter the 
North Roman Street residence, which 
contradicts LaITY Boatner's testimony that 
three unmasked men perpetrated the crime. 
* * * 
. . . [Mims] told Detective Ronquillo that he 
heard shots and looked out his front door, 
whereupon he saw three black males armed 
with AK-47s exit 2230 North Roman (where 
the murders OCCUlTed), get into a white 4-
door Buick and drive off. He then heard a 
shotgun blast and saw a fourth subject get 
into another vehicle and also leave the 
scene. Mims stated that all four men were 
wearing ski masks covering their faces. At 
the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, 
Mims testified similarly, but acknowledged 
that one of the three men he saw exiting the 
house did not have a mask. He also admitted 
that he did not see the men in question aITive 
at or enter 2230 North Roman, nor did he 
see them inside the residence. He also 
recalled that the men wearing masks 
removed them after they entered the Buick. 
Detective Ronquillo's notes indicate that 
Reba Espadron told Detective James Stewart 
that" she observed only one of the 
perpetrators, whom she described as being 5' 
6" tall and slim with a "thing around his 
face." At the petitioner's trial she testified 
accordingly and further described him as 
canying a "big gun" that he held with two 
hands. Ronquillo testified at the post-
conviction hearing that the physical 
description provided by Espadron did not 
match the petitioner. Moreover, the gun 
caITied by the perpetrator who confronted 
Espadron (most likely the AK-47) was 
clearly not a handgun, as was caITied by the 
petitioner. 
Mims' and Espadron's undisclosed 
statements would not have served to 
impeach the trial testimony of LaITY Boatner 
or his identification of the petitioner. Mims 
confirmed that he did not see the subjects he 
described at any time before or during their 
entrance into 2230 North Roman, and thus 
would not have been able to testify as to 
whether their faces were covered when 
Boatner first encountered them. He further 
. stated that one of the men may not have 
been masked at all. Espadron described a 
subject that was clearly not the petitioner, 
who Boatner testified was the only 
perpetrator whose face he observed. Her 
statement thus does not undermine his 
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identification. Therefore, the petitioner 
cannot show that the undisclosed statements 
of Dale Mims or Reba Espadron would have 
aided him at trial. 
B. Evidence of Phillip Young's Improved 
Medical Condition 
The petitioner claims that prosecutors 
withheld material evidence from the 
defense-namely Detective Ronquillo'S 
supplemental report and "daily" notes 
indicating that he interviewed Phillip Young 
in Charity Hospital following the shooting-
that would have demonstrated the 
petitioner's innocence and therefore cast the 
State's trial evidence in a different light. He 
further notes that- the evidence regarding 
Young's improved medical condition and 
the statements made by him contradict 
Ronquillo's testimony and the prosecution's 
statement to the jury that Young was in a 
vegetative state and unable to communicate. 
These allegations are spurious. 
First, the petitioner was well aware of 
Young's medical condition throughout the 
proceedings. Young was in fact a co-
perpetrator of the North Roman Street 
murders and was charged in the same 
indictment as the petitioner. In fact, on 
October 19, 1995-barely a month after the 
petitioner was arraigned-the court ruled 
Young irrestorably incompetent, finding that 
he "will never be able to assist his counsel in 
trial due to perminent [sic] brain damage." 
Second, Ronquillo'S notes regarding 
Young's condition do not conflict with his 
trial testimony. In fact, in response to. the 
prosecutor's very first question on the issue, 
Ronquillo confirmed that he had indeed 
spoken to Young at Charity Hospital. The 
prosecutor even admonished Ronquillo in 
his questioning, in light of the hearsay rule, 
not to "say what [Young] said if he said 
anything to you." This open court colloquy 
hardly evidences a prosecutorial conspiracy 
to conceal from the jury the fact that Young 
could in fact communicate. Moreover, 
Ronquillo's testimony that Young could not 
speak much and could only use his left hand 
. did not conflict with his undisclosed notes; 
rather, his notes corroborate that testimony 
almost word-for-word. Furthermore, 
Ronquillo's statement at trial that he 
couldn't understand. anything· that Young 
was saying did not refer to Young's inabillty 
to communicate at all, merely-when 
presented in the context of the colloquy as a 
whole-to his ability to communicate 
verbally, which inability is acknowledged 
even by the petitioner. The statement also 
reflects Ronquillo'S own subjective 
impression of Young's communicative 
ability and, as such, is not an allegation of 
objective fact that could be empirically 
contradicted by the undisclosed report. 
In any event, even if Young's "statements" 
had been disclosed ahd admissible at trial-· 
despite their constituting hearsay-they 
would not have served to undermine 
confidence in the jury's verdict. Detective 
Ronquillo testified at the post-conviction 
hearing that he disavowed Young's 
statements because he was uncertain as to 
whether they even had any substance. As 
noted above, the jury would have been free 
to consider the fact, as prosecutors would no 
doubt have emphasized, that Young was a 
known associate and co-defendant of the 
petitioner, as well as the inherent bias that 
accompanied that relationship. This was 
corroborated by Ronquillo'S post-conviction 
testimony that "the whole nature of 
[Young's] behavior and how he answered 
questions changed" when he found out 
Ronquillo was a homicide detective. Young 
could also reasonably fear that the 
petitioner-who had just murdered five 
people in cold blood-would not hesitate to 
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do the same· to him if he "snitched." 
Accordingly, Young had every incentive in 
the world to deny the petitioner's 
involvement in the killings or in his 
wounding, even if he could not deny his 
own presence on the scene. Therefore, the 
petitioner cannot show that there was a 
reasonable probability that confidence in the 
outcome would have been undermined. 
Relatedly, Young had a corresponding 
incentive to blame his injuries on one of the 
occupants of the house. However, the jury 
would also have been free to consider that 
the .25 calibre handgun that the petitioner· 
ascribes to Robert Simons was found by 
police clutched in Young's hand and would 
have been reasonable in finding it unlikely 
that Young had somehow managed to grab 
the gun from Simons after having essentially 
been rendered paralyzed and unconscious by 
the shot to his head. Even if established, 
however, the fact that Simons may have shot 
Young would not have served to exonerate 
the petitioner. Finally, the statements by 
Young that do not exculpate the petitioner-
"drove in car", "girlfriend's carlO-are of no 
real evidentiary value. 
Finally, while .the petitioner argues that the 
undisclosed evidence, even if not admissible 
itself, constitutes Brady material because it 
could have led to the discovery of 
admissible evidence favorable to the 
defense, he fails even to speculate what 
additional evidence could have been 
discovered to exculpate him based on the 
disclosure thereof. Detective Ronquillo was 
examjned at length during the post-
conviction hearing about numerous other 
leads and suspects in the North Roman 
Street murders and testified that through 
investigation he was able to' eliminate 
everyone but the petitioner as a confirmed 
perpetrator. Confronted with that testimony 
at trial, the jury would have been reasonable 
in discrediting any "alternative suspect" 
theory that the disclosure of Young's 
hospital statements may have engendered. 
The only evidence of how the defense would 
have used Young's statements was offered 
by the petitioner's trial counsel, who 
testified at the post-conviction hearing that 
he would have attempted to locate Young 01', 
in the alternative, to introduce Ronquillo's 
notes as evidence of police harassment of 
Young to make an identification. However, 
Young's whereabouts throughout the 
proceedings-especially after his remand to 
the state forensic facility-were hardly a 
secret and counsel could easily have visited 
and attempted to interview him with 
minimal diligence. Finally, as Young never 
identified any of the alleged actual 
perpetrators, any evidence as to police 
"harassment" to that end would have been 
entirely irrelevant. 
The petitioner has utterly failed. to 
demonstrate the materiality of the 
undisclosed notes regarding Phillip Young's 
improved medical condition and his 
"statements" to Detective Ronquillo. 
C. Evidence Regarding Robert Trackling's 
Involvement in the Murders 
The petitioner alleges that prosecutors 
withheld material evidence of Rob eli 
Traclding's confession to having 
participated in the North Roman Street 
murders and his implication of Donielle 
Bannister therein. . . . The petitioner cites 
[Eric Rogers' post-conviction testimony 
regarding Trackling's prison cell confession] 
as material evidence that directly exculpates 
him from the North Roman Street murders. 
The second piece of undisclosed information 
involves a June 1, 1995, interview between 
Detective Adams and Trackling relating to. 
his involvement in the Morrison Road 
160 
murders, during which Trackling identified 
the petitioner from a photographic lineup as 
"Short Dog" and implicated him in the 
Morrison Road murders. The petitioner 
notes with suspicion the timing of Adams' 
interview with Trackling . . . and the fact 
that Trackling was not asked about his role 
in the North Roman Street murders, despite 
the infOlmation learned from Rogers. He 
further points to a notation entry in 
Detective Ronquillo's supplemental report 
stating that Adams had interviewed 
Trackling and that Trackling had denied 
being involved in the North Roman Street 
murders, which he contrasts with the fact 
that Adams did not, as far as is known, ask 
Trackling about North Roman Street. The 
petitioner surmises that this proves the 
existence of an as-of-yet undisclosed 
interview, even as the District Attorney's 
file contains no such second interview. 
Finally, the petitioner directs this Court to a 
notation in Ronquillo's supplemental report 
referring to his interview with Trackling in 
July of 1995, during which Trackling denied 
his involvement in the North Roman Street 
murders and offered the alibi that he was at 
work when the crimes were committed. The 
report goes on to note that Ronquillo 
checked Trackling's time card and 
discovered that he did not clock out of work 
until 7:45 pm. The petitioner cites this as 
proof of Trackling's possible involvement in 
the North Roman Street murders, which did 
not occur until 8:30 pm. Police lmowledge 
of Trackling' s involvement, according to the 
petitioner, was evidenced by his being 
placed in photographic lineups shown to 
Reba Espadron and Larry Boatner, neither 
of whom identified him as a perpetrator. 
Upon that, the petitioner argues that police 
concealed Trackling's confession to his 
prejudice. 
The petitioner's unwieldy allegation as to 
evidence of Trackling's supposed 
involvement in the North Roman Street 
murders fails to satisfy his burden under 
Brady. As an initial matter, Eric Rogers' 
testimony at trial-to the extent it tracked 
his police statement and post-conviction 
testimony-would have been inadmissible 
hearsay through Trackling and Detective 
Adams. Moreover, his undisclosed statement 
that Trackling admitted to committing the 
North Roman Street murders with Donielle 
Bannister and Robert Home is contradicted 
by his own post-conviction testimony that 
Trackling told him he committed the 
murders with Bannister and Romalice 
McGee. It is also contradicted by the other 
undisclosed evidence of which the petitioner 
complains-Trackling's own statements to 
Adams and Ronquillo denying his 
involvement in the North Roman Street 
murders. His statement regarding Romalice 
McGee's involvement was rebutted by 
Detective Ronquillo's post-conviction 
testimony that Larry Boatner was shown a 
. lineup containing McGee's picture and was 
unable to identify him as one of the 
perpetrators. 
Rogers' statement that "Short Dog" was 
Robert Home is contradicted by Trackling's 
identification of the petitioner as "Short 
Dog" as well as by the testimony of the 
petitioner's own sister, Trenieze Smith, at 
his related trial in the Morrison Road case, 
in which she aclmowledged that she thought 
her brother went by the niclmame "Short 
Dog." At the post-conviction hearing, she 
similarly testified that the petitioner was 
lmown as "Shorty." FUlihermore, Rogers' 
post-conviction testimony that he in fact 
never received the sentence reduction that 
Adams allegedly offered him in return for 
implicating the petitioner contradicts his 
unsupported allegation that Adams had 
coaxed him to do so,. Finally, under 
Louisiana evidence rules, Rogers' testimony 
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would have been subj ect to impeachment 
through his conviction for second-degree 
murder, further damaging his credibility. 
Accordingly, Rogers' inconsistent and 
. controverted statements . . . would carry 
little evidentiary weight and the petitioner 
cannot therefore show that the trial jury 
would have been. unreasonable in 
discrediting his testimony in· light of the 
countervailing evidence. 
As to Detective Adams' intei'view with 
Trackling, the petitioner fails to demonstrate 
that its substance is favorable to his defense. 
Indeed, disclosure of that statement would 
have only provided additional evidence 
implicating the petitioner in the North 
Roman Street murders by introducing 
another photographic identification and 
.corroboration that his nickname was "Short 
Dog." Coupled with Eric Rogers' statement 
that "Short Dog" was involved in the North 
Roman Street murders, the effect would be 
highly prejudicial at trial. That Trackling 
was not· questioned by Detective Adams 
about the North Roman Street murders 
.. during his June 1, 1995, interview means 
nothing; as the interview was explicitly 
concerned with his role in the Morrison 
Road case, it is not surprising that Adams 
did not delve into ancillary investigations. 
Even if the petitioner's allegation of an 
undisclosed second interview between 
Adams and Trackling, in which Trackling 
denied his involvement in the North Roman 
Street murders, were substantiated, that 
information would be merely cumulative of 
Trackling's interview with DeteCtive 
Ronquillo, during which he denied the same. 
. The petitioner further fails to show how 
Trackling's undisclosed interview with 
Detective Ronquillo, in which he denied his 
involvement in the North Roman Street 
murders, would have exculpated him in the 
same crime. The only evidence that the 
petitioner . advances in support of his 
argument is the fact that Trackling's time 
card showed that he was not at work, as he 
had told Ronquillo he was, at the time of the 
murders. However, Ronquillo testified that 
he found Trackling's denial credible because 
he had already confessed to being involved 
in the Morrison Road murder and Ronquillo 
"[didn't] see why he would confess to one 
murder and not the other." Moreover, the 
effect of disclosing Trackling's possible 
involvement to the jury would have been 
soundly rebutted by Ronquillo'S testimony 
that Larry Boatner was shown photographic 
lineups including Trackling's picture and 
. was unable to identify him as a perpetrator. 
The petitioner acknowledges that much, but 
still claims that police concealed the 
evidence of his supposed confession. 
However, as noted, the only evidence of 
Trackling's supposed involvement comes 
from the mouth of a convicted murderer 
who's credibility is undermined by the very 
evidence the petitioner complains was not 
disclosed to him. That evidence also reflects 
Trackling's implication of the petitioner in 
the murders by his nickname. Therefore, the 
petitioner's own argument defeats itself. 
In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that 
the undisclosed evidence was somehow 
sufficient to convince the jury of Trackling' s 
involvement in the North Roman Street 
murders, this would still not constitute 
material or even favorable evidence entitling 
the petitioner to habeas relief. As is by now 
well documented, both surV1VIng 
eyewitnesses-Reba Espadron and Larry 
Boatner-testified that three to four subjects· 
participated in the home invasion and 
killings, including the petitioner and likely 
Phillip Young. As noted, Shelita Russell 
also indicated that more than one subject 
entered the house, and Dale Mims likewise 
testified that he observed four men flee the 
scene after the shootings. Trackling's own 
162 
alleged confession indicates that he 
committed the murders with two other 
people-Donielle 'Bannister and "Short 
Dog," i.e. the petitioner. Thus, the evidence 
establishing Trackling's involvement in the 
crime would do nothing to negate the 
petitioner's own involvement; it would 
merely add another name to the indictment. 
The petitioner therefore cannot demonstrate 
that the jury would have been unreasonable 
in finding the evidence of his guilt sufficient 
nonetheless. ' ' 
* * * 
CONCLUSION 
F or the foregoing reasons, the petition for 
writ of certiorari should be denied. 
163 
"Brady and the New Orleans DA: Another Look" 
SCOTUSblog 
June 13,2011 
Lyle Denniston 
Just weeks after the Supreme Court divided 
deeply over the tactics of prosecutors in 
New Orleans, the Justices on Monday 
decided to take another look, adding a new 
case claiming repeated violations of those 
prosecutors' duty to share information that 
would help defense lawyers. Public 
defender lawyers, in the new case, aimed 
strong complaints at the District Attorney's 
office in Orleans Parish, contending that it 
has "a well-documented history of hiding .. 
. from defense counsel" evidence of 
potential aid to the defense. That office, they 
contended, has not taken seriously prior 
orders from the Supreme Court to change its 
ways. 
It may not be a coincidence. that the new 
case, Smith v. Louisiana (docket 10-8145), 
has been developing at the Court even as the 
Justices were working on the case of 
Connick v. Thompson (09-571), the case 
decided· on a 5-4 split on March 29, 
absolving the New Orleans DA of 
complaints for failing to train prosecutors 
about their obligations under the Court's 
1963 precedent in Brady v. Maryland. In 
Brady, the Court decided that it was 
unconstitutional for prosecutors to suppress 
an accomplice's confession. It established 
the basic obligation of prosecutors to share 
with defense counsel any "exculpatory" 
(that is, favorable) evidence, if that evidence 
bore on guilt or innocence. 
Brady violations were also directly at issue 
in the Connick v. Thompson case. Last year, 
as the Court initially pondered that case, it 
sought a closer look, asking for the record of 
lower court proceedings; Not long after· that 
file reached the Court in February of last 
year, the Justices granted review, on the sole 
question of whether· a "single Brady 
violation" would justify a finding that the 
DA's office had improperly failed to train its 
line prosecutors. Ultimately, the Court said 
no, but the dissenting Justices protested that 
there was far more than a single violation in 
the prosecution of John Thompson. 
The Connick case was argued last October, 
and intemal discussions began. In 
December, the case of Smith v. Louisiana, 
involving Juan Smith was filed at the Court. 
After the state urged the Court not to hear 
that case, the Justices then called for a 
response by the· state. That request was 
issued in February of this year, while draft 
opinions were still circulating in Connick v. 
Thompson,' that case was then decided near 
the end of March, and nine days later the 
Justices sought the lower court record in 
Smith-an indication that they were then 
examining it as a potential sequel to 
Connick. Nothing further was done with the 
case until Monday, with the grant. 
In a ,lengthy footnote in the petition in the 
Smith case, his lawyers ticked off a list of 
cases which, they asserted, showed that "the 
history of the Orleans Parish District 
Attomey's Brady violations began before 
and continued after Mr. Smith's tria1." One 
of the cases cited in that footnote was the 
case of John Thompson. That footnote also 
noted that, in the 1995 case of Kyles v. 
Whitley, the Supreme Court had overtumed 
a conviction "because of the extent of the 
Brady violations by the Orleans Parish 
District Attorney's Office." 
164 
Smith's petition also noted that, since 1981, 
there have been seven cases in which 
Louisiana death-row inmates have been 
exonerated, and four of the seven had been 
prosecuted in Orleans Parish "and all four of 
these cases . . . involved serious Brady 
violations." 
The Thompson and Kyles cases were among 
the four. "Rather than heeding this Court's 
directive in Kyles, the Orleans Parish DA's 
office continued its pattern of deceit by 
concealing material, exculpatory evidence 
from the defense in the instant case," the 
petition added. 
Urging the COUli to deny review, lawyers 
for the DA's office said the complaints of 
Juan Smith's lawyers "are unsubstantiated," 
adding that "the mere aggregation· of 
individually meritless suggestions cannot 
prove ... a cognizable violation" of Brady, or 
of two other precedents cited· by Smith's 
counsel: Napue v. Illinois in 1959 and Giglio 
v. US. in 1972 (two other cases involving 
misconduct by prosecutors-withholding 
knowledge of false testimony in Napue, 
failing to disclose a promise of non-
prosecution of a co-conspirator in return for 
his trial testimony in Giglio). 
Smith's lawyers, the prosecutors contended, 
were trying to bolster their case by 
proposing "that any conviction out of the 
Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office 
mandates reversal." None of the claimed 
violations of prosecutors' legal duties, the 
brief in opposition argued, involved 
"material" evidence and none of it would 
have changed the outcome of the case: 
Smith's convictions on multiple murder 
charges. 
Smith's conviction of five murders in New 
Orleans in 1995 led to a sentence of life in 
prison without a chance for parole. That is 
the conviction directly at issue in the new 
petition. The results of that trial were used 
as a factor in a second trial, for four other 
murders in New Orleans, also in 1995, and 
Smith was sentenced to death after 
conviction in that proceeding. In the earlier 
proceeding, the petition argued, prosecutors 
repeatedly withheld evidence from the 
defense-including a jailhouse confession 
by another man. 
Smith's petition for review in the Supreme 
Court raised two issues: whether the 
"cumulative effect" of the alleged violations. 
by prosecutors would have changed the 
verdict against him, and whether state courts 
in Louisiana have violated Smith's due 
process rights in rejecting his .prosecutorial 
misconduct claims. The case will be heard 
and argued in the Court's next Term, 
starting Oct. 3. 
* * * 
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"u.s. Justices Weigh Another Case Involving Claims 
of Prosecutorial Misconduct in New Orleans" 
New Orleans Times Picayune 
June 16,2011 
John Simermn 
The U.S. Supreme Court will take a look at 
yet another case in which Orleans Parish 
prosecutors are accused of withholding key 
evidence to win a murder conviction. 
The high court this week agreed to hear the 
case of Juan Smith, who was convicted by 
District Attorney Harry Connick's office on 
five counts of first-degree murder in a 1995 
rampage inside a home on North Roman 
Street. 
Evidence from the allegedly tainted trial also 
helped prosecutors convict Smith in a 
separate trio of murders a month earlier, 
including the killing .of former Saints 
football player Bennie Thompson's ex-wife 
and child. That case landed Smith on death 
row. 
Gary Clements, director of the Capital Post-
Conviction Project of Louisiana, which will 
represent Smith at oral arguments expected 
this fall, said the court this session has 
accepted only one in 1,100 similar appeals 
by indigent criminal defendants. 
It's the second recent case the Supreme 
Court has taken up in which Orleans Parish 
prosecutors were accused of violating a 
requirement under Brady v. Maryland to 
give the defense ali exculpatory evidence. 
In an ideologically divided, 5-4 opinion in 
March, the court sided with the city, 
rejecting a $14 million judgment for former 
death row inmate John Thompson. The issue 
in the that case was not whether the DA's 
office could be held liable for a few 
prosecutors admittedly hiding blood 
evidence favorable to Thompson in an 
armed robbery case before his 1984 trial for 
the murder of hotel executive Ray Liuzza. 
The Supreme Court majority found that 
Thompson needed to show a pattern of 
prosecutors ignoring or thumbing their noses 
at Brady requirements, but failed to do so. 
The dissent was caustic, with Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg calling the failures by 
prosecutors in the Thompson case "neither 
isolated nor atypical" of the office at the 
time of Thompson's trial. 
"Something's going on there," said 
Clements of the Supreme Court's renewed 
interest with the Smith case. "What makes it 
stand out is they are looking at the 
allegations that we have made that the 
Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office 
has once again failed to turn over important 
evidence that supports the defendant." 
In its appeal, the capital defense group 
counts seven death penalty convictions 
overturned in Louisiana for Brady violations 
since 1981-four of them in Orleans Parish. 
Clements said all four took place during the 
tenure of Connick, who retired in 2003. 
Clements said attorneys for Smith found the 
exculpatory evidence in investigative 
updates that they received a few years ago. 
According to the petition, several witnesses 
in the quintuple murder told police the 
killers wore masks that made their identities 
indiscernible, and one Orleans Parish inmate 
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told police another man had confessed he 
was at the murder scene and that Smith was 
not there. 
The same year of Smith's arrest, the 
Supreme Court scolded Connick's office for 
threatening to drag the justice system to "a 
gladiatorial level" by suppressing evidence. 
"This is another example of our office being 
called on to defend prosecutions that 
occurred decades ago," said Christopher 
Bowman, an assistant district attorney and 
spokesman for DA Leon Cannizzaro. 
"However, every court that has reviewed 
(Smith's) claims has summarily denied 
them. We don't believe . (he) is making any 
new claims. We believe we will be able to 
effectively defend the conduct of Mr. 
Connick's office in due course." 
Smith was arrested. five months after three 
gunmen entered the home on the 2200 block 
of North Roman Street, ordered six people 
to lie on the floor and shot five dead in the 
bloodiest crime in New Orleans that year. 
A month earlier, Bennie Thompson's. 3-
year-old child, his ex-wife Tangie 
Thompson and her boyfriend, Andre White, 
were killed in their residence on MOlTison 
Road. Smith's appeal on that conviction is 
on hold pending resolution of the North 
Roman Street case. 
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Maples v. Thomas 
10-63 
Ruling Below: Maples v. Allen, 586 F.3d 879 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. granted 131 S. Ct. 1718 
(U.S. 2011). 
In 1999, Cory Maples was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Maples appealed 
to both the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court and both courts 
affirmed his conviction. Subsequently, Maples filed for post-conviction relief alleging numerous 
instances of ineffective assistance on the part of his trial counsel. The trial court ordered 
Maples's petition dismissed and sent notice to Maples's new counsel, two attorneys with the 
New York City law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell along with Maples's local counsel in Alabama. 
Maples's local counsel took no action. The attorneys from Sullivan & Cromwell had left the firm 
by the time the dismissal order was issued. The firm's mail room returned the notice to the 
Alabama circuit court clerk unopened. The deadline for appealing the dismissal of the petition 
for post-conviction relief passed and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denied Maples an 
out-of-time appeal. Maples then filed a federal habeas petition that was denied in the district 
court. The district court held that Maples's ineffective-assistance claims were procedurally 
defaulted because he failed to file a timely appeal to the dismissal of his motion for post-
conviction relief and even if such a default were the result of ineffective assistance, such 
ineffectiveness could not establish a cause for default as there is no constitutional right to post-
conviction counsel. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 
Question Presented: Whether the Eleventh Circuit properly held that there was no "cause" to 
excuse any procedural default where petitioner was blameless forthe default, the state's own 
conduct contributed to the default, and petitioner's attorneys of record were no longer 
. functioning as his agents at the time of any default. 
Cory R. MAPLES, Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
Richard F. ALLEN, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, 
Respondent-Appellee. 
United States Court of Appeals for theEleventh Circuit 
October 26, 2009 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
PER CURIAM: 
Cory Maples appeals from the district 
court's· denial of his petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
2254. The district court granted Maples a 
certificate of appealability ("COA") on the 
issue of whether Maples's ineffective-
assistance claims are procedurally barred. 
This Court expanded the COA to include 
Maples's claim that the jury instructions 
were constitutionally deficient. After review 
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and oral argument, we affirm. 
1. BACKGROUND 
Maples was convicted of capital murder and 
sentenced to death for killing two 
companions, Stacy Alan Terry and Barry 
Dewayne Robinson II, after an evening of 
drinking, playing pool, and riding around in 
Terry's car. When the men arrived at 
Maples's house, Maples went inside and got 
a .22 caliber rifle. Maples then shot each 
man twice in the head in an execution-style 
killing. See Maples v. State, 758 So.2d 1, 
14-15 (Ala.Crim.App.1999). Maples fled in 
Terry's car. 
Maples signed a confession, stating that he: 
(1) shot both victims around midnight; (2) 
had drunk six or seven beers by about 8 
p.m., but "didn't feel very drunk"; and (3) . 
did not know why he decided to kill the two 
men. Faced with this confession, Maples's 
trial attorneys argued that Maples was guilty 
of murder, but not capital murder. Under 
Alabama law, capital murder involves, inter 
alia, (1) murder during a robbery, or (2) the 
murder of two persons by one act or 
pursuant to one scheme or course of 
conduct. The trial judge instructed the jury 
on capital murder, robbery, and the lesser 
included charges of murder (a non-capital 
crime) and first-degree theft of property. 
Both the capital murder and the lesser 
included murder charges required that the 
jury find that Maples had the intention to 
cause the death of a person. The jury 
convicted Maples of capital murder. 
On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of 
Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme 
Court affirmed Maples's conviction and 
death sentence. Ex parte Maples, 758 So.2d 
81 (Ala.1999); Maples v. State, 758 So.2d 1 
(Ala.Crim.App.1999). On direct appeal, 
Maples argued that the jury instructions 
violated due process because the trial court 
failed to include, sua sponte, an instruction 
on the lesser included, non-capital offense of 
manslaughter due to voluntary intoxication. 
This claim forms part of the basis of the 
current' appeal. 
Maples subsequently filed a petition for 
post-conviction relief pursuant to Alabama 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, claiming, 
inter alia, . that trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to investigate or present evidence 
of: (1) Maples's mental health history; (2) 
his intoxication at the time of the crime; and 
(3) his alcohol and drug history. Maples's 
Rule 32 petition claimed the jury 
instructions violated due process by not 
including the lesser offense of manslaughter 
due to voluntary intoxication. The State of 
Alabama moved the state trial court (what 
Alabama calls the circuit court) to dismiss 
Maples's Rule 32 petition, and that motion 
was denied. Seventeen months later, the trial 
court issued an order (the "Rule 32 Order") 
dismissing Maples's Rule 32 petition. The 
trial court dismissed some claims for failure 
to state a claim, and found other claims 
procedurally batTed because they could have 
been raised at trial or on direct appeal but 
were not. 
The Alabama trial court clerk sent copies of 
the Rule 32 Order, filed on May 22, 2003, 
to: (1) Maples's two attorneys (Jaasi 
Munanka and Clara Ingen-Housz) with the 
law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell in New 
York, who were attorneys of record and had 
performed all of the substantive work on 
Maples's Rule 32 case; and (2) Maples's 
local counsel (John G. Butler, Jr.) in 
Alabama. No one disputes that both Butler 
and Sullivan & Cromwell received copies of 
the Rule 32 Order dismissing Maples's 
petition. 
Neither Maples nor any of his three 
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attorneys filed a notice of appeal from the 
dismissal of Maples's Rule 32 petition 
within the 42 days required by Alabama 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1). Butler 
took no action whatsoever after receiving 
the Rule 32 Order. Sullivan & Cromwell 
received the Rule 32 Order but instead of 
opening the envelope that contained it, the 
firm returned. it to the Alabama circuit court 
clerk. 
By the time the trial court dismissed 
Maples's Rule 32 petition, attorneys 
Munanka and Ingen-Housz had left Sullivan 
& Cromwell. As Maples's Sullivan & 
Cromwell attorney acknowledged at oral 
argument, arrangements had been made 
within the firm for other attorneys at 
Sullivan & Cromwell to· take over 
representation of Maples. However, none of 
Maples's attorneys filed anything with the 
Alabama trial court reflecting this change. 
The State's attorney (Jon Hayden) wrote 
Maples a letter, dated August 13, 2003, 
informing him that although his deadline for 
appealing the dismissal of his Rule 32 
petition had passed, Maples still had four 
weeks to file a federal habeas petition. 
Hayden gave Maples the address to file a . 
federal habeas petition and informed him 
how to seek new counsel if he wished. 
Thereafter, Maples's mother contacted 
Sullivan & Cromwell. On Maples's behalf, 
new attorneys from the Sullivan & 
Cromwell firm requested that the Alabama 
trial court re-issue its Rule 32 Order so that 
he might file a timely appeal. The trial court 
refused, stating in an order that it was 
"unwilling to enter into subterfuge in order 
to gloss over mistakes made by counsel for 
[Maples]." Ex parte Maples, 885 So.2d 845, 
847 (Ala.Crim.App.2004) (quoting trial 
court order). 
Maples, through counsel Sullivan & 
Cromwell, then petitioned the Alabama 
Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of 
mandamus directing that he be granted an 
out-of-time appeal. That court denied his 
petition, finding that the circuit court clerk 
had propedy served Maples's attorneys of 
record at their listed addresses with the Rule 
32 Order and the attorneys had failed to act. 
Thus, an out-of-time appeal was not 
warranted. The Alabama Supreme Court 
also denied Maples's petition for a writ of 
mandamus requesting an out-of-time appeal 
of the Rule 32 dismissal. The United States 
Supreme Court denied Maples's subsequent 
celiiorari petition. 
In the meantime, Maples, again through 
. counsel Sullivan & Cromwell, had filed the 
federal habeas petition at issue here alleging, 
inter alia, the same ineffective~assistance 
claims asserted in his Rule 32 petition and 
the same jury-instruction claim asserted in 
his direct appeal. The, district court stayed 
the § 2254 petition while Maples's state 
court petition seeking an out-of-time appeal 
of the Rule 32 Order was pending. 
After the state appellate courts denied 
Maples's requests for an out-of-time appeal 
in his Rule 32 case, the district court denied 
Maples's § 2254 petition. The district court 
concluded that: (1) Maples's ineffective-
assistance claims were procedurally· 
defaulted because Maples did not timely file 
an appeal of the dismissal of his Rule 32 
petition; (2) even if Maples's default were 
the result of his three post-conviction 
counsel's failing to file a Rule 32 appeal, 
such ineffectiveness could not establish 
cause for the default because there is no 
constitutional right to post-conviction 
counsel; and (3) the Alabama appellate 
courts' decisions that Maples was not 
entitled to a sua sponte jury instruction on 
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manslaughter due to voluntary intoxication 
was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established federal 
law. This appeal followed. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"When examining a district court's denial of 
a § 2254 petition, we review the district 
court's factual findings for clear error arid its 
legal determinations de novo." We review 
de novo the district court's determination 
that a claim has been procedurally defaulted. 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), governs 
Maples's § 2254 petition and appeal. 
AEDPA "greatly circumscribes federal comi 
review of state court decisions" and 
"establishes a general framework of 
substantial deference for reVIewmg every 
issue that the state comis have decided." 
According to § 2254, as amended by 
AEDP A, a federal court shall not grant a 
writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state 
pnsoner 
with respect to any claim that was 
. adjudicated on the merits in State 
court proceedings unless the 
adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Comi of 
the United States; or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was 
based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of 
the evidence presented in the State 
court proceeding. 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Procedural Bar 
The first issue is whether Maples's 
ineffecti ve-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims 
are procedurally barred from federal habeas 
review. 
Before bringing a § 2254 habeas action in 
federal comi, a petitioner must exhaust all 
state comi remedies that are available for 
challenging his state conviction. To exha~st 
state remedies, the petitioner must "fairly 
pl'esent[ ]" every issue raised in his federal 
petition to the state's highest court, either on 
direct appeal or on collateral review. Thus, 
to properly exhaust a claim, "state prisoners 
must give the state courts one full 
opportunity to resolve any constitutional 
issues by invoking one complete round of 
the State.' s established appellate review 
;process. " 
Maples's ineffective~assistance claims were 
first presented to the state trial court in 
Maples's Rule 32 petition. It is undisputed 
that Maples never appealed that court's 
dismissal of his Rule 32 claims. Thus, 
Maples did not properly exhaust those 
claims in state court. And because any 
further attempts by Maples to exhaust those 
claims in state court would be futile, 
Maples's unexhausted Claims are 
procedurally defaulted. 
We know that Maples's further attempts at 
exhaustion would be futile because the 
Alabama courts' already have denied 
Maples's requests for an out-of-time Rule 32 
appeal. So Maples has procedurally 
defaulted his ineffective-assistance claims 
for this reason. 
Maples urges this Comi to overlook his 
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procedural default, claiming the Alabama 
courts have not' regularly enforced 
Alabama's time limits for appeals, although 
they obviously did so in Maples's case. For 
a state procedural ruling to preclude federal 
habeas review of Maples's ineffective-
assistance claims, the state court's ruling 
must rest upon an "independent" and 
"adequate" state-law ground. 
Here, it is undisputed that (1) the last state 
court's judgment was based on a procedural 
bar to state review and not the merits of the 
claim, and (2) that state law ground was 
independent of the federal question. More 
specifically, under Alabama law, Maples 
had 42 days to file a notice of appeal of the 
. Rule 32 Order but did not do so .. And the 
Alabama appellate court denied Maples's 
request for an out-of-time appeal under state 
law and undisputedly did not consider the 
merits of his Rule 32 claims. Thus, the only 
question in this case is whether Alabama's 
procedural bar provides an "adequate" state 
ground for denying relief. 
"[T]he adequacy of state procedural bars" is 
not a matter of state law, but "is itself a 
federal question." To constitute an adequate 
state ground, the state procedural rule "must 
not be applied in an arbitrary or 
unprecedented fashion," but must be 
"sufficiently firmly established and regularly 
followed" to warrant a procedural default. In 
determining whether a state procedural rule 
is firmly established and regularly followed, 
courts consider whether the state has put 
litigants on notice of the rule and whether 
the state has a legitimate state interest in the 
rule's enforcement. Further, while "regularly 
followed" means "closely hewn to," it does 
not mean complete unanimity or absolute 
consistency of state decisions applying the 
rule. 
Here, the district court properly concluded 
that Alabama's 42-day and out-of-time 
appeal rules were firmly established and 
regularly followed by the Alabama courts 
and were not applied in an unprecedented or 
arbitrary fashion in Maples's case. Maples 
was on notice of the rules and the state has 
an undoubted legitimate state interest in its 
time deadlines for appeals for finality 
purposes. Further, Alabama courts routinely 
have enforced the 42-day rule and denied 
out-of-time appeals. 
Alabama has granted out-of-time appeals in 
only three limited circumstances: (1) 
prisoners proceeding pro se who were not 
served with copies of the relevant orders 
within the 42-day period; (2) qirect criminal 
appeals where the defendant requested 
counsel to appeal but no appeal was filed, 
given that a defendant has a constitutional 
right to counsel; and (3) the trial court, 
acting through its clerk, assumed a duty to 
personally serve or notify a. patty who was 
represented by counsel in Rule 32 
proceedings, but then negligently failed to 
do so, resulting in an out-of-time appeal. 
None of these three exceptions apply here. 
First, Maples never filed any pleadings pro 
se or otherwise appeared pro se but had 
three counsel who were served with the Rule 
32 Order. Second, Maples's case was not a 
. direct criminal appeal; but an appeal from a 
collateral Rule 32 dismissal, where Maples 
has no constitutional right to counsel. 
Indeed, Maples does not rely on these two 
exceptions. 
Rather, Maples relies on the third exception, 
arguing primarily that his case is like 
Marshall, where the Alabama courts granted 
an out-of-time appeal. However, Maples's 
case is wholly different from Marshall. The 
petitioner Marshall filed a notice of appeal 
that was dismissed as untimely. Marshall 1, 
884 So.2d at 898. Marshall filed a second 
Rule 32 petition seeking an out-of-time 
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appeal for his first Rule 32 petition.9 The 
Alabama appellate courts in Marshall 
appeared to find that the state circuit court 
clerk assumed a duty to serve Marshall 
personally in prison, even though he had 
counsel at some point, because Marshall had 
filed "numerous pro se motions and 
pleadings throughout this matter" in the 
circuit court and had "request[ ed] 
information on the status of his first Rule 32 
petition." The out-of-time appeal in 
Marshall was granted only because the "the 
court assumed a duty of notification it did 
not otherwise owe the petitioner and then 
failed to perform that duty." 
The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that 
the remedy for breach of the clerk's duty to 
. notify was issuance of a writ of mandamus 
to the clerk directing reinstatement of 
Marshall's untimely appeal to the docket, 
and not the grant of Marshall's second Rule 
32 petition. The Alabama Supreme Court's 
decision that Marshall was entitled to an 
out-of-time appeal expressly relied on 
Johnson's and Weeks's assumption-of-duty 
rule. 
In contrast to Marshall, Maples never filed 
any pleadings pro se but had three attorneys 
to whom the clerk sent notice. Maples relied 
exclusively on his counsel and made no 
attempt to deal directly with the state trial 
court or its clerk, or to keep himself apprised 
directly of the developments in his case. 
. Maples never requested the clerk to give 
him personal notice in addition to his 
counsel. There is no basis here upon which 
9 In Marshall, the petitioner's counseled Rule 32 
petition was denied in June 2000. Marshall's 
November 2000 notice of appeal was dismissed as 
untimely. Marshall filed a second Rule 32 petition, 
claiming he personally never received notice of the 
denial of his first Rule 32 petition and was due an 
out-of-time appeal because the trial court did not 
send him pei'sonally a copy of the denial order in the 
first Rule 32 case. 
to infer that the trial court clerk was 
negligent or that the clerk even knew Maples 
wanted to be personally informed of the 
court's orders, much less that it assumed a 
duty to notify Maples personally in prison. 
Indeed, in Maples's case, the Alabama 
appellate court itself expressly distinguished 
Marshall when it denied Maples's request 
for an out-of-time appeal. Maples, 885 
So.2d at 848-50. Simply put, Marshall does 
not convince us that Alabama appellate 
cOUlis ignore the state's procedural rules for 
appeals or fail to apply them regularly. 
Maples can point to no Alabama case where 
an out-of-time appeal has been granted in 
circumstances such as his case. 
For all of these reasons, we conclude that it 
was neither arbitrary nor inconsistent for the 
Alabama courts to enforce its 42 day rule for 
appeals and deny Maples's request for an 
out-of-time appeal, and that Alabama's 
appeal rules are adequate, independent state 
law procedural rules barring Maples's 
ineffective-assistance claims from federal 
habeas review. 
B. Cause and Prejudice to Excuse 
Procedural Default 
Notwithstanding that a claim has been 
procedurally defaulted, a federal cOUli may 
still consider the claim' if a state habeas 
petitioner can show either (1) cause for and 
actual prejudice from the default; or (2) a 
fundamental miscarriage of justice. Maples 
argues that, even if they are procedurally 
defaulted, his ineffective-assistance claims 
should be heard by the federal court because 
he has demonstrated cause for and prejudice 
from the default. Cause is established if 
"some objective' factor external to the 
defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply 
with the State's procedural rule." "Such 
external impediments include evidence that 
could not reasonably have been discovered 
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in time to comply with the rule; interference 
by state officials that made compliance 
impossible; and ineffective assistance of 
counsel at a stage where the petitioner had a 
right to counsel." 
Here, the factor that resulted in Maples's 
default-namely, counsel's failure to file a 
timely notice of appeal of the Rule 32 
Order-cannot establish cause for his default 
because there is no right to post-conviction 
counsel. 
C. Waiver of the Exhaustion Requirement 
and Estoppel as to the Procedural Bar 
Maples's remaining arguments are based on 
a footnote in the State's brief to the Alabama 
Supreme Court opposing Maples's request 
for an out-of-time appeal of the Rule 32 
Order. In the Alabama Supreme Court, 
Maples's brief asserted that "Maples may 
very well be· executed despite valid post-
conviction claims merely because he was 
denied the opportunity to timely appeal the 
dismissal of his Rule 32 Petition." A 
footnote in the State's response brief said 
that "Maples has filed a petition for [ a] writ 
of habeas corpus in federal court . . . [and] 
may still present his postconviction claims 
to that. court.~' Maples argues that this 
statement in the State's footnote (1) is a 
waiver of the exhaustion requirement or (2) 
judicially estops the State· from arguing that 
his ineffective-assistance claims are 
procedurally barred .. 
Maples's arguments fail. Section 2254(b)(3) 
provides that "[a] State shall not be deemed 
. to have waived the exhaustion re'quirement 
or be estopped from reliance upon the 
requirement unless the State, through 
counsel, expressly waives the requirement." 
Thus, we cannot find either waiver of 
exhaustion or estoppel as to the procedural 
bar unless the State's footnote can be 
considered an express waiver. 
This Court has found express waivers under 
§ 2254(b )(3) only where the State has 
provided an explicit statement during federal 
habeas proceedings that it is waiving a 
petitioner's procedural default. 
Here, the State's footnote statement to the 
Alabama Supreme Court is not an "express 
waiver." Merely observing to a state court 
that a: petitioner may present his claims in 
· federal habeas proceedings does not imply 
that the federal court would reach the merits 
of these claims. And observing. that a 
petitioner may present his claims in federal 
court, without explicitly· stating that the 
State was Walvmg the exhaustion 
requirement, cannot satisfy § 2254(b)(3)'s 
mandate that the State "expressly waive[ ] 
the requirement." Because the State did not 
expressly waive the exhaustion requirement 
or the procedural bar, it cannot be deemed to 
have waived those defenses nor can it be 
estopped from asserting them now. 
D. Jury-Instruction Claims 
* * * 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the distric.t court's denial of 
· Maples's § 2254 petition. 
AFFIRMED. 
BARKETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
· I cannot agree that Maples's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims are 
procedurally barred. As such, the claims 
should be reviewed on the merits. As the 
majority opinion explains in detail, a 
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petitioner's habeas claims are procedurally 
defaulted-and therefore rendered unavailable 
for review by this court-when, inter alia, the 
state rule on which the default is based is 
"adequate and independent." However, 
Alabama's law on out-of-time appeals, 
which forms the basis of Maples's claim in 
this case, is not "adequate" pursuant to the 
Supreme Court's definition of that term. 
Maples therefore has not procedurally 
defaulted. Accordingly, there is no 
procedural bar to the consideration of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims that 
. Maples attempts to bring before this· couti. 
The Supreme Court defines an "adequate 
and independent" state court decision as one 
"[which] rests on a state law ground that is 
independent of the federal question and 
adequate to support the judgment." To be 
considered "adequate" by a federal court, 
the state procedural rule must be both 
"firmly established and regularly followed." 
In other words, the rule must be "clear [and] 
closely hewn to" by the state for a federal 
. court to find it to be adequate. The 
"adequacy" requirement thus means that the 
procedural rule "must not be applied in an 
arbitrary or unprecedented fashion." If the 
rule is not firmly established, or if it is 
applied in an arbitrary or unprecedented 
fashion, then it is not adequate to preclude 
federal review. In this case, the rule used to 
procedurally bar review in the state court 
was not firmly established or, if interpreted 
as firmly established, was applied to Maples 
in an unprecedented and arbitrary fashion. 
As demonstrated by Marshall v. State, 884 
So.2d 898, 899 (Ala.Crim.App.2002), 
overruled on other grounds, 884 So.2d 900 
(Ala.2003),1 the rule which the majority 
1 The Alabama Supreme Court held that Marshall 
should have petitioned for a writ of mandamus rather 
than seeking relief as he did. This procedural change 
did not affect Marshall's underlying claims. In any 
event, Alabama subsequently amended its rules of 
applies is not firmly established and has 
been arbitrarily applied to Maples. As in this 
case, the defendant in Marshall did not 
receive notice when his first Rule 32 petition 
for post-conviction relief was denied. His 
time to appeal the denial thus lapsed before 
he was even aware an order had been 
entered. When Marshall was finally notified, 
he filed a second Rule 32 petition which 
asked the court to permit him to file his 
appeal out of time. The Alabama Couti of 
Criminal Appeals granted that petition. 
The majority finds that Marshall permits an 
out-of-time appeal based on failure to notify 
the defendant personally only when the 
court has assumed a duty to notify the 
defendant personally of an order in his case. 
Only then would the cOllli's failure to notify 
the defendant violate his rights. Applying 
. that rule to the issues in Marshall, this 
majority concludes that the Marshall couti 
allowed Marshall an out-of-time appeal 
because the court had assumed a duty to 
notify Marshall of its decision after he wrote 
to the clerk of courts· inquiring about the 
status of his case. The court then allegedly 
violated that duty-thereby permitting an 
out-of-time appeal-when its clerk failed to 
respond. 
That may be the rule that Marshall 
suggested; but it is not the rule that Marshall 
applied. Like Maples, Marshall did not 
begin filing his requests with the clerk until 
after the order denying his Rule 32 petition 
had been decided. As Marshall himself 
explained, he made the requests "because he 
had no idea that his first· petition had been 
dismissed." Again, like Maples, Marshall 
was represented by counsel in his Rule 32 
proceeding; neither Maples nor Marshall 
civil procedure to peJmit Marshall's method of 
challenging the denial of his out-of-time appeal of his 
Rule 32 petition. This dissent therefore uses the 
procedural terminology interchangeably. 
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were proceeding pro se. Counsel for both 
Marshall and Maples received a copy of the 
order denying the their clients' Rule 32. 
petitions, and both sets of counsel failed to 
timely act on that order. Despite these· 
indistinguishable facts, the Marshall court 
granted an out-of-time appeal, and the 
Maples court did not. The Marshall opinion 
thus provides no clear basis for 
distinguishing the facts of Marshall's out-of-
time appeal from the facts of Maples's out~ 
of-time appeal. This inconsistency in the 
application of Alabama's law on granting 
out-of-time appeals renders the rule an 
inadequate ground on which to bar federal. 
review of Maples' s claims. 
Marshall aside, the interests of justice also 
require that Maples be permitted review of 
his claims when the alleged default of those 
claims occurred through no fault of his own. 
Rather, any such default is entirely the fault 
of his post-conviction counsel, and this court 
is allowing him to be put to death because of 
that negligence. "[T]he penalty of death is 
different in kind from any other punishment 
imposed under our system of criminal 
justice." Due to this "unique nature of the 
death penalty," the. Eighth Amendment 
demands "heightened reliability . . . in the 
detelmination whether the death penalty is 
appropriate in a particular case." As a result, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that "in 
capital cases, it is constitutionally required 
that the sentencing authority have 
information sufficient to enable it to 
consider the character and individual 
circumstances of a defendant prior to the 
imposition of a death sentence." If the facts 
alleged by Maples to support his claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel are true, 
then the jury in this case was left without 
sufficient information of Maples's character 
and individual circumstances when it 
returned a verdict for the death penalty. 
Notwithstanding the supposed procedural 
bar in. this case, the imposition of the death 
penalty and the heightened reliability that it 
requires, necessitate federal review of 
Maples's ineffective assistance claims. 
Ultimately, "[h]abeas corpus is governed .by 
equitable principles." Barring federal review 
of claims defaulted under state law serves 
'the dual principles of comity and federalism, 
Nevertheless, in certain cases, like the 
present case, those equitable principles 
"must yield to the imperative of correcting a 
fundamentally unjust [sentence]." Without 
review of Maples's claims, we cannot 
ascertain the reliability of Maples's death 
sentence. 
Maples was entitled to an out-of-time appeal 
under Alabama precedent established in 
Marshall v. State, 884 So.2d 898, 899 
(Ala.Crim.App.2002). Because he was 
denied that opportunity, the merits of his 
claims must be examined by the district 
court to determine whether or not his 
sentence is reliable. If AEDP A bars review 
in such circumstances, then its 
constitutionality would appear questionable 
in this regard. 
I respectfully dissent. 
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"Supreme Court Says No to Campaign Finance 
Review, Yes to Death Row Inmate Appeal" 
Washington Post 
March 22, 2011 
Robert Barnes 
* * * 
Death row case 
The court agreed to hear th~ case of an 
Alabama death row inmate whose appeal 
has been turned . down by lower comis 
because ofa paperwork mix-up. 
Cory R. Maples was convicted in 1997 of 
killing two men after a night of heavy 
drinking and drug use. He filed appeals 
alleging that his inexperienced comi-
appointed attorneys-who during the trial 
. warned the jury that it might appear they 
were "stumbling around in the dark"-were 
negligent. 
At one. point in the years of appeals that 
followed, Maples was represented by two 
lawyers from a New York firm, Sullivan & 
Cromwell. But the two left the firm without 
telling Maples or the court. And when the 
court sent notice of an unfavorable ruling, 
someone in the law firm's mailroom 
stamped the letters "Return to sender." 
The letters went back to the county clerk, 
who did nothing with them. It was only after 
the 42-day deadline for appeal had passed 
that Maples received notice. The law firm 
. tried to intervene, but the court said it was 
too late. 
Maples also found no relief from the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the 11 th Circuit in 
Atlanta. Gregory G. Garre, who was 
solicitor general under President George W. 
Bush and is now representing Maples, 
brought the issue to the Supreme Comi. 
The case, he wrote, "raises the shocking 
prospect that a man may be executed 
without any federal court review of serious 
constitutional claims due to a series of 
events for which all agree he was blameless 
and notwithstanding the state's own failings 
in the purported default." 
Garre noted in his petition that in 2006, the 
court held in Jones v. Flowers that, when the 
loss of a home was at stake, state officials 
had to take action when an important notice 
was returned unopened. 
"It follows that the state may not 'shrug [its] 
shoulders ... and say 'I tried' when a man's 
life is at stake," Garre wrote. 
The case is Maples v. Thomas and will be 
argued in the court term that begins in 
October. 
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"Sullivan & Cromwell's Life-or-Death Mistake?" 
Above the Law . 
November 2, 2009 
Kashmir Hill 
. More than a decade ago, Cory Maples of 
Alabama murdered two people. After an 
evening of heavy drinking, playing pool, and 
riding around in a friend's car, Maples killed 
two friends, shooting them execution-style. 
. According to cOUli documents, he signed a 
confession, "stating that he: (1) shot both 
victims around midnight; (2) had drunk six 
or seven beers by about 8 p.m., but 'didn't 
feel very drunk'; and (3) did not lmow why 
he decided to kill the two men. Faced with 
this confession, Maples's trial attorneys 
argued that Maples was guilty of murder, 
but not capital murder." 
A jury found Maples guilty and sentenced 
him to death. 
Maples appealed his capital murder 
conviction with the help of attorneys at 
Sullivan & Cromwell: 
Maples subsequently filed a petition for 
post-conviction relief pursuant to Alabama 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, claiming, 
inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to investigate or present evidence 
of: (1) Maples's mental health history; (2) 
his intoxication at the time of the crime; and 
(3) his alcohol and drug history. 
The trial court dismissed Maples' Rule 32 
petition, and sent notice of the decision to 
the attorneys at Sullivan & Cromwell and to 
local Alabama counsel. There was a 42-day 
period for filing a notice of appeal, but all 
the lawyers involved dropped the ball on the 
case, PepsiCo-style. 
So what's the explanation· for S&C's 
missing the deadline for filing an appeal? 
From our tipster: 
Basically, Sullivan & Cromwell 
forgot to file a notice of appeal for a 
death row inmate, causing him to 
procedurally default all his 
ineffective-assistance claims. Oops! 
Here's the explanation, from the Eleventh 
Circuit: 
The Alabama trial court clerk sent 
copies of the Rule 32 Order, filed on 
May 22, 2003, to: (1) Maples's two 
attorneys (Jaasi Munanka and Clara 
Ingen-Housz) with the law firm of 
Sullivan & Cromwell in New York, 
who were attorneys of record and 
had performed all of the substantive 
work on Maples's Rule 32 case; and 
(2) Maples's local counsel (John G. 
Butler, Jr.) in Alabama. No one 
disputes that both Butler and 
Sullivan & Cromwell received 
copies of the Rule 32 Order 
dismissing Maples's petition. 
Neither Maples nor any of his three 
attorneys filed a notice of appeal 
from the dismissal of Maples's Rule 
32 petition within the 42 days 
required by Alabama· Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1). Butler 
took no action whatsoever after 
receiving the Rule 32 Order. Sullivan 
& Cromwell received the Rule 32 
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Order but instead of opemng the 
envelope that contained it, the firm 
returned it to the Alabama circuit 
court clerk. 
Apparently attorneys Munanka and Ingen-
Housz had left Sullivan & Cromwell. 
Although anangements had been made for 
new attorneys to take over the pro bono 
matter, they had not filed notice of the 
change of counsel with the Alabama trial 
court. 
The state's attorney wrote Maples a letter 
letting him know he had missed the deadline 
to appeal the Petition's dismissal, but that he 
could still file a federal habeas petition. 
Thereafter, Maples's mother contacted 
Sullivan & Cromwell. On Maples's behalf, 
new attorneys from the Sullivan & 
Cromwell firm requested that the Alabama 
trial court re-issue its Rule 32 Order so that 
he might file a timely appeal. The trial court 
refused, stating in an order that it was 
"unwilling to enter into subterfuge in order 
to gloss over mistakes made by counsel for 
[Maples]. " 
New Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys helped 
Maples file his federal habeas petition, but 
that petition was denied: 
The district court concluded that: 
(1) Maples's ineffective-assistance claims 
were procedurally defaulted because Maples 
did not timely file an appeal of the dismissal 
of his Rule 32 petition; (2) even if Maples's 
default were the result of his three post-
conviction counsel's failing to file a Rule 32. 
appeal, such ineffectiveness could not 
establish cause for the default because there 
is no constitutional right to post-conviction 
counsel; and (3) the Alabama appellate 
courts' decisions that Maples was not 
entitled to a sua sponte jury instruction on 
manslaughter due to voluntary intoxication 
was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established federal 
law. 
The decision was affirmed by the Eleventh 
Circuit in a per curiam opinion. Cory 
Maples remains on death row. 
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"Alabama Plans Death Penalty Despite 
Paperwork Mix-Up" 
The Guardian 
January 8, 2010 
Ed Pilkington 
A death row prisoner in Alabama has had a 
final plea against execution turned down by 
the federal appeals court on the grounds that 
his lawyers failed to meet a 42-day deadline 
to file legal paperwork. 
Cory Maples, 35, may go to his death as a 
result of a procedural mistake by his lawyers 
of which he had no knowledge or he had no 
control. 
The case has highlighted inconsistencies in 
the application of the death penalty across 
America: critics say the system is so skewed 
that issues of justice and fairness are 
frequently lost ina myopic focus on 
bureaucratic rule-keeping. 
"We have created an incredibly complex 
procedural maze, with the result that we are 
risking executing people who should not 
have been given a death sentence in the first 
place," said Bryan Stevenson, director of the 
Alabama-based Equal Justice Initiative, EJI. 
The case of Maples began on 7 July 1995 
when two friends, Stacy Terry and BatTY 
Robinson, went round to his house. Later, as 
the men were leaving in their car, Maples 
. shot them both twice in the head with his 
father's gun. He confessed to the murders, 
telling police he had drunk about eight pints 
of beer. 
At his trial, Maples was found guilty by 10 
votes to two and the jury recommended 
death. Just one fewer vote against him 
would have spared him under Alabama law. 
. After Maples was sent to death row in 2000 
he took on another team of lawyers for post-
conviction appeals. They found that his 
original lawyer had made basic and serious 
mistakes. 
He had failed to present the jury with 
evidence that Maples had been drunk, or that 
he had a history of mental illness, suicide 
attempts and drug addiction, to such an 
extent that he was mentally incapable of 
carrying out a premeditated murder and was 
thus unfit to face the death penalty. 
His new lawyers, at a large international 
firm called Sullivan & Cromwell, went 
before the Alabama courts to argue that 
Maples's trial lawyer had mishandled his 
defence, but in 2003 a judge rejected the 
petition. They then had 42 days to file a 
further appeal. . 
Paperwork was mailed from Alabama to 
their New York offices, addressed to two 
lawyers who had left the company. The 
letter was returned unopened to the Alabama 
comis and the deadline missed. . 
Sullivan & Cromwell said it could not 
comment as the case, which it continues to 
work on, is still active. After.prolonged legal 
wrangling, the federa1 appeals court has 
ruled that because the· deadline was missed, 
Maples has lost the right to a final appeal 
against being put to death. "Any and all fault 
here lies with Maples for not filing a timely 
notice of appeal," the ruling says. 
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One judge, Rosemary Barkett, dissented 
from the ruling, saying "the interests of 
justice require that Maples be permitted 
review of his claims. This court is allowing 
him to be put to death because of the 
negligence" of his lawyers. 
Death row campaigners say the Maples case 
highlights the brutal, legalistic approach to 
execution adopted in Alabama and a handful 
of other states. Alabama has 200 death row 
prisoners, and holds the record in the 
country for the number of people sentenced 
to death each year in recent times. 
Yet it is the only state in America that has 
no public defender programme, which 
means that people charged with offences 
that could lead to the death penalty have no 
right to choqse a lawyer for themselves. 
Instead, they are handed a lawyer by 
Alabama state, some of whom, according to 
EJI, have fallen asleep or been drunk during 
trials. 
At the time Maples went on trial there was a 
limit on out-of-court preparation costs for 
the state-appointed lawyer, who was given 
just $1,000 (£625) to prepare for the case. 
"When you pay someone this kind of money 
you have every reason to think the lawyer is 
not going to do effective work," Stevenson 
said. 
The result, he added, was that the burden of 
responsibility was placed on death row 
prisoners themselves-many of whom are 
poorly educated or mentally ill-to 
negotiate the legal maze. 
"The crazy situation is that we execute 
someone according to whether documents 
were filed on a Thursday or Friday, or if the 
Ts were cross and the Is dotted," he said. 
181 
"Pro Bono and Big Law Firms (or Who Exactly Was 
CoryMaples's Lawyer?)" 
Balkinization 
March 23,2011 
Jason Mazzone 
The Supreme Court has granted review in 
Maples v. Allen, a habeas case. Cory Maples 
was convicted of murder and sentenced to 
death in Alabama. The conviction and 
sentence were affirmed on appeal. Maples 
thereafter filed a state petition for post-
conviction relief arguing that his trial lawyer 
was constitutionally defective. The state 
court hearing that petition denied it. Maples 
did not file a timely notice of appeal from 
that denial and only found out about the 
decision after the time to appeal had passed. 
According to the record in the case, the 
court clerk had mailed of a copy of the order 
denying the petition to Maples's attorneys at 
the law firm where, according to the docket 
. information, they were employed. Those 
lawyers, however, had since left the firm 
(without updating their contact information 
with· the court) and so the mail room 
receiving the court's mailing sent it back to 
the court. The court clerk made no 
additional effort to locate Maples's 
attorneys. The clock ticked. Maples's time 
to appeal ran out. After Maples eventually 
became aware of the denial of his original 
petition, he unsuccessfully petitioned the 
state appellate court to allow an untimely 
appeal. He thereafter filed a federal habeas 
. petition, asserting his ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel claim. The federal district 
court denied the habeas petition on the 
ground that the claim was procedurally 
defaulted and there was no good cause that 
would excuse the default. The 11th Circuit 
affirmed the district court. 
The case has attracted significant attention 
because the lawyers representing Maples in 
the post-conviction proceeding, Clara Ingen-
Housz and Jaasi Munanka, were from the 
New York office of Sullivan & Cromwell 
(S&C); it was the S&C mail room that 
returned the trial court's oi'der to the court 
after Ingen-Housz and Munanka had left 
S&C. Numerous commentators have asked 
how it is that S&C dropped the ball, with the 
result that Maples· now faces execution 
. without any federal review of his ineffect.ive 
assistance of counsel claim. 
I see some different issues. 
First things first: the case isn't important for 
the legal questions it raises and it isn't going 
to generat~ any new law. Maples is 
represented at the Supreme Court by former 
Solicitor General Gregory Gane. Maples 
asks the Supreme Court for a ruling that the 
state timing rule is not consistently applied 
and therefore is not adequate to procedurally 
bar his habeafi petition. In light of. the 
Comt's recent decision in Beard v.' Kindler, 
it is very unlikely that the Court will grant 
Maples reliefon that basis. Instead, I predict 
a "sympathy" per curiam, in which the Court 
will squeezes Maples's plight into Holland 
v. Florida. and hold that equitable tolling is 
appropriate in his case. Maples will end up 
with federal review of his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim (which, like 
most such claims, will likely fail on the 
merits). 
The more interesting aspect of the case is 
what it tells us about pro bono work at big 
law firms. 
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Although Ingen-Housz and Munanka were 
attorneys at S&C at the time they took on 
Maples's case, Maples was apparently not 
represented by S&C itself. Among the 
materials in the record (petition for cert., p. 
257a) is an affidavit from an S&C patineI', 
Marc De Leeuw, who explains: 
Lawyers at S&C handle pro bono 
cases on an individual basis. 
Accordingly, the lawyers who first 
appeared in this case, and all lawyers 
who have participated thereafter, 
have done so on an individual basis, 
and have attempted not to use the 
firm name on cOlTespondence or 
cOUli papers. 
In the state cOUli filings, therefore, Maples's 
attorneys of record were Ingen-Housz . and 
Munanka (not Ingen-Housz and Munanka of 
S&C). 
It isn't hard to think of reasons a big law 
firm would, as a legal matter, have pro bono 
clients represented by individual attorneys 
rather than the firm at large. Individual 
representation limits the firm's exposure to 
liability; the firm need not hold onto the case 
if (as here) the lawyers leave the firm; the 
firm need not commit its vast resources to 
the case; and if the case comes out badly the 
firm can deny responsibility. Indeed, if 
Ingen-Housz and Munaka were Maples's 
attorneys in an individual capacity, it 
becomes hard to fault the S&C mailroom or 
S&C itself. After all, nobody at S&C would 
have a responsibility (or perhaps even 
authority) to open and hand over to another 
attorney within the firm a court document 
sent to an individual attorney in care of S&C 
,concerning a client S&C never represented. 
In practice, however, the wall between 
individual attorneys and the firm where they 
are ordinarily employed is obviously far less 
solid. As is true of most pro bono work in 
big firms, it is very likely that Ingen-Housz 
and Munanka worked on Maples's case in 
the office and not at home. They likely used 
firm resources (the Westlaw account, 
secretarial support and so on). And they 
were likely able to count the hours they 
worked on the case towards whatever hourly 
expectations the film has of its attorneys. 
Moreover, S&C (like other big firms) 
celiainly gives a public impression that the 
firm itself is handling the pro bono cases. 
S&C's website says, for example: 
S&C consistently ranks among the 
leaders of large firms in participation 
in pro bono and other public service 
activities .... We are proud of our 
tradition of public service and of the 
quality and quantity of S&C's 
diverse pro bono practice. 
Our lawyers . . . represent pro bono 
clients around the country in various 
habeas corpus matters, in post-
conviction death row proceedings 
and in federal narcotics prosecutions. 
Sullivan & Cromwell's public 
service activities are coordinated by 
Marcia Levy, Special Counsel for 
Pro Bono Initiatives, along with the 
Firm's five-patineI' Public Service 
Committee. S&C recently created 
the position of Special Counsel for 
Pro Bono Initiatives to enhance the 
Film's deep commitment to pro bono 
work and broaden the opportunities 
and types cif pro bono m!ltters 
. available. In addition, the Firm has 
designated a day-to-day coordinator 
of pro bono activities. 
The coordinators . seek out 
challenging and rewarding public 
service opportunities. The Firm 
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creates munerous opportunities for 
all lawyers, summer associates and 
legal assistants to participate III 
public service activities. 
Public service matters . are generally 
undertaken in one of two ways: as a 
result of a referral from a community 
organization or at the initiative of the 
Firni or individual lawyers. . S&C 
encourages lawyers to learn about 
and sign up for pro bono matters 
through Pro Bono Net 
(www.probono.net). In whichever' 
way a matter is initiated, a proposed 
new matter goes through the Firm's 
standard new matter opening 
procedures. These procedures 
include conflict clearance as well as 
approval by the Managing Partners 
Committee. 
All of this suggests to me that pro bono 
clients are S&C clients. 
More significantly, Maples might well have 
believed-and might still believe-he was 
represented by S&C. His petition for 
celiiorari indicates that after Maples learned 
of the missed deadline, his mother called 
S&C, which arranged for new lawyers from 
the firm to take over the case. The Eleventh 
Circuit's opinion refers repeatedly to S&C 
as representing Maples. And the Wall Street 
Journal says that S&C hired Gregory Garre 
to handle the case at the Supreme Court. 
This case raises in my mind three basic 
questions about big law representation of 
pro bono clients. One is whether the clients 
know they are represented only by 
individual attorneys (and therefore cannot 
count on the firm as a whole for resources 
and support). A second question is whether 
big firms should receive the public credit 
they do for pro bono work conducted by 
attorneys acting in an individual capacity. 
The third question might be the most 
important. If lawyers at big firms are 
handling pro bono case in an individual (and 
not firm) capacity, we might well ask about 
the quality of lawyering the pro bono clients, 
especially in death penalty cases, are given. 
Clara Ingen-Housz and Jaasi Munanka 
began representing Cory Maples in 
September 2000. Ingen-Housz was trained 
as a lawyer in France and she received an 
L.LM from Harvard in 1999. Munanka 
graduated from the University of Michigan 
Law School, also in 1999. Neither of the two 
did a clerkship before starting at S&C. In 
other words, Maples's life was in the hands 
of two lawyers, one educated in France, both 
just entering their second year as S&C 
associates in New York City. And those two 
sophomore lawyers were responsible for 
navigating the complexities of Alabama law 
and the minefieid of federal law governing 
habeas review of state court judgments. 
There is no question that a firm like S&C 
can handle the complexities and risks of 
death penalty litigation. But leaving the task 
to two beginners, if that's what big firms are 
doing, is surely a bigger sin than any a mail 
room employee niight commit. 
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Howes v. Fields 
10-680 
Ruling Below: Fields v. Howes, 617 F.3d 813 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. granted 131 S. Ct. 1047 
(U.S. 2011). 
In 2001, Petitioner Randall Fields was serving a 45-day sentence for disorderly conduct in the 
Lenawee county j ail when he was taken out of his cell and questioned for several hours about his 
relationship with a minor. FIelds was informed he was free to leave at any time during this 
session but was not otherwise read his Miranda rights. Statements made by Fields during this 
session were used at a subsequent trial, over objection by defense counsel, where Fields was 
convicted of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The Michigan Court of Appeals 
affirmed Fields' conviction, holding that Fields was unquestionably in custody but because he 
had been informed he was free to leave and never asked to do so, Miranda wamings were not 
required. The Michigan Supreme Court denied Fields permission to appeal that decision and 
Fields then filed for habeas relief in federal coUti. The district court conditionally granted Fields' 
habeas petition holding the state court umeasonably applied Mathias v. United States resulting in 
non-harmless error. . 
Question Presented: Whether this Court's clearly established precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
holds that a prisoner is always "in custody" for purposes of Miranda any time that prisoner is 
isolated from the general prison population and questioned about conduct occurring outside the 
prison regardless of the surrounding circumstances. 
Randall Lee FIELDS, Petitioner-Appellee, 
v. 
Carol HOWES, Respondent-Appellant. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
Decided and Field: August 20,2010 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
DAN AARON POLSTER, District Judge. 
Appellant appeals the district court's 
conditional grant of the petition of writ of 
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
The district court found that the Michigan 
Court of Appeals umeasonably applied 
established federal law in determining that a 
confession made by Appellee was properly 
admitted into evidence. For the following 
reasons, we affirm. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Appellee Randall Lee Fields was 
incarcerated at· the Lenawee County 
Sheriffs Department for disorderly conduct 
on December 23, 2001, when a corrections 
officer escorted him from his cell to a locked 
conference room in the main area of the 
sheriff s department. Fields was not advised 
of where he was being taken or for what 
purpose. He was wearing an orange 
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jumpsuit, but was not handcuffed or 
otherwise chained. 
In the conference room, Fields was 
questioned by Deputy David Batterson and 
Deputy Dale Sharp about his relationship 
with Travis Bice, whom Fields had met 
when Bice was a minor. The questioning 
commenced between 7:00 p.m. and 9:00 
p.m. and lasted for approximately seven 
hours. Fields was not read his Miranda 
rights but was told that if he did not want to 
cooperate he was free to leave the 
conference room at any time. Leaving the 
locked conference room would have taken 
nearly twenty minutes, as a corrections 
officer would have had to have been 
summoned to return Fields to his cell. 
Fields did not ask for an attorney or to go 
back to his cell. However, he told the 
officers more than once that he did riot want 
to· speak with them anymore. At one point in 
the interview, Fields became angry and 
started yelling. Deputy. Batterson testified 
that he told Fields he was not going to 
tolerate being talked to like that and that 
Fields Was welcome to return to his cell. 
Additionally, Deputy Sharp testified that 
Deputy Batterson told Fields that if he 
continued to yell the interview would be 
terminated. Fields testified that he was told 
to "sit my fucking ass down" and that "if I 
didn't want to cooperate, I could leave." 
During the interview, Deputy Batterson told 
Fields that there had been allegations of a 
sexual nature involving Bice. Fields initially 
did not acknowledge any sexual relationship 
with Bice, but he eventually admitted to 
masturbating Bice and engaging in oral sex 
with him on at least two occasions. Prior to 
trial in the Lenawee County Circuit Court, 
the trial judge denied Fields' motion to 
suppress these statements. At trial, over the 
renewed objection of defense counsel, 
Deputy Batterson testified to Fields' 
jailhouse admissions. Fields was ultimately 
convicted of two counts· of third-degree 
. criminal sexual conduct and was sentenced 
on December 5, 2002, to a prison term often 
to fifteen years. 
Fields filed an appeal of right in the 
Michigan Court of Appeals on three 
grounds. The ground relevant to the instant 
appeal asserted that "[t]he trial court 
violated Mr. Fields' due process rights by 
admitting his alleged custodial statement 
where Mr. Fields was in custody in the 
county jail and the Lenawee County sheriff 
interrogated him for as much as 7 hours 
without providing Miranda warnings." The 
Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
cOUli, holding that because Fields "was 
unquestionably in custody, but on a matter 
unrelated to the interrogation" and "was told 
that he was free to leave the conference 
room and return to his cell ... [but] never 
asked to leave . . . Miranda warnings were 
not required . . ." People v. Fields, No. 
246041,2004 WL 979732, at *2 (Mich.App. 
May 6, 2004). The Michigan Supreme Court 
denied Fields leave to appeal the Michigan 
Court of Appeals' decision. People v. 
Fields, 471 Mich. 933, 689 N.W.2d 233 
(Mich.2004) (table). 
Fields then filed a pro se petition, pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, for a writ of habeas 
corpus on the same grounds as his direct 
appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals. 
The district court conditionally granted 
Fields's habeas petition, holding that the 
state court unreasonably applied Mathis v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503,20 
L.Ed.2d 381 (1968) and that the state court's 
error was not harmless. Appellant Carol 
Howes, Warden of the Lakeland 
Correctional Facility in Coldwater, 
Michigan, has appealed the district court's 
decision. 
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The district court's grant of a writ of habeas 
corpus is reviewed de novo. Findings of fact 
are reviewed for clear error unless· the 
district court's decision is based on the 
transcripts from the petitioner's state court 
trial, in which case the findings of fact are 
reviewed de novo. Questions of law and 
mixed questions of law and fact are also 
reviewed de novo. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Appellant argues that the district court 
misinterpreted and erroneously applied 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d) by determining that the 
state court adjudication was objectively 
unreasonable. 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which is part of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), provides that: 
(d) An application for a writ of 
habeas corpus on behalf of a person 
in custody pursuant to the judgment 
of a State court shall not be granted 
with respect to any claim that was 
adjudicated on the merits in State 
court proceedings unless the 
adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of 
the United States. 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
The district court made no findings of fact 
because the parties agreed there were no 
factual disputes. Thus, we are left to 
examine, de novo, whether the Michigan 
Court of Appeals' decision was contrary to, 
or an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established federal law. 
A state court decision is contrary to clearly 
established Jederallaw as determined by the 
Supreme Court if: (1) the state court arrives 
at a conclusion opposite to that r~ached by 
the Supreme Court on a question of law; or 
(2) the state court confronts a set of facts 
that are materially indistinguishable from a 
Supreme Court decision and nevertheless 
arrives at a result different from Supreme 
Court precedent. A state court unreasonably 
applies clearly established federal law if the 
state court identifies the correct goveming 
legal rule from the Supreme Court's cases 
but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the . 
state prisoner's case. A state court's 
application of federal law must be 
"objectively unreasonable" to be an 
unreasonable application of federal law 
under § 2254( d)(1). Critically, "an 
unreasonable application of federal law is 
different from an incorrect application of 
federal law." Nevertheless, if the Supreme 
Court has not "broken sufficient legal 
ground to establish [a] ... constitutional 
principle, the lower federal courts cannot 
themselves establish such a principle with 
clarity sufficiept to satisfy the AEDP A bar" 
under either the contrary to or unreasonable 
application standard. 
The Fifth Amendment provides that no 
person ". . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against 
himself. . . ." In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 444-45,86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 
694 (1966), the Supreme Court held that this 
privilege against self-incrimination applies 
to a criminal suspect subjected to custodial 
interrogation. Specifically, statements taken 
during a custodial interrogation cannot be 
admitted to establish the guilt of the accused 
unless the accused was provided a full and 
effective waming of his rights at the· outset 
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of the interrogation process and knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently waived his 
rights. Custodial interrogation is 
"questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom of action in any significant way." 
Miranda only applies if the suspect was (1) 
interrogated while (2) in custody. 
Interrogation under Miranda is "express 
questioning or its functional equivalent" that 
law enforcement officers "should know [is] 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response." Appellant does not dispute that . 
the two law enforcement officials' seven 
hour questioning of Fields constituted an 
interrogation. Therefore, we must only 
determine whether Fields was in custody for 
purposes of Miranda. 
"Miranda warnings are required only where 
there has been such a restriction on a 
person's freedom as to render him 'in 
custody. ,,, "Although the circumstances of 
each case must certainly influence a 
determination of whether a suspect is in 
custody for purposes of receiving of 
Miranda protection, the ultimate inquiry is 
simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or 
restraint on freedom of movement' of the 
degree associated with a formal arrest." 
In Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 
S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968), the 
Supreme Court held that "nothing in the 
Miranda opinion ... calls for a cUliailment of 
the warnings to be given persons under 
interrogation by officers based on the reason 
why the person is in custody." While the 
petitioner in Mathis was serving time in a 
state prison for an unrelated conviction, an 
IRS agent questioned him about tax refunds 
he had claimed on his individual income tax 
returns. The agent did not read the petitioner 
his Miranda' rights prior to obtaining 
documents and oral statements subsequently 
used to convict the petitioner of two counts 
of knowingly filing a false claim. At trial, 
the district court denied the petitioner's 
attempts to suppress the evidence elicited by 
the revenue agent. On appeal, the circuit 
court affirmed the district court. 
The Supreme COUli reversed the lower 
courts, finding that the petitioner was 
entitled to receive a Miranda warning prior 
to questioning by the govemment agent. 
Specifically, the Supreme Court rejected the 
respondent's contentions that Miranda did 
not apply because: (1) the questions asked 
were part of a routine civil, rather than 
criminal, tax investigation; and (2) the 
petitioner was in jail for a separate offense 
than that for which he was being questioned. 
The respondent's first contention was 
rejected because, as occurred with the 
defendant in Mathis, civil tax investigations 
frequently lead to criminal prosecutions. In 
rejecting the second distinction, the Supreme 
Court found that requiring Miranda 
warnings only where questioning occurs in 
connection with the case for which a suspect 
is being held in custody "goes against the 
whole purpose of the Miranda decision 
which was designed to' give meaningful 
protection to Fifth Amendment rights." 
The central holding. of Mathis is that a 
.Miranda warning is required whenever an 
incarcerated individual is isolated from the 
general prison population and interrogated, 
i.e. questioned in a manner likely to lead to 
self-incrimination, about conduct occurring 
outside of the prison. In the instant case, the 
district cOUli determined that the Michigan 
Court of Appeals unreasonably applied 
Mathis by concluding that the investigators 
need not have provided Miranda warnings 
to Fields because the interrogation was 
unrelated to the crime for which he was 
being held in custody. Though we agree 
with the district cOUli's decision, we believe 
that the Michigan Court of Appeals' 
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· decision was contrary to, as opposed to an 
unreasonable application of, Mathis. In its· 
opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
explicitly stated that Fields "was 
unquestionably in custody, but on a matter 
unrelated to the interrogation," yet still 
concluded that Miranda warnings were not 
required. People v. Fields, No. 246041, 
2004 WL 979732 at *2 (Mich.App. May 6, 
2004) (emphasis added). The Michigan 
Court of Appeals did not cite Mathis nor any 
case relying upon Mathis in its decision. 
However, the material facts in this case are 
indistinguishable from Mathis. In both 
cases, the imprisoned suspect was 
interrogated about a matter unrelated to his 
offense of incarceration. Yet, while the 
Supreme Court in Mathis held that the 
suspect was entitled to a Miranda warning 
prior to interrogation, the Michigan Court of 
Appeals ruled that a Miranda warning was 
not required. The Michigan Court of 
Appeals therefore arrived at a conclusion 
contrary to clearly established federal law. 
Appellant contends that federal law does not 
necessarily require Miranda warnings any 
time an incarcerated individual is questioned 
about a subject unrelated to the offense of 
incarceration. As there was no Sixth Circuit 
decision on point at the time of briefing, 
Appellant cites numerous cases from other 
Circuits to support its position. 
However, these cases are readily 
distinguishable from Mathis and do not 
provide persuasive authority to this case, 
which may explain why none of them were 
cited by the Michigan Court of Appeals. 
Four cases involved on-the-scene 
questioning by prison officers concerning an 
offense committed .in the jail itself. See 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S.Ct. 1602 
("General on-the-scene questioning as to 
facts surrounding a crime or other general 
questioning of citizens in the fact-finding 
process is not affected by our holding"). 
Five cases involved voluntary 
made by individuals who 
interrogated in isolation. 
confessions 
were not 
Because Fields was removed from the 
general prison population for interrogation 
about an offense unrelated to the one for 
which he was incarcerated, Mathis is the 
applicable law. None of the cited appellate 
cases, all of which Were decided subsequent 
to Mathis, erode its essential holding: 
Miranda warnings must be administered 
when law enforcement officers remove an 
inmate from the general prison population 
and interrogate him regarding criminal 
conduct that took place outside the j ail or 
prison. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals correctly 
determined that Fields was "unquestionably" 
in custody and was subject to interrogation. 
Fields was taken from his prison cell to a 
conference room without explanation. The 
conference room was locked. Though told 
that he could leave at any time, exiting the 
conference room was a lengthy process that 
required a corrections officer to be 
summoned. Thus, Fields faced the type of 
"restraint on freedom of movement" 
necessary to be deemed in custody. 
Furthermore, Fields was .questioned for 
approximately seven hours. The subject of 
the questioning was his sexual relationship 
with a minor, which was not related to his 
offense of incarceration. This was assuredly 
an interrogation as it was express 
questioning that was reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response. 
Despite properly determining that Defendant 
was in custody and subject to interrogation, 
the Michigan Court of Appeals erroneously 
concluded that "there must be some nexus . 
between [the elements of custody and 
interrogation]· in order for Miranda to 
apply." Fields, 2004 WL 979732, at *2. The 
Michigan Court of Appeals relied upon 
189 
People v. Honeyman, 215 Mich.App. 687, 
546 N.W.2d 719, 723 (1996), which created 
the "nexus" test without citation to federal 
authority. Fields, 2004 WL 979732, at *2 n. 
3. However,· Miranda and its progeny only 
require a finding of custodial interrogation; 
there is no nexus requirement. Thus, the 
MiChigan Court of Appeals erred first by 
searching for a nexus between custody and 
interrogation and then by finding that, 
because Defendant was in custody "on a 
matter unrelated to the interrogation," 
Defendant wasn't "in custody for the 
purpose of determining whether Miranda 
wamings were required." Fields, 2004 WL 
979732, at *2. 
. Any doubt that Fields was in Miranda 
custody is erased by both this Court's recent 
decision in Simpson v. Jackson, 615 F.3d 
421, No. 08-3224, 2010 WL 2771861 (6th 
Cir. July 13,2010), and the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Maryland v. Shatzer, - U.S. -
-, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 
. (2010). As an initial matter, it should be 
noted that although Simpson was argued 
after our case and both opinions were 
written concurrently, the Simpson decision 
was issued prior to this opinion. We are 
therefore bound. by its ruling. Because 
Simpson only briefly discussed the Miranda 
custodial interrogation issue, we are 
including a detailed explanation of our 
ruling. 
In Simpson, the incarcerated appellant, op 
separate occasions, made incriminating 
statements to police officers questioning him 
about a crime unrelated .to his offense of 
incarceration. The appellant was not read his 
Miranda rights on either occasion. The 
statements were then used as evidence to 
support criminal charges against the 
appellant. The appellant moved to suppress 
these statements at trial, but the state trial 
judge denied the motion and admitted his 
statements. The appellant was subsequently 
convicted. On direct appeal, the Court of 
Appeals of Ohio upheld the appellant's' 
conviction. The appellant then petitioned for 
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254, which was dismissed by the 
district court. The appellant appealed the 
dismissal to our court. The panel reversed 
the district court's dismissal and granted the 
appellant's petition, holding that the state 
court's decision was contrary to factually 
indistinguishable Supreme Court precedent. 
Specifically, the panel found "no relevant 
factual distinction between Mathis and the 
circumstances of [the appellant's 
statements]. " 
In both our case and Simpson, "as in Mathis, 
state agents unaffiliated with the prison 
isolated an inmate and questioned him about 
an unrelated incident without first giving 
Miranda wamings." Moreover, the state 
court judges in both cases, without even 
citing Mathis, ruled that statements obtained 
from such questioning was admissible. And 
in both cases, the failure to heed Mathis and 
forego the issuance of Miranda wamings 
was "improper" and "any resulting 
statements [should have been] suppressed" 
by the trial court. 
In Maryland v. Shatzer, the Supreme Court 
found an incarcerated prisoner subjected to 
questioning on an unrelated crime to be in 
custody for Miranda purposes. The Shatzer 
defendant, who was serving a sentence for 
an unrelated child-sexual-abuse offense, was 
questioned at the correctional institution by 
a detective on August 7, 2003, regarding 
allegations he had sexually abused his son. 
Before any questions were asked, the 
defendant was read his Miranda rights. 
Mistaking the detective for an attomey, the 
defendant waived his rights. However, once 
the detective explained he' was there to 
question the defendant about the allegations 
that he abused his son, the defendant 
declined to speak to the detective without an 
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attomey present and was released back into 
the general . prison population. 
Approximately two-and-a-half years later, 
on March 2, 2006, a new detective visited 
the defendant, who had been transferred to a 
different facility, to question him about the 
same allegations of abusing his son. The 
defendant was read his Miranda rights, and 
a written waiver of these rights was 
obtained. The defendant was questioned for 
approximately thirty minutes in a 
maintenance closet. He never requested an 
attomey be present or referred to his prior 
refusal to answer questions. 
Five days later, the detective retumed to the 
correctional facility with another detective 
to administer a polygraph examination to the 
defendant. The defendant was read his 
Miranda rights, and a written waiver was 
again obtained. When the detectives began 
questioning the defendant, he became upset 
and incriminated himself by saying "1 didn't 
force him." He then requested an attomey, 
ending the interrogation. 
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the 
incriminating statements made in 2006 
based on his invocation of his Miranda 
rights in 2003. The trial court denied his 
motion to suppress, reasoning that there was 
a break in custody between 2003 and 2006, 
and therefore, the 2006 waiver of his 
Miranda rights superseded the defendant's 
request for an attomey in 2003. The 
, defendant was subsequently found guilty of 
sexual child abuse of his son. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland reversed and 
remanded, and the Supreme Court of the 
United States granted a writ of certiorari. 
Holding that a break in custody of more than 
two weeks terminates' an invocation of 
Miranda protections, the Supreme Court 
reversed the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland and remanded the 
matter. The Court's opinion discussed 
whether incarceration necessarily constitutes 
custody, which it had "never decided ... and 
[had] indeed explicitly declined to address .. 
" Concluding that "all' forms of 
incarceration" satisfy the restraint on 
freedom of movement analysis of custody, 
the Court nevertheless held that "lawful 
imprisonment imposed upon conviction of a 
crime does not create the coercive pressures 
identified in Miranda "and. therefore 
Miranda rights are not triggered simply 
because an individual is incarcerated. That 
is, Miranda custody requires both a restraint 
on movement, which is always satisfied by 
incarceration, and coercive pressure. 
Critically for the pending appeal, the Court 
noted that" [n] 0 one questions that Shatzer 
was in custody for Miranda purposes during 
the interviews with Detective Blankenship 
in 2003 and Detective Hoover in 2006." A 
prisoner is in custody when he is removed 
from his "normal life" by being taken from 
his. cell to an isolated area, such as a closet 
or conference room, for the purpose of 
interrogation. Once the prisoner is then 
released back into the general prison 
population, away from his interrogators, he 
is no longer in custody. 
Thus, faced with a factual scenario of an 
inmate being removed from his cell and 
being interrogated about an unrelated crime, 
the Supreme Court expressed no doubt that a 
Miranda waming was required. The 
question facing the Court was whether the 
inmate's 2003 invocation of his Miranda 
rights precluded law enforcement from 
soliciting a Miranda waming in 2006 and 
interrogating the inmate again. The Supreme 
Court's unambiguous conclusion that the 
. Shatzer defendant was in Miranda custody 
on both occasions serves to bolster our 
detennination regarding Fields. 
Moreover, in finding that the defendant in 
Shatzer was in custody, the Supreme Court 
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did not address the physical circumstances 
of the intenogation, such as whether the 
intenogation room was· windowless, 
whether the defendant was handcuffed, 
whether the defendant was told he could 
stop the intenogation or the length of the 
intenogation. The Court's approach, 
combined with the holding in Simpson, 
. provides us the necessary guidance to 
formalize a bright line test for determining 
whether Miranda rights are triggered for an 
incarcerated individual. A Miranda warning 
must be given when an inmate is isolated 
from the general prison population and 
intenogated about conduct OCCUlTing outside 
of the prison. 
The critical issue in this inquiry becomes 
whether the prisoner is isolated from the 
general prison population for questioning. 
"Miranda ... was designed to guard against 
... the 'danger of coercion [that] results 
from the interaction of custody and official 
intenogation. '" While locking doors or 
handcuffing the inmate enhances the 
potential for coercion, isolation is perhaps 
the most coercive. aspect of custodial 
intenogation. Assuming the inmate is indeed 
undergoing intenogation, being placed in a 
room, apart from others within the prison 
populatiort, sequesters the. prisoner with his 
accusers in the type of scenario for which 
Miranda seeks to provide protection. 
Moreover, "[w]hen a prisoner is removed 
from the general prison population and taken 
to a separate location for questioning, the 
duration of that separation is assuredly 
dependent upon his intenogators." The 
sense of control exercised by intenogators 
over the prisoner in determining the length 
of the prisoner's removal from his normal 
life further reinforces the element of 
coercion.· A prisoner may feel he has no 
choice but to cooperate and provide the 
exact answers his intenogators seek to elicit, 
regardless of the potential for incrimination. 
We believe a reasonable person in an 
inmate's position would VIew such 
intenogation conducted in isolation as 
coercive, thus necessitating a Miranda 
warning. 
This bright line approach will obviate fact-
specific inquiries by lower courts into the 
precise circumstances of prison 
intenogations conducted in isolation, away 
from the general prison population. 
FUlihermore, law-enforcement officials will 
. have clearer guidance for when they must 
administer Miranda warnings prior to a 
prison intenogation. 
The Michigan COUli of Appeals' conclusion 
that, although Fields was in custody, 
intenogation without a Miranda warning 
was permissible because the questioning 
concerned an unrelated matter contradicts 
clearly established federal law as determined 
by the Supreme Court in Mathis. In order for 
habeas relief to be warranted, however, we 
must also determine if the admission of 
Fields' involuntary confession was harmless 
enol'. An eITor that "'had substantial and 
injurious effect or illfluence in determining 
the jury's verdict,'" is not harmless. Even if 
there is only "grave doubt about whether a 
trial enor of federal law has substantial and 
injurious effect or influence in determining 
the jury's verdict, that enor is not harmless." 
Moreover, "the risk that the confession is 
unreliable, coupled with the profound 
impact that the confession has upon the jury, 
requires a reviewing court to exercise 
extreme caution before determining that the 
admission of the confession at trial was 
harmless." 
There is no question that the failure to 
suppress Fields' confession was not 
harmless enor. In fact, Appellant has not 
even challenged this portion of the district 
court's ruling. Fields was convicted of two 
counts of third~degree criminal sexual 
conduct. As noted by the district court, the 
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critical evidence against Fields was his 
confession and the victim's testimony. The 
victim, however, recanted his testimony on 
several occasions, including telling two law 
enforcement officers and at least three other 
individuals' that the sexual conduct with 
Petitioner never occurred. Accordingly, 
Fields' confession must have heavily 
influenced the jury's decision. The district 
court therefore correctly concluded that the 
trial court's errol' was,not harmless and that, 
consequently, habeas relief was merited 
because the Michigan Court of Appeals' 
decision contradicted ,federal law as 
established by the Supreme Court. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed supra, the district 
court's conditional grant of the petition of 
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254 is hereby AFFIRMED. 
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
I agree that the outcome of this case is 
controlled by this court's prior decision in 
Simpson v. Jackson, No. 08-3224, 615 F.3d 
421, 2010 WL 2771861 (6th Cir. July 13, 
2010). However, I write separately because I 
disagree with both Simpson's and the 
majority's interpretation of two Supreme 
Court cases: Mathis v. United States, 391 
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 
(1968) and Maryland v, Shatzer, - U.S. -
-, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 175L.Ed.2d 1045 
(2010). In particular, in contrast to the 
majority and Simpson, I do not believe that 
Mathis obviates the need for the context-
specific custody analysis clearly established 
by Miranda and its progeny. Moreover, I do 
not agree with the majority that Mathis 
established a bright line test to the effect 
that, "[a] Miranda warning must be given 
when an inmate is isolated from the general 
prison population and interrogated about 
conduct occurring outside of the prison." 
Instead, applying the context-specific 
Miranda custody analysis under the 
deferential review mandated by AEDP A, I 
believe that the propel' course of action in 
this case would be to reverse the district 
court and uphold the state court's 
. determination. 
I read Mathis as standing for a narrower 
proposition than does the majority. The 
Court in Mathis addressed the government's 
argument that it should: "narrow the scope 
of the Miranda holding by making it 
applicable only to questioning one who is 
'in custody' in connection with the very case 
under investigation." The Court found that 
there was "nothing in the Miranda opinion 
which call[ ed] for a curtailment of the 
warnings to' be given persons under 
interrogation by officers based on the reason 
why the person is in custody." Therefore, 
Mathis holds that Miranda applies to a 
person interrogated while in prison on 
charges unrelated to the investigation for 
which he is interrogated, but it does not 
establish that such a person is automatically 
in custody 01' entitled to Miranda warnings 
anytime he is intenogated away from the 
general prison population. Instead, this 
determination depends on the context-
specific analysis of whether the inmate' is 
deemed to be "in custody"; i.e., whether he 
was subject to the sort of isolation and 
coercive influence that trigger the need for 
Miranda warnings. Therefore, I would not 
read the "essential holding" of Mathis to be 
that "Miranda warnings must be 
administered when law enforcement officers 
remove an inmate from the general prison 
population and interrogate him regarding 
criminal conduct that took place outside the 
jail 01' prison." 
Furthermore, I also do not read Shatzer as 
bro'adly as does the majority here. 
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Admittedly, Shatzer does state that: "[n]o 
one questions that Shatzer was in custody 
for Miranda purposes during the interviews 
with Detective Blankenship in 2003 and 
Detective Hoover in 2006." However, the 
fact that no one questioned whether Shatzer 
was in custody, does not mean (or clearly 
establish) that anytime an inmate is removed 
from the general prison population and 
interrogated he is "in custody" for Miranda 
purposes. Instead, it only means that the 
parties, unlike the government in this case, 
did not make an issue of the "in custody" 
requirement in relation to those specific 
interrogations. 
Consequently, instead of adopting a bright 
line rule governing the interrogation of those 
already in prison and mandating that we find 
that Fields was in custody, I believe that the 
normal, context-specific analysis articulated 
in Miranda and its progeny applies here and 
that this analysis should determine whether 
Fields was in custody for Miranda purposes. 
In speaking of "custody," the language of 
the Miranda opinion indicates that "when an 
individual is taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom by the authorities in 
any significant way and is subjected to. 
questioning, the privilege against self-
incrimination is jeopardized." However, as 
the Court's cases "make clear . . . the 
freedom-of-movement test identifies only a 
necessary and not a sufficient condition for 
Miranda custody" and "Miranda is to be 
enforced 'only in those types of situations in 
which the concerns that powered the 
decision are implicated. '" The Court noted 
in Berkemer that: 
The purposes of the safeguards 
prescribed by Miranda are to ensure 
that the police do not coerce or trick 
captive suspects into confessing, to 
relieve the inherently compelling 
pressures generated by the custodial 
setting itself, which . work to 
undermine the individual's will to 
resist, and as much as possible to 
free. courts from the task of 
scrutinizing individual cases to try to 
determine, after the fact, whether 
particular confessions were 
voluntary. 
fd. at 433, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (internal citations 
and quotations omitted). 
Indeed, under the Miranda custody test: 
"[t]wo discrete inquiries are essential to the 
determination: first, what were the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation; 
and second, given those circumstances, 
would a reasonable person have felt he or 
she was not at liberty to terminate the 
interrogation and leave." Consequently, the 
Miranda custody analysis in this case is 
shaped by the circumstances surrounding 
Fields' interrogation, including the fact that 
Fields was already incarcerated on separate 
charges and, therefore, that he lived in 
prison. 
Turning to the particulars of this case, the 
Michigan Court of Appeals was the last state 
court to issue a reasoned oplmon. 
considering this issue. That court noted that 
the fact that "a defendant is in prison for an 
unrelated offense when being questioned 
does not, without more, mean that he was in 
custody for the purpose of determining 
whether Miranda warnings were required." 
People v. Fields, 2004 WL 979732, *2 
(Mich.Ct.App. May 6, 2004) (citation 
omitted). The court also noted that: 
[D]efendant was unquestionably in 
custody, but on a matter umelated to 
the interrogation: Although 
defendant was not read his Miranda 
rights, he was told that he was free to 
leave the conference room and return 
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to his cell. Defendant never asked to 
leave. Because Miranda wamings 
were not required, the trial court did 
not en in denying defendant's 
motion to suppress his statement. 
Obviously or "unquestionably," Fields was 
in custody in the sense that he was 
incarcerated on a matter unrelated to the 
intenogation. However, this does not mean 
that he was "in custody" for purposes of the 
Miranda and, indeed, the Michigan COUli of 
Appeals went on to describe the ·fact that 
Fields would have felt free to telminate the 
interview and leave, which is critical to the 
Miranda custody determination. In 
particular, even though Fields was 
intenogated hi a separate conference room, 
he was told that he was free to leave the 
conference room and retum to his cell; 
consequently, the Michigan COUli of 
Appeals concluded that Fields was not 
subject to the sort of coercion necessary to 
trigger Miranda warnings because he was 
not in custody for purposes of Miranda. 
We view this determination under AEDP A 
which, to grant relief, requires that we find 
the state court's decision to be "contrary to, . 
or involve[ ] an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law" as 
established "by the Supreme Court." 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A state-coUli decision 
is "contrary to" clearly established federal 
law if: (1) the state court applies a rule that 
contradicts the governing law set forth by 
the Supreme Court in its cases, or (2) the 
state court confronts a set of facts that are 
materially indistinguishable from. those 
presented in a Supreme COUli decision and 
neveliheless anives at a result different from 
Supreme Court precedent. In order to 
constitute an "unreasonable application" of 
clearly established federal law, a state 
court's application of federal law to the facts 
of the case must be "objectively 
unreasonable." The Supreme Court has 
stressed that "the most important point is 
that an unreasonable application of federal 
law is different from an inconect application 
of federal law." 
As discussed above, the Michigan Court of 
Appeals' decision has not been shown to be 
contrary to' clearly established Supreme 
Court precedent. That court did not apply a 
rule that contradicts the governing law set 
forth by the Supreme Court in its cases; 
instead, it applied the conect, context-
specific Miranda custody test. Nor did the 
Michigan Court of Appeals arrive at a result 
different from Supreme Court precedent on 
a set of facts that are materially 
indistinguishable from a Supreme Court 
decision. Furthermore, while a close call, I 
cannot say that the Michigan Court of 
Appeals' decision applying the context-
specific Miranda custody analysis is 
objectively unreasonable. The Michigan 
Court of Appeals provided the specific 
factual context sunounding the 
investigation: 
At trial, Deputy Batterson testified 
that he removed defendant from his 
cell, where he was jailed on domestic 
assault, and led him to a conference 
room. He told defendant that he 
wanted to speak with him in regard 
to the victim whom defendant 
indicated he knew; The interview 
began around 7:00 or 9:00 p.m. and 
ended around midnight. Defendant 
was not read his Miranda rights, but 
Deputy Batterson told him he was 
free to leave the conference room 
and return to his j ail cell. 
Fields, 2004 WL 979732 at * 1. 
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As noted above, the Michigan Court of 
Appeals found the fact that Fields was told 
that he was free to leave to be critical. 
It is true that Fields had to leave his cell, and 
was escorted through a separate door into a 
conference room in a separate building, and 
that he was questioned at length. However, 
Fields was a prisoner. So, the fact that he 
had to be escorted to the conference room, 
and could leave and return to his cell at any 
time, but only with an escort, were normal, 
routine features of his life as an inmate. 
While he did have to pass through the J-
door, and the conference room was in a 
separate part of the building, the state cOUli 
rightly noted that· the fact that Fields was 
told he could leave at any time is of critical 
significance. This, along with the fact that 
Fields was already accustomed to 
incarceration and its accompanying 
restraints, demonstrate that there were 
objective circumstances creating an 
interrogation environment in which a 
reasonable person, already imprisoned on 
separate charges, "would have felt free to 
terminate the interview and leave." 
In short, while the maj ority' s bright line rule 
frees the courts from the task of scrutinizing 
individual cases to try to determine whether 
the suspect already incarcerated on separate 
charges was in custody for Miranda 
. purposes, I do not believe that it is 
appropriate for this court to fashion such a 
rule under the constraints imposed by the 
AEDP A. Instead, we should apply the 
context-specific analysis atiiculated in 
Miranda and its progeny to determine 
whether Fields was "in custody." Under 
these circumstances, because "fair-minded 
jurists could disagree over whether [Fields] 
was in custody," the state court's decision 
that Fields was not in custody was not 
objectively unreasonable. However, Slllce 
we are bound by Simpson, I concur. 
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"Scope of Miranda in Jail" 
SCOTUSblog 
January 24,2011 
Lyle Denniston 
The Supreme Court a'greed on Monday to 
clarify when prison or jail' officials must 
give an inmate warnings about his rights 
under Miranda v. Arizona, when they take 
the prisoner out of a cell for questioning 
about another crime. The issue arises in a 
Michigan child sex abuse case, Howes v. 
Fields (10-680). The Court's ruling on the 
case-expected in its next Term-will 
clarify the scope of the Court's ruling in 
1968 in Mathis v. Us. That was one of two 
cases granted review before the Justices 
began a four-week recess. 
* * *, 
The new Miranda case the Court put on its 
decision docket grows out of an 
investigation by sheriff's deputies in 
Lenawee County, Mich., into a possible 
sexual abuse of a minor. Randall Fields was 
in the county jail serving a 45-day sentence 
for disorderly conduct. He was taken out of 
his cell, and questioned for perhaps seven 
hours in a conference room. During the 
questioning, he was told he could leave, but 
state courts concluded that he was "in 
custody" during that intelTogation. 
However, state courts ruled that, because 
Fields was questioned about a potential 
crime other than the one for which he was in 
j ail, and thus there was no connection 
between the two, the deputies were not 
required .to give him Miranda warnings. 
That ruling was overturned when Fields took 
the case on to federal court. The Sixth 
Circuit, Court interpreted the 1968 Mathis 
decision to mean that "a Miranda warning is 
required whenever an incarcerated 
individual is isolated from the general prison 
population and intelTogated, i.e., questioned 
in a manner likely to lead to self-
incrimination, about conduct occurring 
outside of the prison." 
State officials urged the Supreme Court to 
rule that such a "bright-line rule" goes 
beyond what the Court had previously 
required. 
* * * 
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"Guam Joins Miranda Suit in High Court" 
Pacific Daily News 
June 9, 2011 
Steve Limtiaco 
Guam Attorney General Leonardo Rapadas 
and attorneys general from three dozen 
states filed a "friend of the court" brief with 
the U.S. Supreme Court, challenging a 
recent federal court decision that limits the 
ability of law enforcement to question 
prisoners. 
At issue before the high court is how to 
apply Miranda-informing someone of their 
right to remain silent and their right to legal 
counsel-when they are already locked up. 
The Sixth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in 
August 2010 ruled that inmates who are 
pulled aside for questioning while locked up 
need to be read their Miranda rights. 
But the attorneys general in their May 31 
brief argue it is only necessary to read 
inmates their Miranda rights if they are 
exposed to restraints or "coercive pressures" 
other than those typical of being in prison. 
Several other federal courts have adopted 
that position, they noted. 
The case is based on statements made by 
Randall Fields, who was arrested and locked 
up for disorderly conduct at the Lenawee 
County, Michigan, Sheriff s Department in 
December 2001. Deputies moved Fields to a 
locked conference room at the sheriff s 
department and questioned him. His 
statements to deputies were used against him 
in court, and he was convicted of two counts 
of criminal sexual conduct. 
He appealed to the federal district court, 
which ruled that Fields' confession was 
improperly admitted into evidence. Carol 
Howes, warden of the Lakeland Correctional 
Facility, appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which 
agreed with the lower court. 
According to the U.S. Supreme Comi brief 
filed by Rapadas and others, the states 
oppose any expansion of the Miranda 
doctrine, especially in prison, because it 
gives prisoners greater rights than other 
citizens. 
"Periodic removal from the. general 
population is a fact of life for most inmates 
and, therefore, does not itself generate the 
same type of coercive pressures at issue in 
Miranda," they stated. 
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Messerschmidt v. Millender 
10-704 
Ruling Below: Millender v. County of Los Angeles, 564 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2009), rehearing en 
banc 620 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted Messerschmidt v. Millender 10-704, 2011 WL 
2518829 (U.S. June 27,2011). 
Detective Curt Messerschmidt applied for a wanant to search the premises of Augusta Millender 
and seize property in connection with an assault with a deadly weapon. Millender was the foster 
mother of suspect Jeny Ray Bowen. Bowen's girlfriend at the time, Shelly Kelly alleged that 
Bowen fired multiple shots at her vehicle from "a black sawed off shotgun with a pistol grip." . 
Kelly provided Messerschmidt with a photograph of Bowen with this weapon. Messerschmidt 
drafted a warrant application that sought to seize all firearms, firearm parts, ammunition, or 
firearm-related paperwork at the residence and any articles of evidence that tended to show 
Bowen's affiliation with a street gang. 
The warrant was approved investigators conducted an early mOlning search of the residence, 
failing to find Bowen or the "black sawed off shotgun with pistol grip." The officers did however 
find and confiscate Millender's personal shotgun and ammunition. 
The Millenders filed suit, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The district 
court concluded the warrant was facially valid but unconstitutionally overbroad as to the search 
for firearms, firearm-related materials, and gang-related materials. The district court rejected the 
officers' claims of qualified immunity which was the subject of the Ninth Circuit appeal. The 
Ninth Circuit held the warrant was not supported by probable cause and the officers were not 
entitled to qualified immunity. 
Questions Presented: (1) Whether police officers are entitled to qualified immunity when they 
obtained a facially valid wan-ant to search for firearms, firearm-related materials,and gang..; 
related items in the residence of a gang member and felon who had threatened to kill his 
girlfriend and fired a sawed-off shotgun at her. (2) Whether United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984), and Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), should be reconsidered or clarified. 
Augusta MILLENDER; Brenda Millender; and William Johnson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v. 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; Robert J. Lawrence (292848); Curt Messerschmidt 
(283271), Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department; Leroy D. Baca; Scott Walker (188188); Rick 
Rector (280600); Donald Nichiporuk (213625); Richard Schlegel (280735), e/s/a M. 
Schlegel; Brice Stella (402018), e/s/a D. Stella; Jack Demello (223333), e/s/a J. Dernell; 
David O'Sullivan (293952); Jack Ritenour (164927); and Ian Stade (279464), Defendants. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Filed August 24,2010 
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[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
IKUTA, Circuit Judge: 
Plaintiffs Augusta Millender, Brenda 
Millender, and William Johnson 
(collectively, "the Millenders") filed this suit 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County 
of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles County 
Sheriffs Department, and several individual 
members of the Sheriff s Department, 
alleging violations of their civil rights. Their 
complaint arose from a search pursuant to a 
warrant obtained by Detective Curt 
Messerschmidt of the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff s Department and executed under the 
supervision of Sergeant Robert Lawrence. 
Messerschmidt and Lawrence (collectively, 
"the deputies") appeal from the district 
court's determination that they were not 
entitled to qualified immunity with respect 
to" the alleged overbreadth of the search 
warrant. Because the challenged sections of 
the warrant were "so lacking in indicia of 
probable cause as to render official belief in 
its existence unreasonable," Malley v. 
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 
89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986), we affirm. 
I 
On November 4, 2003, Messerschmidt 
applied for an arrest warrant for Jerry Ray 
Bowen at 2234 E. 120th St., Los Angeles, 
and for a warrant to" search that address and 
seize specified property in connection with 
"a spousal assault and an assault with a 
deadly weapon." Messerschmidt prepared an 
affidavit, entitled "Statement of Probable 
Cause." The affidavit contained the 
following facts: 
According to Kelly, as soon as the officers 
[assigned to protect her as she moved out of 
a residence shared with Bowen] left, Bowen 
appeared and screamed, "I told you to never 
call the cops on me bitch!" Bowen 
physically assaulted Kelly and [Kelly 
eventually escaped]. Bowen followed 
seconds later, now holding "a black sawed 
off shotgun with a pistol grip." Standing in 
front of Kelly's car, "Bowen pointed the 
shotgun at Kelly and shouted, "If you try to " 
leave, I'll kill you bitch." Kelly was able to 
escape by" leaning over in her seat and 
flooring the gas. Bowen jumped out of the" 
way and fired one shot at her, blowing out 
the front left tire qf Kelly's car. Chasing the 
car on foot, Bowen fired four more times in 
Kelly's direction, missing her each time. 
. . . Kelly reported the shooting, described 
Bowen's firearm as a "black sawed off 
shotgun with a pistol grip," and gave the 
officers four photos of Bowen to aid their 
investigation. 
Based on this information, Messerschmidt 
put a photo of Bowen into a "six pack" line-
up. When Messerschmidt showed the photo 
line-up to Kelly, she immediately identified 
Bowen and circled his picture. 
Messerschmidt's affidavit states that "[t]he 
person [Kelly] identified IS Jerry Ray Bowen 
. . . , a known Mona Park Crip gang 
member." Kelly told Messerschmidt that 
Bowen's current address was 2234 E. 120th 
St., Los Angeles. 
* * * 
Messerschmidt's" affidavit also requested 
night service of the search warrant, giving 
two reasons. First, "the investigation has 
shown that the primary suspect in this case 
has gang ties to the Mona Park Crip gang 
based on information provided by the victim 
and the cal-gang data base." Second, 
Messerschmidt believed that' "the nature of 
the crime (Assault with a deadly weapon) 
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goes to show that night service would 
provide an added element of safety to the 
community" as well as· to those personnel 
serving the warrant. The affidavit concluded 
by stating that Messerschmidt "believes that 
the items sought will be in the possession of 
Jerry Ray Bowen and the recovery of the 
weapon could be invaluable m the 
successful prosecution of the suspect 
involved in this case, and the curtailment of· 
further crimes being committed." 
In addition to preparing the affidavit, 
Messerschmidt completed a "Search 
Warrant and Affidavit" form to authorize the 
search of the residence identified in 
"Attachment 1" and the seizure of property 
identified in "Attachment 2." Attachment 1 
identifies the "location to be searched" as 
2234 E. 120th St. in Los Angeles. 
. Attachment 2 sets out two categories of 
items to search and· seize. The first 
paragraph lists: 
All handguns, rifles, or shotguns of 
any caliber, or any firearms capable 
of firing ammunition, or firearms or 
devices modified or designed to 
allow it to fire ammunition~ All 
caliber of ammunition, 
miscellaneous gun parts, gun 
cleaning kits, holsters which could 
hold or have held any caliber 
handgun being sought. Any receipts 
or paperwork, showing the purchase, 
ownership, or possession of the 
handguns being sought. Any firearm 
for which there is no proof of 
ownership. Any firearm capable of 
firing or chambered to fire any 
caliber ammunition. . 
The second paragraph lists: 
Articles of evidence showing street 
gang membership or affiliation with 
any Street Gang to include but not 
limited to any reference to "Mona 
Park Crips", including writings or 
graffiti depicting gang membership, 
activity or identity. Articles of 
personal property tending to 
establish the identity of person [sic] 
in control of the premise or premises. 
Any photographs or photograph 
albums depicting persons, vehicles, 
weapons or locations, which may 
appear relevant to gang membership, 
or which may depict the item being 
sought and or believed to be 
evidence in the case being 
investigated on this warrant, or 
which may depict evidence of 
criminal activity. Additionally to 
include any gang indiCia that would 
. establish the persons being sought in 
this warrant, affiliation or 
membership with the "Mona Park 
Crips" street gang. 
* * * 
Messerschmidt was aware of other relevant 
facts not included in the affidavit. First, 
Kelly explained to Messerschmidt that the 
address she gave him, 2234 E. 120th St., 
was the home of Bowen's foster mother, 
Augusta Millender. Second, Messerschmidt 
knew that Bowen had a previous criminal 
record and was on summary probation for 
spousal battery and driving without a 
license. Bowen also had several previous 
felony convictions and misdemeanor arrests, 
and was a "third strike candidate" under 
California law.· Third, in addition to 
identifying the gun Bowen used as a black 
sawed-off shotgun with a pistol grip, Kelly 
gave Messerschmidt a picture. of Bowen 
posing with the gun. FOUlih, there was no 
evidence that Bowen's assault on Kelly was 
in any way gang-related. In subsequent 
testimony, Messerschmidt answered "No" to 
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the question, "So you didn't have any reason 
to believe that the assault on Kelly was any 
sort of a gang crime, did you?" 
Before Messerschmidt submitted the 
warrants and affidavit to the magistrate, they 
were reviewed by his supervisors in the 
Sheriff s station, Sergeant Lawrence and 
Lieutenant Ornales. In addition, Deputy 
District Attorney Janet Wilson signed the 
search warrant, indicating that she had 
reviewed it for probable cause and approved 
it. Messerschllidt presented the Search 
Warrant and ·Affidavit and the Probable 
Cause An'est Warrant, along with their 
attachments (including the affidavit), to a 
magistrate. The magistrate approved both 
warrants and authorized night service. 
At 5:00 a.m. on the morning of November 6, 
2003, the Sheriffs Department's SWAT 
team served the search and arrest warrants at 
the 120th St. address. The SWAT team 
forced open the front security door, broke a 
front window, and proceeded to enter, 
search, and clear the house. The ten 
occupants of the house, including the 
Millenders, were ordered to exit, which they 
did. Once the SWAT team had secured the 
residence, investigators searched the area. 
While Messerschmidt and Lawrence did not 
participate in the search, they were both 
present. The investigators conducting the 
search failed to find Bowen or a black 
sawed-off shotgun with a pistol grip. 
However, they did find and take Augusta 
Millender's personal shotgun (a black 12-
gauge "Mossberg" with a wooden stock), a 
box of .45 caliber "American Eagle" 
ammunition, and a letter from Social 
Services addressed to Bowen. Some two 
weeks later, Messerschmidt, without SWAT 
assistance, arrested Bowen in the middle of 
the day· after discovering Bowen hiding 
under a bed in a motel room. 
The Millenders filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 against the County of Los Angeles, the 
Los Angeles County' Sheriff s Department, 
Sheriff Leroy Baca, and 27 Los Angeles 
County deputies, including Messerschmidt 
and Lawrence. As relevant here, the 
Millenders alleged violations of their FOUlih 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The 
parties filed cross motions for summary 
adjudication on the validity of the arrest and 
search warrants. The district court concluded 
that the arrest warrant was facially valid, and 
granted the defendants' motion for summary 
adjudication on this issue. The Millenders 
have not appealed this ruling. 
The district cOUli also held that the warrant's 
authorization to search for and seize all 
firearms, firearm-related materials, and 
gang-related items was unconstitutionally 
overbroad, but that its authorization to 
search for evidence tending to establish 
control of the premises was constitutional. 
Accordingly, the court granted the 
Millenders' motion for summary' 
adjudication as to firear~- and gang-related 
evidence, but granted the defendants' 
motion as to identification evidence. The 
district court then rejected the deputies' 
claim of qualified immunity on the ground 
that the deputies' actions were not 
objectively reasonable. 
Messerschmidt and Lawrence timely 
appealed the district court's determination 
that they were not entitled to qualified 
immunity. 
II 
[Jurisdiction and Standard of Review] 
III 
"The doctrine of qualified immunity 
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protects government officials from liability 
for civil damages insofar as their conduct 
does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known." A 
police officer is not entitled to qualified 
immunity if: (1) the facts show that the 
officer's conduct violated a plaintiff's 
constitutional rights; and (2) those rights 
. . 
were clearly established at the time of the 
alleged violation. Although we have 
. discretion to address these prongs in any 
order, we begin in this case by considering 
whether the deputies' conduct violated the 
Millenders' constitutional rights. 
A 
The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against umeasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath 01' affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
u.s. Const. amend. IV. 
* * * 
We read the Fourth Amendment as requiring 
"specificity," which has two aspects, 
"particularity and breadth." "Particularity is 
the requirement that the warrant must clearly 
state what is sought. Breadth deals with the 
requirement that the scope of the warrant be 
limited by the probable cause on which the 
warrant is based." In determining whether a 
warrant's description is sufficiently specific 
to meet these Fourth Amendment 
requirements, we consider the following 
questions: 
(1) whether probable cause exists to 
seize all items of a particular type 
described in the warrant; (2) whether 
the warrant sets out objective 
standards by which executing 
officers can differentiate. items 
subject to seizure from those which 
are not; and (3) whether the 
government was able to describe the 
items more particularly in light of the 
information available to it at the time 
the warrant was issued. 
Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 963 (citations omitted). 
The first consideration encapsulates the 
overarching Fourth Amendment principle 
that police must have probable cause to 
search for and seize "all the items of a 
particular type described in the warrant." 
The second and third factors are relevant to 
determining whether the warrant satisfies 
this general rule. 
When considering challenges to warrants 
under this framework, we must be mindful 
that a "magistrate's determination of 
probable cause should be paid great 
deference by reviewing courts." The 
Supreme Court has directed us to take a 
practical approach in determining whether 
there is sufficient probable cause, and to 
avoid "interpreting affidavits in a 
hypertechnical, rather than a common-sense, 
manner." "Deference to the magistrate, 
however, is not boundless." We are not to 
"defer to a warrant based on an affidavit that 
does not provide the magistrate with a 
substantial basis for determining the 
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existence of probable cause." 
B 
We begin by analyzing whether the 
warrant's authorization to search for 
firearms and firearm-related materials 
satisfies the three-factor specificity 
framework. We first consider whether the 
deputies had probable cause to search for 
and seize "all the items of a particular type 
described in the warrant." "The premise here 
is that any intrusion in the way of search or 
seizure is an evil, so that no intrusion at all 
is justified without a careful prior 
detelmination of necessity." For example, 
probable cause to search for documents 
peliaining to "certain aspects of [ an] 
operation" cannot justify the seizure of all 
documents in an office. 
As noted above, the warrant in this case 
authorizes a search for essentially any 
device that could fire ammunition, any 
ammunition, and any firearm-related 
materials. There is no dispute that the 
deputies had probable cause to search for 
and seize the "black sawed off shotgun with 
a pistol grip" used in the crime. But the 
. affidavit does not set forth any evidence 
indicating that Bowen owned or used other 
firearms, that such firearms were contraband 
or evidence ofa crime, or that such firearms 
were likely to be present at the Millenders' 
residence. Nothing in the warrant or the 
affidavit provides any basis for concluding 
there was probable cause to search for or 
seize the generic class of firearms and 
firearm-related materials listed in the search 
warrant. As such, we . conclude that 
"probable cause did not exist to seize all 
items of those particular types." 
* * * 
More specific standards may be contained in 
an affidavit, rather than the warrant itself, 
only if: "(1) the warrant expressly 
incorporate [ s] the affidavit by reference and 
(2) the affidavit either is attached physically 
to the warrant or at least accompanies the 
warrant while agents execute the search." ... 
In this case, the deputies argue that the 
affidayit narrowed the scope of the search 
warrant by including specific information 
about the crime at issue, the weapon used, 
and Bowen's gang membership, and that 
this information cured any constitutional 
deficiency. The affidavit does satisfy the 
first prong of the Kow test: the distri~t court 
found that the warrant expressly 
incorporated the affidavit by reference. But 
there is no evidence in the record, nor do the 
deputies argue, that the affidavit was 
physically attached to the warrant or 
accompanied the warrant on the search .. 
Therefore, we cannot consider its. effect. 
Even if we could consider the affidavit, it 
still would· not cure the warrant's 
deficiencies .... As in Kow, where we held 
that an incorporated affidavit did not cure a 
facially invalid warrant, "there is absolutely 
no evidence in this case that the officers who 
executed the warrant, although instructed to 
read the affidavit, actually relied on the 
information in the affidavit to limit the 
warrant's overbreadth." Accordingly, we 
cannot uphold the warrant based on 
objective standards in the affidavit. 
Finally, as suggested by the framework's 
third consideration, warrants may sometimes 
authorize a search for classes of generic 
items if the government was not "able to 
describe the items more particularly in light 
of the information available to it at the time 
the warrant was issued." ... But where the 
police do have information more specifically 
describing the evidence or contraband, a 
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warrant authorizing search and seizure of a 
broader class of items may be invalid .... 
In this case, the deputies had a precise 
description of the firearm used by Bowen in 
connection with his assault. Kelly, 
[described the gun and provided a picture of 
it]. Because the govemment knew '''exactly 
what it needed and wanted, ", this third 
consideration also cuts against the validity 
of the warrant. 
The deputies argue that the broad scope of 
the walTant was. necessary in light of the 
specific circumstances of the crime. They 
note that a sawed-off shotgun can be broken 
down into separate pieces for easier 
concealment and that the deputies had 
probable cause to believe that a search for 
the disassembled parts of the sawed-off 
shotgun would be necessary. But this 
reasoning does not preclude a more precise 
description of the items subject to seizure. 
Under the specific circumstances of the 
crime, the deputies' probable cause extended 
only to firearm components that could be 
part of a disassembled sawed-off shotgun 
with a pistol grip; there was no probable 
cause to search for disassembled pieces of 
all firearms described in the warrant. 
The deputies also argue that it was necessary 
to draft the firearm description broadly 
because Kelly could have been mistaken in 
her description of the gun. This argument 
has little force in this situation, because 
Kelly provided the officers with a picture of 
the weapon. The warrant did not omit details 
that Kelly might have mistaken or that might 
not have been accurately reflected in the 
photo, such as the color or specific make of 
the weapon. Rather, Messerschmidt failed to 
include any limitation that would have 
helped focus the walTant on the specific type 
of gun legitimately subject to the search. 
Thus, the deputies' argument, if availing, 
would impermissibly allow police to 
"enlarge a specific authorization, furnished 
by a walTant . . . into the equivalent of a 
general warrant to rummage and seize. at 
will." 
In short, the deputies had probable cause to 
search for a single, identified weapon, 
whether assembled or disassembled. They 
had no probable cause to search for the 
broad class of firearms and firearm-related 
materials described in the walTant. Although 
we have upheld walTants describing broad 
classes of items in certain cases,. the 
rationales adopted in those cases are 
inapplicable here given the information the 
deputies possessed. 
The deputies raise several additional 
arguments to justify the breadth of the 
warrant. These arguments, however, are 
unrelated to the constitutional requirement 
that a search warrant not issue except upon 
probable cause for every item described in 
the warrant. 
First, the deputies argue that it was 
reasonable for the warrant to authorize a 
broad search for firearms and firearm-
related materials because Bowen is a violent 
and dangerous person. . . . The dissent 
makes similar arguments, see Dissent at 
12742-44, n.1 & n.6, and also contends that 
probable cause existed because firearms are 
inherently dangerous, Dissent at 12743-44.4 
There is no doubt that deputies have a valid 
. interest in protecting themselves and the 
public from potentially· violent and 
dangerous suspeCts. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that courts must give 
"some latitude" to "officers in the dangerous 
and difficult process of making arrests and 
executing search warrants," In this vein, the 
4 We refer to Judge Callahan's dissent as "the 
dissent" or "Dissent." We refer to Judge Silverman's 
dissent by name. 
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Court's "search incident to arrest" doctrine 
allows a police officer to take into account 
the inherent hazards raised by an arrestee's 
potential access to firearms. But there is no 
"dangerousness" exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's probable cause requirement, 
regardless of whether a search involves 
violent suspects or deadly weapons. A 
police officer's valid safety concerns do not 
create a "fair probability" that a broad class 
of weapons may be found in a suspect's 
residence or that such items are contraband 
or evidence of a crime. The deputies cite no 
case, and we have found none, holding that a 
warrant's overbreadth could be cured simply 
because of potential danger to police officers 
at .some point in the future. Indeed, such a 
rule would permit officers to transform 
every warrant into a "general, exploratory 
search[ ]" allowing "indiscriminate 
rummaging through a person's belongings." 
Nor is there a per se rule that police have 
probable cause to search the residences of 
ex-felons for firearms and firearm-related 
items. 
Here the record is devoid of evidence that 
Bowen possessed guns other than the sawed-
off shotgun identified by Kelly or that the 
broad range of firearms covered by the 
warrant would be present in the Millenders' 
residence. Therefore, regardless of Bowen's 
history or the inherent dangerousness of 
firearms, the police lacked probable cause to 
apply for a search warrant for a broad range 
of firearms. 
In any event, because Messerschmidt did not 
inform the magistrate of Bowen's prior 
felonies, his criminal history is not relevant 
to our analysis here. It is well established 
that, in reviewing a search warrant, we are 
"limited to the information and 
circumstances contained within the four 
comers of the underlying affidavit." 
Probable cause is a determination made by 
the issuing magistrate based on the facts 
presented to him, not a determination made 
by an officer based on information known 
only to himself. Therefore, the dissent errs 
in suggesting that Messerschmidt's personal 
knowledge that Bowen· was a felon is 
sufficient to create probable cause. Dissent 
at 1036 & n.1. 
Second, the deputies argue they were 
justified in seeking all firearms and firearm-
related materials because such materials 
could aid in the prosecution of Bowen. 
Again, this argument is unrelated to. the 
constitutional requirement that there be 
probable cause for each item described in 
the warrant. Although the deputies likely 
had probable cause to search for a limited 
range of firearm-related material that would 
have provided circumstantial evidence of 
ownership of the sawed-off shotgun at issue, 
such as receipts or compatible ammunition, 
the warrant extended beyond such evidence 
to "[a]ny firearm capable of firing or 
chambered to fire any caliber ammunition." 
Put simply, the Fourth Amendment does not 
authorize the issuance of warrants to 
conduct fishing expeditions to find evidence 
that could assist officers in prosecuting 
suspects. 
The deputies further argue that any caliber 
of shotgun or receipts would show the 
possession and purchase of guns. But we fail 
to see how this gives the deputies probable 
cause, because the possession and purchase 
of guns by itself does not constitute 
contraband or evidence of a crime. As 
discussed above, the warrant did not include 
the information about Bowen's criminal 
record that could make his possession and 
purchase of guns a criminal offense, and 
thus such information cannot be considered 
in our analysis. Moreover, while the district 
court· concluded that the deputies had 
probable cause to search for "[a]rticles of 
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personal property tending to establish the 
identity of the person or persons in control 
. of the premise or premises," a ruling the 
Millenders do not challenge on appeal, the 
deputies do not argue that such probable 
cause justified their search for the broad 
range of firearms listed in the warrant. Nor 
. could they. While we have upheld warrants 
authorizing searches for "[i]ndicia tending to 
establish the identity of persons in control of 
the premises," the probable cause to search 
for such "indicia of control" usually refers to 
such items as "utility company receipts, rent 
receipts, cancelled mail envelopes, and 
keys," not to the full range of firearm and 
firearm-related materials sought here. 
Although we are deferential to a 
magistrate's determination of probable cause 
and consider the language of a warrant and 
affidavit in a common sense and practical 
manner, here we are unable to identify any 
basis, let alone a "substantial basis," for 
probable cause to search and seize the broad 
category of firearm and firearm-related 
materials set forth in the warrant. 
Accordingly, we find ourselves in that rare 
situation where we must conclude that the 
magistrate lacked a substantial basis for 
issuing the warrant for this broad range of 
items. 
C 
We next consider the search warrant's 
authorization to search for all gang-related 
items. . . . Neither of [the] assertions 
[provided in the affidavit] provides probable 
cause for a magistrate to conclude that 
"contraband or evidence of a crime," would 
be found at Mrs. Millender's residence. 
Merely being a gang member or having 
gang ties is not a crime in California. The 
relevant California law "imposes increased 
criminal penalties" for gang membership 
only when the underlying criminal act is 
"'for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in 
association with' a group that meets the 
specific statutory conditions· of a 'criminal 
street gang, ", and when the act is done with 
the "'specific intent to promote, further, or 
assist in any criminal conduct by gang 
members. ", Here, Messerschmidt himself 
stated he had no reason to believe that 
Bowen's assault on Kelly was related to 
gangs, and there is no evidence in the 
affidavit (or the record) to suggest 
otherwise. Because the deputies failed to 
establish any link between gang-related 
materials and a crime, the warrant 
authorizing the search and seizure of all 
gang-related evidence is likewise invalid. 
IV 
Our conclusion that there was no probable 
cause for the broad categories of firearm-
and gang-related items listed in the search 
warrant, and that the search warrant violated 
the Millenders' constitutional rights, is only 
the first step in our analysis of whether the 
deputies are entitled to qualified immunity. 
We must next consider whether the 
Millenders' constitutional rights were 
"clearly established" at the time of the 
deputies' alleged misconduct. 
A 
The Supreme Court has refined the 
application of the qualified immunity test in 
the FOUlth Amendment context. See Malley, 
475 U.S. at 344-46, 106 S.Ct. 1092; Groh, 
540 U.S. at 563-65, 124 S.Ct. 1284. In 
private actions against officers who have 
executed constitutionally inadequate 
warrants, the Supreme Court has held that an 
officer loses qualified immunity only when 
"a reasonably well-trained officer in [the 
defendant officer's] position would have 
known that his affidavit failed to establish 
probable cause and that he should not have 
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applied for the warrant." This standard 
"provides ample protection to all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate the law." 
Despite this protection, the Supreme Court 
has preserved the right of individuals to seek 
relief in certain narrowly defined 
circumstances. Malley and Groh, the two 
leading Supreme Court cases in this context, 
deal with facts and arguments similar to the 
case before us. In Malley, plaintiffs sued a 
state trooper under § 1983 for applying for 
an arrest warrant that failed to establish 
probable cause. Rather than granting the 
officer absolute immunity, Malley held that 
officers should receive only qualified 
immunity because "it would be incongruous 
to test police behavior by the 'objective 
reasonableness' standard in a suppression 
hearing, while exempting police conduct in 
applying for an arrest or search warrant from 
any scrutiny whatsoever in a § 1983 
damages action." Accordingly, Malley held 
that officers would be entitled to qualified 
immunity in § 1983 actions only under the 
same facts that would allow the government 
to claim a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule in a suppression hearing. 
Said otherwise, officers lose immunity only 
"where the warrant application is so lacking 
in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its existence unreasonable." 
Malley rejected the argument that the 
. trooper was "shielded from damages 
liability because the act of applying for a 
warrant is per se objectively reasonable" and 
that he was "entitled to rely on the judgment 
. of a judicial officer in finding that probable 
cause exists and hence issuing the warrant." 
According to Malley, that view of objective 
reasonableness was "at odds" with cases 
such as Leon and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 
(1982). Rather, the pertinent question must 
be "whether a reasonably well-trained 
officer in [the defendant. officer's] position 
would have known that his affidavit failed to 
establish probable cause and that he should 
not have applied for the warrant." If a 
reasonable officer would have known that 
the affidavit was fatally deficient, then the 
defendant's "application for a warrant was 
not objectively reasonable, because it 
created the unnecessary danger of an 
unlawful arrest [or search]." Malley declined 
to hold that an officer could rely on the 
determination of the magistrate, stating that 
"it is possible that a magistrate, working 
under docket pressures, will fail to perform 
as a magistrate should" and, accordingly, it 
was "reasonable to require the officer 
applying for the warrant to minimize this 
danger by exercising reasonable professional 
judgment." 
Groh offers an example of one of the rare 
cases described in Malley when a warrant is 
"so lacking in indicia of probable causeas to 
render official belief in its existence 
unreasonable," 475 U.S. at 345, 106 S.Ct. 
1092, notwithstanding the approval of a 
magistrate. In Groh, the plaintiff claimed his 
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated 
because the warrant authorizing the search 
and seizure of his property was invalid. 540 
U.S. at 554-55, 124' S.Ct. 1284. Although 
the defendant officer had prepared a detailed 
application for the warrant, the warrant itself 
included only a description of the plaintiff s 
residence, and it did not incorporate the 
application by reference. Groh held that the 
warrant "was plainly invalid" because it 
totally failed to describe the things to be 
seized, let alone with particularity . 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the 
search conducted pursuant to the warrant 
was unconstitutional. Rejecting the officer's 
assertion of qualified immunity, Groh 
reasoned that "just a simple glance [ ]would 
have revealed a glaring deficiency that any 
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reasonable police officer would have known 
was. constitutionally fatal." Further, the 
Court held that the officer "may not argue 
that he reasonably relied on the Magistrate's 
assurance that the warrant contained an 
adequate description of the things to be 
. seized and was therefore valid" because the 
officer himself prepared the invalid warrant. 
Accordingly, as Malley and Groh make 
clear, a plaintiff can proceed with a § 1983 
action stemming from· an officer's 
application for an invalid warrant in those 
limited situations when "a reasonably well-
trained officer" in the defendant's situation 
would have known that the warrant did not 
establish probable cause. When the warrant 
is so lacking in indicia of probable cause, 
officers cannot claim that they acted 
reasonably by seeking a warrant merely 
because a neutral magistrate approved the 
application; rather, officers must exercise 
their own "reasonable professional 
judgment." 
In interpreting these precedents, we have 
emphasized the "distinction between 
warrants with disputable probable cause and 
warrants so lacking in probable cause that 
no reasonable officer would view them as 
valid.~' Where the "lack of probable cause 
was so obvious that any reasonable officer 
reading the warrant would conclude that the 
warrant was facially invalid," we have held 
. that "[a]pproval by an attorney and a 
magistrate did not· justify reasonable 
reliance." 
B 
While the deputies claim that "a reasonably 
well-trained officer" in their position would 
no.t have known that the search warrant 
failed to establish probable cause, they add 
little to their prior arguments. The deputies 
argue that they could have reasonably but 
mistakenly concluded that they had probable 
cause to seize the weapon found at the 
Millender residence because "they would 
not know if the suspect would be coming 
back and the officers would not want the 
suspect to gain access to more weapons and 
hurt other people, including the victim in 
this case." To the extent this argument 
differs from their "dangerousness" 
argument, see supra at pp. 12729-30, it also 
fails. Although officers may make a 
warrantless entry into a residence under 
certain exigent circumstances, such as when 
"they have an objectively reasonable basis 
for believing that an occupant is seriously 
injured or imminently threatened with such 
injury," the exigent circumstances doctrine 
is an exception to the warrant requirement, 
not an authorization for the deputies to apply 
for a warrant that is not supported· by 
probable cause. The deputies also assert they 
could have been reasonably mistaken as to 
whether the underlying crime was gang-
related. This argument borders on· the 
frivolous, given Messerschmidt's statement 
that he had no reason to hold such a belief, 
and the absence of any evidence that the 
crime at issue was gang-related. 
The deputies' arguments cannot change the 
reality that the warrant in this case suffered a 
"glaring deficiency." Neither it nor the 
affidavit established probable cause that the 
broad categories of firearms, firearm-related 
material, and gan·g-related material 
described in the warrant were contraband or 
evidence of a crime. Moreover, a reasonable 
officer in the deputies' position would have 
been well aware of this deficiency. The 
affidavit indicated exactly· what item was 
evidence of a crime . . . and reasonable 
officers would know they could not 
undertake a general, exploratory search for 
unrelated items unless they had additional 
probable cause for those items. Under these 
circumstances, we cannot say that an officer 
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could reasonably but mistakenly believe that 
the search warrant established "a colorable 
argument for probable cause." Rather, the 
warrant here was "plainly invalid." 
Citing the dissenting opinions in Malley and 
Groh, see Dissent at 1039 n.8, 1038-40 & 
n.l0, 1045-46, the dissent would hold that 
the officers acted in an objectively 
reasonable manner as a matter of law 
because they "reasonably relied" on the 
review and approval of "their superiors, the 
district attorney, and the magistrate to 
correct the alleged over breadth in the search 
warrant," Dissent at 1044. Judge Silverman 
likewise suggests that the deputies are 
entitled to qualified immunity because they 
obtained a warrant, consulted with their 
superiors, and acted in good faith. Silverman 
Dissent at 1049-50. We cannot accept these 
propositions, however, because they conflict 
with the majority opinions in Malley and 
Groh, which imposed on police officers the 
independent responsibility to ensure there is 
at least a colorable argument for probable 
cause, and rejected the factors suggested by 
the dissenting justices for giving police 
officers even further protection from 
liability. Nor can we agree that the officers 
were objectively reasonable in obtaining a 
search warrant for a broad range of firearms 
and gang indicia because the suspect was an 
ex-felon, the firearms were inherently 
dangerous, and the firearms were 
specifically described. Dissent at 12759-60. 
As explained above, under basic Fourth 
. Amendment principles, a search warrant is 
not supported by probable cause unless the 
affidavit establishes that the items in the 
search warrant are contraband or evidence of 
a crime; neither information known only to 
the officer, the criminal status of the suspect, 
nor the dangerousness of the items listed in 
the warrant establishes probable cause. The 
dissent's desire to transform these long-
standing rules into a more "workable 
guideline," Dissent at 1041, does not excuse 
the police officers from compliance with the 
existing rules mandated by the Supreme 
Court. 
The deputies here had a responsibility to 
exercise their reasonable professional 
judgment. As Malley recognized, "ours is 
not an ideal system," and as such in 
circumstances such as these a neutral 
magistrate's approval (and, a fortiori, a non-
neutral prosecutor's, cannot absolve an 
officer of liability. Accordingly, the deputies 
are not entitled to qualified immunity with 
respect to the Millenders' claim that their 
role in obtaining and executing the warrants 
violated their constitutional rights. 
v 
* * * 
AFFIRMED. 
CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, with whom 
TALLMAN, Circuit Judge joins, dissenting: 
Although the majority's opinion nicely lays 
out the law applicable to a determination of 
qualified immunity, my review of the law 
and the facts in this case :require that I 
dissent. I address four matters. First, I take 
issue with the majority's determination that 
the warrant constitutionally could not 
provide for the search and seizure of 
firearms other than the sawed-off shotgun. 
Second, in reviewing the applicable case 
law, the maj ority fails to appreciate the 
factors courts have used to transform an 
abstract standard-· did the officer reasonably 
rely on review by counsel and a 
magistrate-into a workable guide for a line 
officer. Third, I would find thatthe totality 
of the circumstances in this case compels a 
finding that the line officer reasonably relied 
on his supervisors, the district attorney, and 
the magistrate to determine the 
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constitutional limits of the search warrant. 
Finally, I am concerned that the majority's 
parsing of the search warrant is likely to 
encourage uncertainty and needless 
litigation. I would grant the officer qualified 
immunity. 
I 
Our differing views on the warrant's 
provision for the search and seizure of 
firearms are revealed by our respective 
applications of UnitedStates v. Spitotro, 800 
F.2d 959 (9th Cir.1986), which sets fOlih the 
framework for determining a warrant's 
sufficiency. There we held that "[i]n 
determining whether a description is 
sufficiently precise," we should concentrate 
on one or more of the following: 
(1) whether probable cause exists to 
seize all items of a particular type 
described in the warrant; (2) whether 
the warrant sets out objective 
standards by which executing 
officers can differentiate items 
subject to seizure from those which 
are not; and (3) whether the 
government was able to describe the 
items more particularly in light of the 
information available to it at the time 
the warrant was issued. 
Id. at 963 (citations omitted). 
The majority admits that there was probable 
cause to search for and seize the. "black 
sawed-off shotgun with a pistol grip," but 
objects that "the affidavit does not set forth 
any evidence indicating that Bowen owned 
or used any other firearms, that such 
firearms were contraband or evidence of a 
crime, or that such firearms were likely to be 
present at the Millenders' residence." Op. at 
1025. This approach overlooks the fact that 
the search warrant was accompanied by an 
arrest warrant for Bowen, the real object of 
the search, who the officer believed resided 
at the residence. Bowen was reasonably 
considered to be dangerous' .... 
Given this context, the officers had probable 
cause to search for and seize any firearms in 
the home in which Bowen, a gang member 
and felon, was thought to reside. In Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 
76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the Supreme COUli 
held that probable cause exists when "there 
is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence Of a crime will be found m a 
particular place." Firearms by their very 
nature are dangerous and numerous laws 
render their possession by convicted felons 
criminal. Thus, in light of the facts known to 
the officer, i.e., that Bowen had recently 
fired a shotgun at his girl friend, was a gang 
member, was a felon, and presumably was 
armed, there was at least a "fair probability" 
not only that there might be firearms in the 
house in which Bowen was believed to be 
residing, but that such firearms would be 
"contraband or evidence of a crime." 
Moreover, the safety of all involved, both 
the officers and the inhabitants of the horne, 
requires that officers seeking the nighttime 
arrest of a dangerous felon be allowed to 
seize any firearm that they come across in 
their search for that individual or for 
evidence that is otherwise properly covered 
by the search warrant. Indeed, securing any 
weapons found during the search is justified 
to protect the officers executing the warrant 
from harm while doing so. 
Once it is understood that there was a fair 
probability that any firearms found in the 
house in which Bowen was thought to reside 
would be contraband or evidence of a crime, 
the warrant meets the second and third 
provisions of the Spilotro· framework. The 
warrant sets· out firearn1s and firearms-
related items in objective language that 
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allowed the officers to differentiate what 
items they might seize. Furthermore, as any 
firearm was likely to be contraband or 
evidence of a crime, a more particular 
description was neither required nor 
desirable. Accordingly, I dissent from the 
majority's determination that the wanant's 
provision for the search and seizure of 
firearms was unconstitutional. 
II 
A. Supreme Court Authority 
The majority and I agree that the standard 
for determining qualified immunity has been 
set forth by the Supreme Court in "Malley v. 
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-46, 106 S.Ct. 
1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) and Groh v. 
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 
L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004). Moreover, there is 
little difference in our reading of these 
opinions in the abstract. Rather, we differ on 
the application of the qualified immunity 
test to a front line police officer's request for 
an atTest wanant and accompanying search 
wanant. The majority's position is difficult 
to reconcile with the Fourth Amendment's 
preference for searches authorized by 
neutral and detached magistrates. 
[Summary of Malley, Grah, and Leon.] 
In sum, I agree with the majority that 
pursuant to Malley and Groh, the question is 
whether a reasonably well-trained officer in 
the defendant's situation would have known 
that the wanant did not establish probable 
cause. Op. at 12734-35. But an appreciation 
of the specific language in the Supreme 
. Court's opinions should lead us to focus on 
those factors that transform an abstract 
standard into a workable guideline for a line. 
officer. 
B. Ninth Circuit Authority 
A review of our own precedent reveals and 
reinforces the factors that should be 
considered in determining whether an 
officer who sought a wanant reasonably 
relied on review by counsel and a 
magistrate. 
[Summary of Ninth Circuit precedent.] 
C. Analysis 
Our review of Supreme Court and Ninth 
Circuit cases addressing reasonable reliance 
reveals certain considerations that transform 
what might otherwise be an abstract 
question into a working guide for police 
officers. Among these considerations are: 
(1) whether it was reasonable for the officer 
to apply for the wanant; (2) whether there 
was sufficient probable Calise to issue a 
wanant; (3) whether the wanant was 
facially invalid; (4) whether the warrant 
properly identified the limited matters to be 
searched; (5) whether the officer fairly 
sought review by his or her superiors, 
counsel and a magistrate; and (6) whether 
the officer's· misunderstanding was 
reasonable even where there was no 
probable cause. 
All of these factors should be applied in a 
manner consistent with the Supreme Court's 
perspective that qualified immunity should 
"amply" protect "all but the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate 
the law." 
III 
The application of these factors to the 
present case compels a determination that 
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the officers reasonably relied on their 
superiors, the district attorney, and the 
magistrate to correct the alleged over 
breadth in the search warrant. 
First, as this case comes to us, we accept 
that it was reasonable for the officers to 
apply for the warrant and that there was 
sufficient probable cause for the warrant to 
issue. In the district court, plaintiffs 
challenged whether the affidavit established 
probable cause to believe that Bowen could 
be found at the residence, but the district 
court denied that claim. On this 
interlocutory appeal from the district comi's 
denial of qualified immunity, we accept the 
district comi's determination that there was 
sufficient probable cause to allow the officer 
to apply for the nighttime search warrant 
and for the magistrate to issue the warrant. 
Second, the warrants were facially valid. 
They adequately identified the location to be 
searched, the person to be arrested, and the 
items to be seized. Regardless of whether 
there was probable cause to search for 
firearms and indicia of gang membership, 
thttse limited items were properly identified 
on the face of the warrant. 
Third, Officer Messerschmidt scrupulously 
followed the proper procedUl'esin seeking 
the arrest and search warrants. The warrant 
affidavit was reviewed by his sergeant and 
Messerschmidt consulted a lieutenant. 
Moreover, the warrants were reviewed by a 
deputy district attorney before they were 
presented to, reviewed by, and signed by a 
magistrate. Messerschmidt followed the 
Supreme Comi directions in Leon to seek 
the "detached scrutiny of a neutral 
magistrate. " 
Despite accepting that there were reasonable 
grounds for seeking the warrants, that there 
was sufficient probable cause to issue the 
search warrant, that the warrant was facially 
valid, and that the proper procedUl'es were 
followed to have the warrants reviewed and 
approved by a neutral magistrate, the 
majority nonetheless concludes that the 
absence of probable cause for two sections 
of the warrant was so obvious that the 
officer is not entitled to qualified· immunity. 
Despite our observation, and the Supreme· 
Court's observation, that "reasonable minds 
frequently may differ on the question 
whether a particular affidavit establishes 
probable cause," the majority, in essence, 
considers the officer to have been 
incompetent or dishonest. Initially, it should 
be noted that the majority does not suggest 
that the officer was dishonest. Although the 
plaintiffs in the district court argued that the 
officer had failed to present the magistrate 
with all the relevant facts, the district court 
rejected those contentions, and there is 
nothing in the majority's opinion that 
resurrects that contention. Rather, the 
majority's opinion basically holds. that the 
lack of relationship between the charged 
crime by Bowen and certain items described 
in the search warrant was so obvious that the 
officer may be held personally liable for 
having entertained a contrary thought. Of 
COUl'se, in light of my perspective on 
whether the search might include firearms 
other than the sawed-off shotgun, I think 
that the officer's inclusion of other firearms 
in the warrant, if not proper, was certainly 
objectively reasonable. 
How could the officer have thought that he 
could search for indicia of gang 
membership? We must ask this question 
based on what the officer knew when he 
prepared his affidavit. Here, we agree that 
the officer knew that Bowen had fired a 
sawed-off shotgun at a person in public, that 
he was a felon, and that he had ties with a 
street gang. We also accept that the officer 
reasonably believed that Bowen was "hiding 
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out" at the house on 120th Street. Why are 
these "facts" not sufficient to allow the 
officer initially to include a search for 
indicia of gang membership in his warrant 
application? Indeed, the affidavit in support 
of the warrant offered precisely this line of 
reasoning. 
It appears that ultimately there was no 
evidence of a link between Bowen's assault 
on Kelly with a deadly weapon and his 
membership in a street gang, but the officer 
did not know this when he applied ,for the 
warrant. Given that Bowen was a felon, a 
gang member, and had used a sawed-off 
shotgun, the possession of which might well 
be illegal, the officer may reasonably have 
conceived of possible ties between the 
crime, the weapon and the gang. I do not 
disagree with the district court's and the 
majority's determination that nevertheless 
there was insufficient probable cause to 
support a warrant for indicia of gang 
membership. Rather, my point is ,only that it 
was reasonable for the officer to think that 
there might be sufficient probable cause, at 
least to include the request in the initial 
application that would then be reviewed by 
his superiors, a deputy district attomey and a 
magistrate. 
The officer. may well have made factual and 
legal mistakes. He may have thought that the 
facts that Bowen was a felon, a gang 
member, and had committed an assault with 
a deadly weapon created probable cause tb 
search for indicia for gang membership. He 
was wrong, but objectively viewed, his 
mistake was not objectively umeasonable. 
One way of ascertaining whether a mistaken 
belief was reasonable is to compare it to 
other cases where we have found that an 
officer was not entitled to qualified 
immunity. I can find no clear precedent that 
supports the majority's conclusion. In Kow, 
58 FJd 423, "the lack of probable cause was 
so obvious that any reasonable officer would 
conclude that the warrant was facially 
invalid." Similarly, the warrant in Stubbs, 
873 F.2d 210, was facially invalid. Perhaps 
the most analogous case is KRL II There, 
we denied qualified immunity to Officer 
Hall because we found that "no reasonable 
officer could conclude that the discovery of 
a 1990 ledger and several checks showed 
that KRL had been primarily engaged in 
fraudulent activity since 1990." However, 
our denial of qualified immunity was based 
on: (1) Hall's "leadership role in the overall 
investigation;" (2) our factual determination 
that "the discovery of a ledger and several 
checks predating the allegedly fraudulent 
activity by five years did not provide 
sufficient probable cause to search for 
documents dating back to 1990;" and (3) our 
conclusion that the warrant was obviously 
facially invalid. Although Officer 
Messerschmidt may have been in charge of 
the investigation of Bowen, he did not have 
a leadership position similar to that held by 
Hall in KRL II Furthermore, his incorrect 
factual conclusion was not as far-fetched as 
that in issue in KRL II, and the warrant was 
not obviously facially invalid. 
It might also be noted that in 2003, when 
Messerschmidt sought the warrant, neither 
of our opinions in KRL had issued. 
However, we had decided Ortiz, 887 F.2d 
1366. In that case, the officer sought 'a 
warrant to search a home for weapons and 
explosives based on only four telephone 
calls by the same anonymous person. 
Nonetheless, whiIe finding that there was no 
probable cause to support the warrant, we 
granted the police officer qualified 
immunity, commenting that an "error of 
constitutional dimensions may have been 
committed with respect to the issuance of , 
the warrant, but it was the judge, not police 
officers who made the ,critical mistake." I 
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would hold that here, as in Ortiz, the 
officer's "conduct was 'sufficient to 
establish objectively reasonable behavior. '" 
Moreover, the majority's opinion appears to 
extend unnecessarily the guiding Supreme 
Court opinions. In Malley, the Court stated 
that the question was "whether a reasonably 
well-trained officer in petitioner's position 
would have lmown that his affidavit failed to 
establish probable cause and that he should 
not have applied for the walTant." In Groh, 
the Court denied qualified immunity 
because the walTant "did not describe the 
items to be seized at all "and "was so 
obviously deficient that we must regard the 
. search as 'walTantless' within the meaning 
of our case law." Here, there IS really no 
question that there was probable cause to 
issue the wanant and that it was not facially 
invalid. 
I recognize that each provision of a search 
wanant should be supported by probable 
cause. Nonetheless, we have held in appeals 
from suppression orders that evidence from 
valid portions of a walT ant may be severed 
from invalid portions. Similarly, we should 
recognize that the lack of probable cause for 
one clause in an otherwise valid wan'ant 
does not mean that the officer's decision to 
seek the wanant, or even to include that 
clause in the walTant, was necessarily 
unreasonable. Instead, at least where the 
walTant is supported by probable cause and 
is facially valid, but there is some question 
asto the sufficiency of evidence to support a 
section of the walTant, then absent some 
showing of bad faith on the part of the 
officer or of a failure to present .all the 
relevant known facts to the magistrate, the 
officer should be allowed to rely on his 
superiors, the district attomey and the 
magistrate to COlTect any over-breadth. 
Certainly, that should be the case here, as 
the officer's affidavit clearly sets forth the 
basis on which the officer mistakenly 
thought he could seek a walTant to search for 
indicia of gang membership. 
Moreover, the two provisions of the walTant 
at . issue-those authorizing searches for 
firearms and . for indicia of gang 
membership-do not appear to have been 
very important either when the walTant was 
initially sought or later. First, as noted, the 
primary purpose of the search was to alTest 
Bowen. Second, because the district court 
upheld the wanant's provision allowing the 
search for, and seizure of, indicia of home 
ownership, and because the majority 
concedes that the officers were entitled to 
search for disassembled parts of the sawed-
off shotgun, the questioned provisions did 
not expand the actual scope of the search. 
Third, as the search only resulted in the 
seizure of Mrs. Millender's shotgun and a 
box of ammunition (and no indicia of gang 
membership), it does not appear that 
plaintiffs were really harmed by the search 
authorized by the questioned provisions of 
the warrant (as contrasted to the entry into 
the home and the general search). As Justice 
Kennedy noted in his dissent in Groh,· the 
Supreme Court has stressed that "'the 
purpose of encouraging recourse to the 
walTant procedure' can be served best by 
rejecting overly technical standards when 
cOUlis review warrants." Here, even 
accepting that there was no probable cause 
to support the questioned provisions of the 
walTant, because this defect did not expand 
the scope of the search nor cause any real 
harm to the plaintiffs, it should not defeat an 
otherwise appropriate grant of qualified 
immunity. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the purpose 
of qualified immunity: to "amply" protect 
officers other than "the plainly incompetent 
or those who knowingly violate the law." 
Hete, as noted, there is no suggestion that 
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the officer "knowingly violated the law." 
While the majority concludes that the officer 
should have known that the search warrant 
was too broad, the length it has to go to 
make that point suggests that an officer's 
failure to so reason cannot be considered 
plain incompetence. Indeed, the very fact 
that judges on this en banc panel disagree on 
this point, in itself, weighs in favor of 
granting qualified immunity. 
IV 
Last, but not least, I am concerned that the 
maj ority' sparsing of the search warrant will 
lead to uncertainty and needless litigation. 
Denying qualified immunity where, as here, 
the defect in the warrant (a lack of probable 
cause for two sections of a warrant) did not 
expand the scope beyond what was 
constitutional and did not caUse any real 
harm, creates considerable incentive to 
challenge all but the narrowest of warrants. 
Even if the overbreadth of a warrant does 
not produce any evidence and does not 
result in any real harm, a disgruntled person 
can overcome a claim of qualified immunity 
. by showing that the officer did not have 
probable cause to support some part of the 
warrant. This seems contrary to the purpose 
of qualified immunity. 
Moreover, the approach may well interfere 
with a police officer's ability to properly 
protect the public and investigate crimes. 
Instead of investigating . a possible 
relationship between an assault with a 
deadly weapon by a convicted gang member 
and the felon's street gang, the majority 
would hold the officer personally liable for 
not grasping that these facts did not support 
the issuance of a warrant for anything other 
than the felon and the particular weapon. 
This appears to be the type of "hIgh level of 
generality" that Justice Thomas warned 
against in his dissent in Groh, 540 U.S. at 
578, 124 S.Ct. 1284. Furthennore, this 
approach may well discourage officers from 
following up on leads that they would 
otherwise bring to the attention of their 
superiors for fear of personal liability if they 
unwittingly err in their judgment. 
To recap, although· I think that the officer 
could reasonably have sought to search for 
firearms other than the shotgun, I agree with 
the majority that there was not a sufficient 
showing of a relationship between the 
assault and gang membership to provide 
probable cause for the inclusion of indicia of 
gang membership in the search warrant. But, 
applying the factors stressed by the Supreme 
Court and our court, I cannot conclude that 
the officer's inclusion of the provision in the 
. warrant was so objectively unreasonable as 
to preclude reliance on the approval of his 
supervisors, the district attorney and the 
magistrate. It was reasonable for the officer 
to apply for the warrant, there was probable 
cause to issue the walTant, the warrant was 
not facially invalid, the warrant properly 
identified the limited matters to be seized, 
and the officer followed the proper 
procedures for seeking review by his 
superiors, a district attorney and a 
magistrate. Moreover, at least as to the 
questioned provisions, it does not appear 
that the officer hid any relevant information 
from his superiors or the magistrate and his 
affidavit plainly presented the grounds on 
which he sought indicia of gang 
membership. Furthermore, I have found no 
precedent that suggests that an officer may 
not rely on his superiors and the magistrate 
when he makes an honest mistake in 
thinking that there is probable cause to 
support a provision in an otherwise valid 
warrant. The majority's contrary conclusion 
is of little real benefit to the plaintiffs, and 
unfairly punishes a line officer for what, at 
most, was a failure· on the part of his 
sup enol'S, the deputy district attomey and 
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the magistrate, to properly limit the warrant. 
Here, as in Ortiz, an "error of constitutional 
dimensions may have been committed with 
respect to the issuance of the warrant, but it 
was the judge, not the police officers who 
made the critical mistake." I would hold that 
the officer's application for a search warrant 
which included searching for other firearms 
and indicia of gang membership was not 
objectively unreasonable and that the officer 
is entitled to qualified immunity. 
SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge, with whom 
TALLMAN, Circuit Judge, joins, 
dissenting: 
I join Parts II through IV of Judge 
Callahan's dissent, but write separately to 
emphasize several points. 
The doctrine of qualified immunity "protects . 
goveniment officials from liability for good 
faith misjudgments and mistakes," and that 
is precisely the situation here. The judge 
issued a defective warrant and the deputies 
mistakenly relied on it, but their mistake was 
. entii'ely in good faith. The deputies did not 
act until they obtained the warrant and they 
did only what the warrant authorized them 
to do. They did not engage in any form of 
misconduct. They did not rough-up the 
residents. They did not put false information 
in the affidavit, conceal exculpatory 
information, or seize property not mentioned 
in the four-comers of the warrant. This is 
not a case where police officers sought to 
evade the warrant requirement; to the 
contrary, they sought to comply with it. The 
record is totally devoid of any evidence that 
the deputies acted other than in good faith. 
Qualified immunity protects from liability 
. "all but the plainly incompetent and those 
who knowingly violate the law." Does the 
deputies' mistake rise to the level of plain 
incompetence or intentional violation of the 
law? I cannot imagine a clearer case of 
reasonable error . than this one. In 
determining whether the deputies reasonably 
relied on the warrant, "all of the 
circumstances . . . may be considered." It is 
undisputed that the deputies knew Bowen to 
be a convicted felon with a very violent 
history, including convictions for assault 
with a deadly weapon and being a felon in 
possession of a firearm. They also knew that 
he repOliedly had just shot at the victim 
several times with a short-barrel Shotgun. As 
a convicted felon, Bowen was prohibited 
. from possessing firearms. Under· such 
circumstances, how can it be "entirely 
unreasonable"-not just a mistake but 
entirely unreasonable-for the deputies to 
have relied on a jUdge-signed warrant 
authorizing the seizure of all of Bowen's 
guns? 
I also do not see how the deputies can be 
deemed to be plainly incompetent, or to 
have knowingly violated the law, for relying 
on the warrant's authorization to seize Mona 
Park Crip gang paraphemalia. The deputies 
had probable cause to believe both that 
Bowen was tied to the Mona Park Crip gang 
and that he was residing at the Millender 
residence. Had Mona Park Crip 
paraphemalia been found in close proximity 
to guns during the search of the Millender 
house-say, a gun concealed in Mona Park 
Crip clothing-such a discovery would have 
tended to prove that the guns were Bowen's 
and not the Millenders'. It is commonplace 
for search warrants to authorize the seizure 
of items that can help identify persons in 
control of the premises or contraband. The 
deputies' belief iri the validity of this portion 
of the warrant was entirely reasonable. 
Qualified immunity insulates police officers 
from the threat of personal liability so that 
they can "execute [their] office with the 
decisiveness and the judgment required by 
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the public good." The tradeoff for this 
perceived societal benefit is that some 
wrongs will go uncompensated. That is the 
nature of immunity, and it is a tradeoff 
adopted by the Supreme Court itself. 
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"Cert. Grant in Millender v. LA: Qualified Immunity 
for an Unconstitutional General 
Warrant to Seize Firearms?" 
The Volokh Conspiracy 
July 10, 2011 
David Kopel 
The Supreme Court recently granted 
celiiorari in Millender v. Los Angeles. Here 
are the background facts: Bowen sh60ts at 
his ex-girlfriend with a sawed-off shotgun. 
The police obtain a search warrant for the 
home of Bowen's 73-year-old former foster 
mother. The warrant application does not 
disclose that Bowen last lived with his foster 
mother 15 years ago. (The girlfriend 
suggested to the police that Bowen might be 
hiding there.) The warrant authorizes the 
seizure of all firearms on the premises, not 
merely the particular gun which had been 
used in the crime against the girlfriend. 
The police executed a 5 a.m. dynamic entry, 
and in the course of their search, seize a 
firearm which is lawfully owned by the 73-
year-old woman, Augusta Millender. She 
sues, and the 9th Circuit en banc rules that 
the warrant was objectively unconstitutional. 
The officer who procured the warrant (and 
Los Angeles, by respondeat superior) are not 
entitled to qualified immunity, because the 
warrant to seize all firearms was so clearly 
unconstitutional, based on settled law. 
In the certiorari grant, the Questions 
Presented are: 
This COUli has held that police officers who 
procure and execute warrants later 
dete1mined invalid are entitled to qualified 
immunity, and evidence obtained should not 
. be suppressed, so long as the warrant is not 
"so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 
render official belief in its existence entirely 
umeasonable." United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 920, 923 (1984); Malley v. Briggs, 
475 U.S. 335,341,344-45 (1986). The 
Questions Presented are: 1. Under these 
standards, are officers entitled to qualified 
immunity· where they obtained a facially 
valid warrant to search for firearms, firearm-
related materials, and gang-related items iri 
the residence of a gang member and felon 
. who had threatened to kill his girlfriend and . 
fired a sawed-off shotgun at her, and a 
district attomey approved the application, no 
factually on point case law prohibited the 
search, and the alleged overbreadth in the 
warrant did not expand the scope of the 
search? 2. Should the Malley/Leon standards 
be reconsidered or clarified in light of lower 
courts' inability to apply them in accordance 
with their pUlpose of deterring police 
misconduct, resulting in imposition of 
liability ort officers for good faith conduct 
and improper exclusion of evidence in 
criminal cases? 
The phrasing of the Questions Presented 
further suggest that attomeys for 
Respondents have an uphill battle. The 
Supreme Court docket page is here; the full 
history of the case in the district court and 
the Ninth Circuit, with full text of many of 
the relevant documents, is available at the 
website of Califomia attomey Chuck 
Michel. Michel is, in my opinion, one of the 
top two firearms law lawyers in Califomia, 
the other being Don Kilmer. 
In conjunction with Stephen Halbrook, 
Michel filed an amicus brief in Millender, 
on behalf of the National Rifle Association 
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and the California Rifle and Pistol 
Association Foundation. The brief explains 
how the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on 
general warrants is closely entwined with 
the right to arms; for example, the 1662 gun 
ban of the wicked Stuart king Charles II was 
enforced by general warrants. 
The Questions Presented seem to presume 
the u;nconstitutionality of the general 
warrant, with the only issue before the Court 
being qualified immunity. The 
Halbrook/Michel argument on qualified 
immunity points out that 
Detective Messerschmidt knew that the only 
firearm involved in- the crime was a black, 
pistol-gripped, short barreled shotgun. He 
nonetheless drafted a general warrant 
authorizing search and seizure of all 
firearms and firearm parts from the home of 
an elderly woman, her daughter, and her 
grandson, knowing that the suspect (Bowen) 
did not even live III that home. 
Messerschmidt cannot now rely on the 
defense that he persuaded others up the 
chain to approve his general warrant. 
It bears repeating that the affidavit failed to 
disclose that the residence was that of an 
elderly lady and her relatives, not that of the 
suspect. 
Although Los -Angeles argues that the 
unconstitutionality of the warrant was not 
clearly established at the time the warrant 
was executed, Halbrook and Michel point 
to: 
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004), afj'g 
Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 
-F.3d 1022 (9th Cir .. 2002), involved a 
general warrant obtained to search for 
unregistered firearms, but the warrant 
contained no list of firearms to seize. Id. at 
554. A list of firearms was included in the 
affidavit, but not attached to the warrant. Id. 
Only lawful firearms were found. Id. at 555. 
The homeowners later filed a civil rights 
action for damages. Id. The Supreme Court 
upheld the Ninth Circuit's conclusion in 
Oroh that the search was unlawful and that 
the agent who secured the warrant and led 
the search could not rely on the defense of 
qualified inmlUnity. Id. at 563-566 .. 
Moreover, 
In Groh, the law was clearly established in 
the very text of the Fourth Amendment. 
Case law condemning general warrants in 
England dates back to at least 1765 in 
Entick, and in the United States, to 1886 in 
Boyd. The general warrant here-to search 
for all firearms and related items, when only 
a black, pistol-gripped; short-barreled 
shotgun was at 'issue, and it had little or no 
connection to the house to be searched-
clearly violated the Fourth Amendment, 
would be known to do so by any -competent 
officer, and was not sanctified by being 
rubber stamped by higher ups. 
Michel has announced that NRA and 
CRPAFwill file an amicus brief in the 
Supreme Court, in part to explain to the 
Court the problem of law enforcement 
officers seizing large numbers of lawfully- . 
possessed firearms in order to boost gun 
seizure statistics. 
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. "Searches for Guns at the Home of a 
Suspect's Family Member" 
The Volokh Conspiracy 
October 2,2009 
Eugene Volokh 
The Ninth Circuit has just agreed to rehear 
Millender v. County of Los Angeles en bane; 
here's what I blogged about the case when 
the panel opinion came out in May: 
Bowen was a felon and likely a gang 
member who had apparently committed a 
serious gun crime (shooting at the car of his 
girlfriend, who was leaving him, with a 
sawed-off shotgun). The police heard that 
Bowen "might be staying at his foster 
mother's home." They therefore got a 
warrant to search the foster mother's 
(Augusta Millender'S) home for, among· 
other things, "all firearms and firemm-
related items." 
When they searched the house, they didn't 
find Bowen or the gun with which he had 
committed the crime, but they did find and 
seize "Mrs. Millender's personal shotgun .. 
. and a box of 45-caliber ammunition." Mrs. 
Millender and the family members with 
whom she was living (her daughter and her 
grandson) sued, claiming the search violated 
the Fourth Amendment. The case eventually 
ended up before the Ninth Circuit,. as 
Millender v. County of Los Angeles, decided 
last Wednesday. 
Judge Callahan, writing for herself and for 
Judge Fernandez, held that the defendant 
police officers were shielded by qualified 
immunity because the search was authorized 
by the warrant, and that this would be so 
even if the warrant was unconstitutionally 
overbroad. Judge Callahan did not express a 
view on whether the warrant was indeed 
overbroad. 
Judge Fernandez concurred in the majority 
opinion, agreeing that the officers were 
shielded by qualified immunity because of 
the warrant, but concluded that the sear<;h 
was indeed unconstitutional. In this case, he 
concluded, there was "extremely little 
support for the search of a third person's 
home for all firemms and ammunition" 
(even though the officers thought Bowen 
was staying at the house, and therefore it 
was "Bowen's home also"). 
Judge Ikuta dissented, concluding that "ilo 
officer of reasonable competence could have 
thought [the] affidavit established probable 
cause to search for the items listed in the 
warrant," and that therefore the officers 
couldn't claim qualified immunity. Judge 
Ikuta also briefly cited D. C. v. Heller, 
though only in passing, and following a 
clause that said, "Mere possession of 
firearms is not, generally speaking, a crime." 
A very interesting case, and much worth 
. reading if you're interested in searches and 
seizures as they affect innocent third parties, 
if you're interested in gun rights, or if you're 
interested in both. 
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Williams v. Illinois 
10-8505 
Ruling Below: People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 939 N.E. 2d 268 (2010) cert. granted, 10-
8505,2011 WL 2535081 (U.S. June 28, 2011). 
Defendant Sandy Williams allegedly sexually assaulted, kidnapped, and robbed L.J. on February 
10,2000. A vaginal examination ofLJ. was conducted after the incident and swabs were sent to 
the Illinois State Police Crime Lab (rSP) for analysis which confirmed the . presence of semen. 
The samples were then sent to Cellmark Diagnostic Laboratory where a DNA profile was 
generated. Six months later, Williams was arrested for an unrelated offense and a blood sample 
was drawn pursuant to court order. rsp generated a DNA profile of the defendant's blood 
sample. 
At trial, rsp forensic biologist Sandra Lambatos testified the two DNA profiles were a match. 
The Cellmark lab report was not admitted into evidence and defense counsel objected, claiming a 
violation of the Confrontation Clause. The trial court disagreed and Williams was convicted. On 
appeal, the Supreme COUli of Illinois affirmed in pmi, holding that Lambatos appealed to the 
Cellmark report for the purpose of explaining the basis of her opinion rather than as proof the 
truth of her assertions and thus the prohibitions against hearsay evidence were inapposite. 
Questions Presented: Whether a state rule of evidence allowing an expert witness to testify 
about the results of DNA testing performed by non-testifying analysts violates the Confrontation 
Clause, when the defendant has no opportunity to confront.tlw actual analysts. 
The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
Sandy WILLIAMS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee. 
Supreme Court of Illinois 
July 15, 2010 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
Chief Justice FITZGERALD delivered the 
judgment of the court, with opinion. 
After a bench trial in the circuit cOUli of 
Cook County, the defendant, Sandy 
Williams, was convicted of two counts of 
aggravated criminal sexual assault and one 
count each of aggravated kidnapping and 
aggravated robbery of LJ. The appellate 
court affirmed the defendant's conviction, 
but reversed the trial court's imposition of a 
consecutive sentence. On appeal to this 
cOUli, the defendant argues that the 
testimony of an Illinois State Police forensic 
analyst, who relied upon a DNA report 
prepared by a nontestifying third-party 
analyst, lacked a sufficient evidentiary 
foundation. Alternatively, the defendant 
argues that this testimony concerning the 
report was hearsay presented for the truth of 
the matter asserted and violated the 
defendant's sixth amendment confrontation 
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clause right. The State cross-appeals, 
maintaining the appellate court improperly 
reversed the trial court's imposition of a 
consecutive sentence. For the following 
reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in 
part. 
BACKGROUND 
The State charged the defendant in a 17-
count indictment with aggravated criminal 
sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, and 
aggravated robbery. The cause proceeded to 
a bench trial. The counts that the State 
ultimately submitted to the judge were 
counts IV and VI (aggravated criminal 
sexual assault under nOJLCS 5/12-14(a)(3) 
(West 2000)), count XV (aggravated 
kidnapping under no ILCS 5/10-2(a)(3) 
(West 2000)) and count XVII (aggravated 
robbery under no ILCS5/18-5 (West 
2000)). The State entered· a nolle prosequi 
. on the remaining counts. The following facts 
were adduced at trial. 
On February 10, 2000, 22-year-old LJ. 
worked until 8 p.m. as a cashier at a clothing 
store in Chicago. On her way home to the 
south side of the city, she purchased items at 
the store for her mother and went toward her 
home. As she passed an alley, the defendant 
came up behind her and forced her to sit in 
the backseat of a beige station wagon, where 
he told her to take her clothes off. The 
defendant then vaginally penetrated LJ. The 
defendant also contacted LJ.'s anus with his 
penis, but did not penetrate. He then pushed 
LJ. out of the car while keepingLJ.'s coat, 
money, and other items. After LJ. ran home, 
her mother opened the door and saw her in 
tears, partially clothed with only one pant 
leg on. After L.J. went into the bathroom, 
her mother called the police. 
Shortly after 9 p.m., Chicago police officers 
arrived at the home and found L.J. in the 
bathtub. She had not yet washed her vaginal 
area. After L.J. told the officers what had 
transpired, the officers issued a "flash" 
message for a black male, 5 foot, 8 inches 
tall, wearing a black skull cap, a black jacket 
and driving a beige station wagon. An 
ambulance transported L.J. and her mother 
to the emergency room. Dr. Nancy Schubert 
conducted a vaginal exam of L.J. and took 
vaginal swabs, which were then sealed and 
placed into a criminal sexual assault 
evidence collection kit along with LJ.'s 
blood sample. The kit was sent to the Illinois 
State Police (ISP) Crime Lab for testing and 
analysis. 
On February 15, 2000, forensic biologist 
Brian Hapack with the ISP Crime Lab 
received LJ.'s sexual assault evidence 
collection kit and performed tests that 
confirmed the presence of semen. Hapack 
placed the swabs in a coin envelope, sealed 
the envelope, and placed the evidence in a 
secure freezer. Hapack guaranteed the 
accuracy of his results by working in a clean 
environment free from contamination and by 
ensuring that the tests functioned properly. 
On August 3, 2000, police arrested the 
defendant for an unrelated offense and, 
pursuant to a court order, drew a blood 
sample from the defendant. On August 24, 
2000, forensic scientist Karen Kooi 
performed an analysis on the sample that 
consisted of four quarter-sized bloodstains 
on a filter card. Kooi extracted a 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile ancl 
entered it into the database at the ISP Crime 
Lab. Meanwhile, the samples from L.J.'s 
sexual assault kit were sent to Cellmark 
Diagnostic Laboratory in Germantown, 
Maryland, for DNA analysis on November 
29, 2000. Cellmark returned LJ.'s vaginal 
swabs and blood standard to the ISP Crime 
Lab on April 3, 2001. Cellmark derived a 
DNA profile for the person whose semen 
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was recovered from 1.J. According to ISP 
forensic biologist Sandra Lambatos, whose 
testimony will be set forth more fully below, 
the DNA profile received from Cellmark 
matched the defendant's DNA profile from 
the blood sample in the ISP database. LJ. 
identified the defendant in a line up on April 
17, 2001. The defendant was then arrested 
for the instant offenses. 
At the bench trial, Lambatos was accepted 
as an expert in forensic biology and forensic 
DNA analysis by the trial cOUli. Lambatos 
began her testimony with a brief explanation 
of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing. 
PCR testing, according to Lambatos, is one 
of the most modern types of DNA analysis 
available and is generally accepted in the 
scientific community. Lambatos explained 
how PCR analysis can be used to identify a 
male profile from a semen sample. First, an 
analyst conducts a procedure that isolates 
and extracts DNA from a sample that may 
include a mixture from a particular 
defendant and the victim. The DNA is not 
large enough to test at. this point, and 
requires amplification to form a more 
workable sample. After amplification, an 
analyst can measure the length of an 
individual specific strand through a process 
called electrophoresis. A computer translates 
this measurement onto a graph called an 
electropherogram. The electropherogram is 
a representation of the individual's specified 
DNA data into a line with peaks 
representing the lengths of the DNA strands 
of the 13 STR regions. Reports generally 
also provide a "table of alleles" showing the 
DNA profile of each sample. She also stated 
that the statistical probability of a match can 
also be determined by entering the alleles 
into a frequency database to learn how 
common they are in the general population. 
Lambatos further testified that it is a 
commonly accepted practice in the scientific 
community for one DNA expert to rely on 
the records of another DNA analyst· to 
complete her work. As mentioned, she used 
the DNA profile from Cellmark to match the 
DNA profile from the defendant's blood 
sample, which was contained in the ISP 
database. She stated that, because Cellmark 
was an accredited laboratory, it was required 
to meet "certain guidelines to perform DNA 
analysis for the Illinois State Police and so 
all those calibrations· and internal 
proficiencies and controls [of the equipment 
used] would have had to have been in place 
for· them to perform the DNA analysis." 
Cellmark's testing and analysis methods 
were generally accepted in the scientific 
community· according to Lambatos. 
Lambatos, however, admitted that Cellmark . 
had different procedures and standards for 
results than the ISP Crime Lab. 
Nevertheless, Lambatos testified that she 
personally developed proficiency tests for 
Cellmark technicians to perform. She further 
testified that she routinely relied on results 
from Cellmark and she did not observe any 
chain of custody or contamination problems. 
The prosecutor then asked her expert 
opinion regarding the DNA match. Defense 
counsel objected and asserted that Lambatos 
could not rely upon the testing performed by 
another lab. The trial court replied, "We will 
see. If she says that she didn't do her own 
testing and she relied on a test of another lab 
and she's testifying to that. We'll see what 
she's going to say." 
Lambatos then testified that a match was 
generated of the male DNA profile found in 
the semen from LJ.'s vaginal swabs to the 
defendant's male DNA profile from the 
defendant's blood standard. In response to 
defense questioning, Lambatos restated her 
interpretation of the alleles at each of the 13 
locations. She testified about. several 
locations where she visually filtered out 
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spurious alleles and "background noise" and 
distinguished the defendant's profile. 
Lambatos concluded that in her expert 
opinion, the semen from LJ.'s vaginal swab 
was a match to the defendant. Lambatos 
testified that the probability of this profile 
occurring in the general population was one 
in 8.7 quadrillion black, one in 390 
quadrillion white, and one in 109 quadrillion 
Hispanic unrelated individuals .. She did not 
observe any degradation or irregularities in 
the sample from L.J.'s vaginal swab. 
She stated that, in general, if "there was a 
question of a match, then we would 
investigate that further by looking at the 
electropherograms from all the cases 
involved and do some more comparisons on 
that." She explained that in looking at 
Cellmark's report, she interpreted it and "I 
did review their data, and I did make my 
own interpretations so I looked at what * * * 
they sent to me and did make. my own 
determination, my own opinion." While 
Lamb ato s testified to her conclusion 
informed by Cellmark's report, Cellmark's 
report itself was not introduced into 
evidence. Also, while Lambatos referenced 
documents she reviewed in forming her own 
opinion, she did not read the contents of the 
Cellmark report into evidence. 
At the conclusion of Lambatos' testimony, 
the defendant moved to strike the evidence 
of testing completed by Cellmark based 
upon a violation of his sixth amendment 
right to confront witnesses against him. The 
defendant also objected on the grounds of 
foundation, citing People v. Raney, 324 
Ill.App.3d 703, 258 Ill.Dec. 356, 756 N.E.2d 
338 (2001), and argued insufficient evidence 
was presented regarding the calibration of 
the Cellmark equipment. The trial court 
denied the defendant's motion to strike. The 
trial court stated, "I don't think this is a 
Crawford scenario, and I agree with the 
State that the evidence is-the issue is, you 
know, what weight do you give the test, not 
do you exclude it and accordingly your 
motion to exclude or strike the testimony of 
the last· witness or opinions based on her 
own independent testing of the data received 
from Cellmark will be denied." 
Following this and other testimony 
concerning the incident, the State rested. 
The trial court denied the defendant's 
motion for a directed finding. The defendant 
did not present any evidence in his defense. 
Thereafter, the trial court found. the 
defendant guilty of two counts of aggravated 
criminal sexual assault, and one count each 
of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated 
robQery. The court denied the defendant's 
motion for a new trial. 
[The Court discussed sentencing.] 
On appeal, the appellate court rejected the 
defendant's contentions that the State failed 
to establish a sufficient foundation for 
Lambatos' opinion; that the State failed to 
establish that Cel1mark's equipment was 
adequately calibrated and properly 
functioning; and that the State failed to 
establish a sufficient chain of custody based 
upon Cellmark's handling of the evidence. 
The appellate court next rejected. the 
defendant's argument that the results of 
Cel1mark's testing and analysis were 
testimonial in nature and therefore 
Lambatos' expert testimony thereto violated 
the defendant's constitutional right to 
confrontation. 385 Ill.App.3d at 370, 324 
Ill.Dec. 246, 895 N.E.2d 961. The court 
noted that the confrontation clause does not 
bar the use of testimonial statements for 
purposes other than establishing the truth of 
the matter asserted. The appellate coUrt 
found that "Cellmark'sreport was not 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted; 
rathel', it was offered to provide a basis for 
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Lambatos~ opinion." 385 Ill.App.3d at 369~ 
324 Ill.Dec. 246~ 895 N.E.2d 961. The court 
stated~ "Overall~ defendant essentially 
requests that we require each and every 
individual involved in the. testing and 
analysis of DNA to testify at trial. For 
obvious reasons in the abstract and for those 
provided in the case at bar~ we decline to 
issue such a ruling." 385 Ill.App.3d at 370~ 
324 Ill.Dec. 246~ 895 N.E.2d 961. ... 
This court granted the defendant~s petition 
for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315; The 
State has requested cross-relief concerning 
the appellate court~s modification of the 
sentence. 
ANALYSIS 
Foundational Challenge 
The defendant argues generally' before this 
cOUli that the. trial court committed 
reversible error when it permitted Lambatos 
to testify that the defendant~s DNA profile 
matched the male DNA profile of the semen 
in L.J.~s vaginal swabs. The defendant 
specifically argues that the trial court erred 
in admitting Lambatos ~ testimony regarding 
the match because a sufficient foundation 
was not established. The defendant 
additionally argues that Lambatos~ 
testimony violated his sixth amendment 
confrontation right under Crawford v. 
Washington,. 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 
158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). We begin with the 
foundational arguinent. We apply the abuse 
of discretion standard to the defendant's 
foundational challenge to the trial court's 
admission of Lambatos' expert testimony. 
The defendant contends that the trial court 
should not have permitted the State's 
forensic analyst to testify because of a lack 
of sufficient testimony that the Cellmark 
repOli was reliable. According to the 
defendant, when expert testimony relies 
upon data obtained from electronic or 
mechanical equipment, the proponent· of the 
testimony must offer foundational proof that 
the equipment was calibrated and 
functioning properly at the time the data was 
presented in order to establish that the 
expert~ s testimony is reliable. The State 
responds that Lambatos' testimony that 
Cellmark's testing was done according to 
valid scientific theory and reliable 
methodology provided a sound basis upon 
which Lambatos could formulate her 
opinion. Therefore, the State asserts that it 
was not obliged to present additional 
testimony regarding the calibration and 
functioning of Cellmark's equipment to 
admit Lambatos' expert opinion pursuant to 
Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill.2d 186, 49 Ill.Dec. 
308, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981). We agree 
with the State. 
. In Wilson v. Clark, this court adopted Rules 
703 and 705 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence concerning an expert's testimony 
at trial. FOlmer Rule 703 states in part: 
"The facts or data in the particular 
case upon which an expert bases an 
opinion or inference may be those 
perceived by or made known to the 
expert at or before the hearing. If of 
a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field in 
forming opinions or inferences upon 
the subject, the facts or data need not 
be admissible in evidence in order 
for the opinion or inference' to be 
admitted." 
Fed.R.Evid. 703 (amended 2000). 
The court in Wilson noted that, in a trial 
context, "[b]oth Federal and State courts 
have interpreted Federal Rule 703 to allow 
opinions based on facts not in evidence." 
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Wilson, 84 Il1.2d at 193,49 Il1.Dec. 308,417 
N.E.2d 1322. Rule 705 states: 
"The expert may testify in terms of 
opinion or inference and give 
reasons therefor without first 
testifying to the underlying facts or 
data,' unless the court requires 
otherwise. The expert may in any 
event be required to disclose the 
underlying facts or data on cross-
examination. " 
Fed.R.Evid.705. 
Following Rule 705, we held in Wilson that, 
at trial, "an expert may give an opinion 
without disclosing the facts underlying that' 
opinion." "Under Rule 705 the burden is 
placed upon the adverse party during cross-
examination to elicit the facts underlying the 
expert opinion." Thus, an expert testifying at 
trial may offer an opinion based on facts not 
in evidence, and the expert is not required 
on direct examination to disclose the facts 
underlying the expert's opinion. 
This court applied Wilson v. Clark to DNA 
evidence in People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d 
187, 307 Il1.Dec. 524, 860 N.E.2d 178 
(2006). There, the defendant filed a motion 
during trial to bar testimony from Terry 
Melton, the president of Mitotyping 
Technologies, concerning human 
mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA). Melton did 
not complete the actual laboratory "bench 
work" on, the evidence. The defendant 
argued that, without the lab technician's 
testimony, Melton's testimony regarding the 
mtDNA results was improper. We rejected 
that argument, holding that it was enough 
that Melton relied upon data reasonably 
relied upon by other experts in her field. 
Here, the trial court correctly denied defense 
counsel's objection to the foundation for 
Lambatos' expert opinion. It is undisputed 
that Lambatos was qualified as an expert in 
forensic biology and DNA analysis; 
Lambatos testified that it is the commonly 
accepted practice in the scientific 
community for a forensic DNA analyst to 
rely on the work of other analysts to 
complete her own work; and Lambatos 
based her opinion on information reasonably 
relied upon by experts in her field. 
As in Sutherland, Lambatos testified that 
Cellmark's work on the vaginal swabs in . 
this case and the results of the PCR analysis 
conducted by Kooi are the types of data 
reasonably relied upon by expelis in her 
field. Lambatos testified that, because 
Cellmark was an accredited laboratory, 
calibrations, internal proficiencies, and 
controls had to be in place for the DNA 
analysis to be completed in this case. These 
internal controls were, according to 
Lambatos' testimony, ones. that she' 
personally developed. Lambatos herself 
reviewed Cellmark's data, including the 
electropherogram, and did not have any 
question about the match. Rather, she used 
her own expertise to compare the two 
profiles before her. She also did not observe 
any problems in the chain of custody or any 
signs of contamination or degradation of the 
evidence. Lambatos ultimately agreed with 
Cellmark's results regarding the male DNA 
profile, and then made her own visual and 
interpretive comparisons of the peaks on the 
electropherogram and the table of alleles to 
conclude there was a match to the 
defendant's genetic profile. 
We also reject the defendant's specific 
complaint that there was no testimony that 
the instruments used by Cellmark were' 
calibrated and functioning properly. The 
defendant principally relies on People v. 
Raney, 324 Il1.App.3d 703, 258 Ill.Dec. 356, 
756 N.E.2d 338 (2001). Raney held that 
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where the expert testimony is based upon an 
electronic or mechanical device, the expert 
must provide some foundational proof that 
the device was functioning properly at the 
time it was used. The defendant there argued 
that the State failed to establish a proper 
foundation for the admission of scientific 
results from the gas chromotography mass 
spectrometer (GCMS) machine. The court 
. agreed, finding that the record contained no 
evidence regarding whether the GCMS 
machine was functioning properly at the 
time it was used to analyze the substance. 
FUliher, the Raney court stated an expeti 
should be able to explain how the GCMS 
machine was calibrated or why she knew the 
results were accurate. Finding a lack of such 
an explanation, the court concluded that the 
State failed to prove the defendant guilty 
beyond a· reasonable doubt because of the 
lack of foundation. The Raney court 
acknowledge<i, however, that "[i]t may not 
be feasible for each expert to personally test 
the instrument relied upon for purposes of 
determining what is a suspected controlled 
substance." 
We find that the testing of narcotics using a 
GCMS machine is not comparable to the 
scientific process at issue in this case. At the 
defendant's bench trial, Lambatos did not 
merely regurgitate results generated by a 
machine, as the witness in Raney did. 
Lambatos conducted an independent 
evaluation of data related to samples of 
genetic material, including items processed 
at both Cellmatk and the ISP Crime Lab. 
Lamb ato s used her expertise and 
professional judgment to compare the DNA 
profiles. Her examination of the different 
alleles from the blood sample and from the 
semen sample indicated a match with the 
defendant. She also determined the 
statistical probability of the match by 
examining the alleles and entering them into 
a . frequency database to determine how 
common they are in the general population. 
Further, this case is distinguishable from 
Raney because Lambatos maintained that 
Cellmark necessarily met the threshold of 
proper DNA analysis because Cellmark was 
an . accredited laboratory and followed 
guidelines that she had personally 
developed. We therefore do not accept the 
. defendant's invitation to broadly interpret 
Raney to find an insufficient foundation 
where an analyst merely relies upon data 
obtained from electronic or mechanical 
equipment. 
Finally, under Wilson, the burden is placed 
upon the adverse party during cross-
examination to elicit facts underlying the 
expert OpllllOn. The record reveals 
substantial cross-examination of Lambatos' 
comparison of the DNA profile from the 
database to the DNA profile from the sexual 
assault kit.. The record also reveals that the 
trial court, sitting as a fact finder, 
appropriately weighed the testimony. It 
stated: 
"The DNA expert that testified, the 
last witness, was in my view the best 
DNA witness I have ever heard. 
Under detail [sic ], lengthy complex 
cross-examination by the defense on 
every single part of her report she 
explains, she told what was the basis 
of her opinion, she was an 
outstanding witness in every respect. 
There is the issue of she didn't do the 
actual test. The testing is farmed out 
to other labs. Some did the testing, 
some are an accredited lab. That was 
part of the playback you might say of 
the Illinois state police forensic 
division at that time, and I agree with 
the State that there is no 
misidentification here. This is a 
match, thisis 1 in 8.7 quadrillion, 50 
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times the population for the last 2000 
years. It's an absolute match." 
Accordingly, the issue of Lambatos' reliance 
on Cellmark's report went to the weight of 
her opinion and not its admissibility. The 
trial court assessed the weight of Lambatos' 
testimony and found it convincing. 
We therefore find that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding a sufficient 
foundation for Lambatos' testimony and 
therefore turn to the defendant's Crav.10rd 
argument. 
Sixth Amendment . 
. The trial court rejected the defense objection 
that his sixth amendment right was violated 
by Lambatos' testimony concerning 
Cellmark's report. The appellate court 
affirmed this decision; finding that the 
complained-of statements regarding 
Cellmark's report by Lambatos were not 
used for the truth of the matter asserted and 
therefore the sixth amendment was not 
implicated. The defendant's claim that his 
sixth amendment confrontation right was 
violated involves a question of law, which. 
we review de novo. 
The sixth amendment guarantees that "[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him." This part of the 
sixth amendment is called the confrontation 
clause and applies to the states through the 
fourteenth amendment. In Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 
158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the United States 
Supreme Court held that the sixth 
amendment's "primary object"· is with 
"testimonial hearsay." Accordingly, 
"[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent 
from trial have been admitted only where 
the declarant is unavailable, and only where 
the defendant has had a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine." The Supreme C()urt added 
an explicit logical corollary to this statement 
by pointing out; in a footnote, that the 
confrontation clause does not bar the 
admission of testimonial statements that are 
admitted for purposes other than proving the 
truth of the matter asserted. Stated another 
way, we need only consider whether a 
statement was testimonial if the statements 
at issue were, in: fact, hearsay statements 
offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. 
The hearsay rule generally prohibits the 
introduction of an out-of-court statement 
offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted therein. Underlying facts· and data, 
however, may be disclosed by an expert, not 
for the truth of the matter asserted, but for 
the purpose of explaining the basis for his 
opinion. Moreover, it is well established that 
an expert may testify about the findings and 
conclusions of a nontestifying expert that he 
used in forming his opinions. 
The defendant argues that the State 
introduced the Cellmark report to establish 
the truth of the matter asserted and it is 
therefore hearsay. Without Cellmark's 
report, according to the defendant, Lambatos 
could not have given her testimony that the 
defendant's DNA matched the profile 
deduced by Cellmark The State counters 
that Lambatos testified about the Cellmark 
tests only to explain how she formed her 
own opinion. Therefore, the on:1y statement 
that the prosecution offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted was Lambatos' own 
opinion. According to the State, presentation 
of the person who prepared the DNA profile. 
at Cellmark was not necessary for 
confrontation purposes. We agree with the 
State. 
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This court has long held that prohibitions 
against the admission of hearsay do· not 
apply when an expert testifies to underlying 
facts and data, not admitted into evidence, 
for the purpose of explaining the basis of his 
opinion. In Lovejoy, a medical examiner 
testified that another toxicologist detected 
six different types of drugs in the victim's 
body after conducting blood tests, indicating 
that poisoning caused the victim's death. 
Lovejoy, 235 I1l.2d at 141, 335 I1l.Dec. 818, 
919 N.E.2d 843. The medical examiner 
testified that he was trained in toxicology 
interpretation and that the toxicology report 
showed lethal amounts of several 
medications in the victim's blood. He 
explained how the toxicology report added 
to his own physical observations during the 
autopsy and that it aided him in determining 
the cause of death. Following Wilson v. 
Clark and its progeny, we noted that experts 
may not only consider the reports commonly 
relied upon by experts in their particular 
field, but also to testify to the contents of the 
underlying records. Quoting People v. 
Pasch, we explained: 
"'While the contents of reports relied 
upon by experts would clearly be 
inadmissible as hearsay if offered for 
the truth of the matter asserted, an 
expert may disclose the underlying 
facts and conclusions for the limited 
purpose of explaining the basis for 
his opinion. [Citation.] By allowing 
an expert to reveal the information 
for this purpose alone, it will 
undoubtedly aid the jury in assessing 
the value of his opinion.'" 
Lovejoy, 235 I1l.2d at 143,335 I1l.Dec. 818, 
919 N.E.2d 843, quoting Pasch, 152 I1l.2d at 
176, 178 I1l.Dec. 38,604 N.E.2d 294. 
Accordingly, we held that the medical 
examiner's testimony repeating the 
nontestifying analyst's conclusions was not 
admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, 
but rather was introduced "to show the jury 
the steps [the examiner] took prior to 
rendering an expert opinion in this case." 
Consequently, there was no confrontation 
clause violation. 
Our appellate court addressed a similar 
fact.ual situation in People v. Johnson, 394 
Ill.App.3d 1027, 333 I1l.Dec. 774, 915 
N.E.2d 845 (2009). In Johnson, the 
defendant challenged an expert's testimony 
regarding DNA test results, arguing that he 
had no opportunity to cross-examine the 
analysts who conducted the testing. The 
court observed that experts are permitted to 
disclose underlying facts and data to the jury 
in order to explain the· basis for their 
opinions. It concluded that the State offered 
the DNA report at issue as part of the basis 
for the expert opinion and no confrontation 
violation occurred. 
Like Lovejoy and Johnson, Lambatos' 
testimony about Cellmark's report was not 
admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. 
The State introduced this testimony, rather, 
to show the underlying facts and data 
Lambatos used before rendering an expert 
opinion in this case. The evidence against 
the defendant was Lambatos' opinion, not 
Cellmark's report, and the testimony was 
introduced live on the witness stand. Indeed, 
the report was not admitted into evidence at 
all. Rather, Lambatos testified to her 
conclusion based upon her own subjective 
judgment about the comparison of the 
Cellmark report" with the existing ISP 
profile. 
For instance, at trial, the defense attorney 
questioned her if she confused the 
defendant's DNA with L.J.'s DNA. He 
asked Lambatos if the alleles were not more 
consistent with the victim than the defendant 
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at several loci. When asked about a specific 
locus called "T-POX," Lambatos responded: 
"In my opinion with this profile, it is 
a mixture so when we have a mixture 
you are looking at the profile asa 
whole * * * and it's important to 
note that the alleles at each locus on 
a DNA molecule that we look at are 
very common. It is not uncommon 
for you and I to have the same alleles 
at a locus or you and 1 to have the 
same alleles. The power of this DNA 
comes with looking at all 13 areas of 
the DNA because it's that 
uniqueness looking at all 13 that's 
going to give us numbers. And here 
like a T-POX and in the other two 
that you mentioned, there are only 
two alleles and like I say in my 
opinion there are only two people in 
this profile and it just may so happen 
that they share an 8 or that they share 
an 11 or it may so happen that she is 
an 8 and 11 and he is just an 11, 11, 
or he is an 8, 11 and she is an 8, 8. 
There's only certain possibilities that 
can be attributed at each locus." 
After defense counsel stated that Lambatos' 
interpretation could have erred because of a 
degraded sample, she stated: 
"Yes, it's possible to have a 
degraded sample but if the sample 
was degraded, that would be known 
by our earlier examination of the 
evidence [by Hapack]. We determine 
the quantity and the DNA that we 
have and the quality of the DNA and 
also after we look at the 
electropherograms, you can see the 
degradation, their specific patterns, 
and the data looks a certain way 
when it is degraded. The peaks aren't 
as defined. They slope off missing 
here and there. Different things 
happen with degradation, and . I 
didn't see any evidence of 
degradation in this particular 
fraction. " 
The defendant's suggestion that Lambatos 
was merely a "conduit" for Cellmark's 
report and that the report was entirely 
dispositive of Lambatos' opinion, and thus 
hearsay, is not compelling. Her testimony 
consisted of her expert comparison of the 
DNA profile in the ISP database with the 
DNA profile from the kit prepared. by 
Cellmark. She used her own expeliise to 
compare the two profiles before· her: the 
blood sample prepared by Kooi and the 
Semen sample prepared by Cellmark. She 
also did not observe· any problems in the 
chain of custody or any signs of 
contamination or degradation of the 
evidence. Lambatos .ultimately agreed with 
Cellmark's results regarding the male DNA 
profile. But Lambatos additionally made her 
own visual and interpretive comparisons of 
the peaks on the electropherogram and the 
table of alleles to make a conclusion on the 
critical issue: that there was a match to the 
defendant's genetic profile. Accordingly, 
Cellmark's report was· not used for the truth 
of the matter asserted and was not hearsay. 
The defendant further asserts that the instant 
matter is "directly analogous" to the United 
States Supreme COUli's recent. holding of 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. -
-, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 
(2009). In Melendez-Diaz, the Court 
considered whether a celiification by a 
forensic lab analyst as to the nature and 
weight . of a controlled substance was a 
testimonial statement, and thus its admission 
in lieu of live testimony by the analyst 
violated the sixth amendment right to 
confrontation. The defendant in that case, 
Luis Melendez-Diaz, was charged with 
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cocaine trafficking in an amount between 14 
and 28 grams. At trial, the prosecution 
placed into evidence white plastic bags 
containing a substance that resembled 
cocaine. It also submitted three "certificates 
of analysis" showing the results of forensic 
analysis performed on the seized substances. 
The certificates reported the weight of the 
substances and stated that the bags '" [have] 
been examined with the following results: 
The substance was found to contain: 
Cocaine. '" The celiificates were sworn to 
before a notary public by analysts at the 
State Laboratory Institute of the 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health 
as required by Massachusetts law. 
Massachusetts law permitted the use of such 
affidavits to provide prima facie evidence of 
the analyzed substance's composition, 
quality and net weight. 
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that, 
following Crawford, the analyst's 
certificates "were testimonial statements and 
the analysts were 'witnesses' for purposes of 
the Sixth Amendment. Absent a showing 
that the analysts were unavailable to testify 
at trial and that petitioner had a prior 
opportunity to . cross-examine them, 
petitioner was entitled to "be confronted 
with" the analysts at trial. "The Court found 
the "case involves little more than the 
application of our holding in Crawford. " 
The Court based its holding on ~wo 
rationales derived from Crawford. First, the 
forensic analyst's certificates were within 
the "core class of testimonial statements" in 
Cravvford. Because the critical issue was 
whether the substance was cocaine, the 
Supreme Court found that "[t]he 
'certificates' are functionally identical· to 
live, in-court testimony, doing 'precisely 
what a witness does on direct examination. '" 
Second, the Court stated, "not only were the 
affidavits 'made under circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness reasonably 
to believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial,' [ citation] 
but under Massachusetts law the. $ole 
purpose of the affidavits was to provide 
'prima facie evidence of the composition, 
quality, and the net weight' of the analyzed 
substance. " 
The maj ority. explicitly rej ected the 
suggestion that the prosecutors were 
required to call each person involved in the 
chain of custody to the witness stand. 
Responding to the dissent in a footnote, the 
majority stated: 
"[We] do not hold, and it is not the 
case, that anyone whose testimony 
may be relevant in establishing the 
chain of custody, authenticity of the 
sample, or accuracy of the testing 
device, must appear in person as pati 
of the prosecution's case. * * * 
'[G]aps in the chain [of custody] 
normally go to the weight of the 
evidence rather than its 
admissibility.' It is up to the 
prosecution to decide what steps in 
the chain of custody are so crucial as 
to require evidence; but what 
testimony is introduced must (if the 
defendant objects) be introduced 
live. Additionally, documents 
prepared in the regular course of 
equipment maintenance may well 
qualify as nontestimonial records." 
(Emphasis omitted.) 
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at -- n. 1, 129 
S.Ct. at 2532 n. 1, 174 L.Ed.2d at 322 n. 1. 
Accordingly, the Court in Melendez-Diaz 
held that the defendant's confrontation 
clause right had been violated. 
We find that Melendez-Diaz does not change 
our determination. In Melendez-Diaz, the 
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disputed evidence was . a "bare-bones 
statement" thai the substance was cocaine, 
and the defendant "did not know what tests 
the analysts performed, whether those tests 
were routine, and whether interpreting their 
results required the exercise of judgment or 
the use of skills that the analysts may not 
have possessed." Here, Lambatos testified 
about her own expertise, judgment, and sldll 
at interpretation of the specific alleles at the 
13 loci, and confirmed her general 
knowledge of the protocols and procedures 
of Cellmark. Lambatos also conducted her 
own statistical analysis of the DNA match. 
She did not simply read to the judge, sitting 
as a fact finder, from Cellmark's report. This 
is in contrast to Cellmark's report, which did 
not include any comparative analysis of the 
electropherograms or DNA profiles and was 
not introduced into evidence. Cellmark's 
electropherogram, rather, was part of the 
process used by Lambatos in rendering her 
opinion concluding that the profiles 
matched. Thus, Lambatos' opmlOn is 
categorically different from the certificate in 
Melendez-Diaz. 
In sum, the State did not offer Lambatos' 
testimony regarding the Cellmark report for 
the truth of the matter asserted and this 
testimony did not constitqte "hearsay." 
Thus, the trial court and appellate court 
properly concluded that Cral1jord· 
considerations did not apply here. Lambatos 
disclosed the underlying facts from 
Cellmark's repmi for the limited purpose of 
explaining the basis for her opinion on the 
critical issue concerning whether there was a 
DNA match between the defendant's blood 
sample and the semen sample recovered 
from L.J. By allowing the expert to reveal 
the information for this purpose alone, it 
undoubtedly aided the judge, sitting as the 
factfinder, . in assessing the value of 
Lambatos' opinion. Finally, the record 
demonstrates that the gaps in the chain of 
custody went to the '''weight of the evidence 
rather than its admissibility'" and our review 
of the record shows that Lambatos' 
conclusion was tested "in the crucible of 
cross-examination. " 
Sentencing 
* * * 
CONCLUSION 
F or the foregoing reasons, the judgment of 
the appellate cOUli is affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. 
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
Justices THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, 
and KARMEIER concurred in the judgment 
and opinion. 
Justice FREEMAN specially concurred, 
with opinion. 
Justice BURKE concurred in part and 
dissented in part, with opinion. 
Justice FREEMAN, specially concUlTing: 
I agree that defendant's convictions and 
sentences must be affirmed. With respect to 
defendant's appeal in which he raises 
several evidentiary challenges, I concur in 
the cOUli's judgment for reasons other than 
those expressed in its opinion. With respect 
to the State's cross- appeal, I join in that 
portion of the· opinion reversing the 
appellate court's modification of defendant's 
sentence. 
My concerns in this case are based on the 
lack of foundation for Sandra Lambatos' 
testimony .... 
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The court dismisses defendant's contentions 
based on Lambatos' testimony that "because 
Cellmark was an accredited laboratory, 
calibrations, internal proficiencies, and 
controls had to be in place for the DNA 
analysis to be completed in this case." The 
court concludes that because witnesses like 
Lambatos are permitted in Illinois to give an 
opinion without disclosing the facts or data 
upon which the expert bases her opinion, 
such testimony is sufficient. In other words, 
Lambatos' foundational testimony was 
based upon data reasonably relied upon by 
other experts in her field, and defendant's 
appellate concerns relate to the weight of the 
evidence, not its admissibility. 
An expert may certainly base. her opinion on 
information reasonably relied upon by other 
experts in the field. But that was not what 
occurred here. Strikingly absent from 
Lambatos' testimony is any information 
about Cellmark's extraction and 
amplification processes in generating the 
profile that was used to produce the data 
upon which she relied in her making 
comparisons. Lambatos' "testing" in this 
case consisted of her own reading to match 
up the numbers generated on the computer 
charts, which was derived from Cellmark's 
underlying scientific processes. What 
Lambatos failed to testify to during her 
examination was what occurred at Cellmark 
beginning from when Cellmark received the 
package containing the victim's vaginal 
swabs and blood sample to when Cellmark 
analysts performed the extraction and 
amplification procedures. Instead, she 
speculated that because Cellmark was 
accredited, "they would have to meet certain 
guidelines to perform DNA analysis for the 
Illinois State Police so all those calibrations 
and internal proficiencies and controls 
would have had to have been in place for 
them to perform the DNA analysis." 
Lambatos' testimony on this point is 
insufficient. First, with respect to the fact of 
accreditation, Lambatos did not identify 
when or by whom Cellmark received its 
accreditation. Whether a laboratory is 
accredited is a fact that can be established 
without the need of an expert witness. Here, 
Lamb ato s ' testimony does not establish that 
Cellmark was accredited; rather, it was her 
opinion that the laboratory was accredited at 
the time it ran the tests. Further, Lambatos 
did not base her assumption that "certain 
guidelines * * * would have had to have 
been in place" on sources such as the report 
of another expert, i.e., the written report of 
the technicians who generated the profile or 
even the lab's logbook at the time the profile 
was generated. Lambatos' opinion regarding 
whether Cellmark followed proper 
guidelines at the time the DNA material was 
extracted and amplified was not based on 
anything other than her rank speculation that 
it "had to have been done" solely because 
Cellmark was an accredited lab. 
While I do not believe that Lambatos IS 
required to personally verify the protocols 
used by Cellmark· to generate the DNA 
profile from the swab, she, at the very least, 
should be able to point to something 
concrete in order to give her opinion as to 
what protocols were used at the time the 
profile was generated. She did not. There 
was no testimony on which protocols were 
used. In fact, Lambatos admitted that 
Cellmark used procedures and standards that 
were different from those used by her own 
employer, the Illinois State Police Crime 
Laboratory. Although Lambatos stated that 
she personally "helped develop line 
proficiency tests to be administered to 
analysts at Cel[l]mark," nothing in her 
testimony revealed that the analysts who 
performed the DNA extraction and 
amplification in this case had taken, let 
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alone passed, the tests she had developed or 
that, when the tests wexe run, they were run 
according to the standards prefelTed by the 
Illinois State Police Lab. 
The lack of any information regarding 
Cellmark's generation of the male DNA 
profile from the victim's vaginal swabs 
contrasts sharply with the testimony. the 
State produced with respect to the DNA 
profile generated from defendant's blood 
sample by Karen Kooi, upon which· 
Lambatos also relied to read and match up 
the numbers on her chart. . Kooi, an 
employee of the Illinois State Police Crime 
Lab at the time, testified as to the protocols 
she used to generate the DNA profile taken 
from defendant's blood. Kooi further stated 
that she utilized "clean lab" techniques when 
she generated the profile. 
. This case, therefore, differs from People v. 
Sutherland, 223 Il1.2d 187, 307 Ill.Dec. 524, 
860 N.E.2d 178 (2006), upon which the 
court primarily relies in reaching its 
conclusion today. There, the witness in 
question was an employee of the laboratory 
which did the DNA analysis, who not only 
testified at trial, but who had also testified at 
the Frye hearing. Moreover, the defendant 
had received from the State, pursuant to 
Rule 417(b), extensive information 
including records reflecting compliance with 
quality control guidelines. In fact, even the 
defendant's own DNA expert was able to 
testify from the records produced that the 
lab's results were "clean." These facts 
render Sutherland distinguishable. 
Two cases from our appellate court support 
my point regarding foundation. In People v. 
Johnson, a panel of the First Division of the 
First District held that a sufficient 
foundation was established where the DNA 
expert, an actual employee of Cellmark, 
testified that although she did not personally 
perform any of the testing used to generate 
the male DNA profile from the sexual 
assault kit, she based her opinion on records 
used in the ordinaTY course of business. 
People v. Johnson, 389 Ill.AppJd 618, 329 
Ill.Dec. 225, 906 N.E.2d 70 (2009). In 
particular, the witness relied on a written 
Cellmark report, which indicated that 10 
Cellmark analysts had been involved in the 
lab work in the case and that all the methods 
used, conclusions and results reached were 
to a reasonable degree of scientific celtainty. 
Another witness, who like Lambatos was 
employed by Illinois State Police, testified 
that he compared the Cellmark -generated 
male DNA profile to the DNA panel he had 
generated from saliva obtained from the 
defendant and concluded that they were a 
match. Like Lambatos, he testified as to the 
statistical probabilities of the match. In 
holding that an adequate foundation for 
CellmaTk's work had been established for 
the Cellmark witness, the court found it 
significant that the witness actually worked 
for Cellmark, which was the lab that 
generated the DNA profile from the victim's 
samples. She also performed an independent 
review of the work to make sure all of the 
procedures done at the lab were followed 
cOlTectly, which the court held was 
sufficient foundation upon which to partially 
base her assessment and conclusion. I note 
that the court stressed, in reaching its 
conclusion, that the foul1dational testimony 
was stronger than that in this case, 
specifically citing the Third Division's 
opinion in this case. 
SimilaTly, in People v. Johnson, 394 
Ill.App.3d 1027, 333 Ill.Dec. 774, 915 
N.E.2d 845 (2009), a panel from the Sixth 
Division of the First District held that a 
sufficient foundation was established where 
the DNA expert, again an actual employee 
of Cellmark, testified not only about the 
proper procedures that were expected to be 
235 
utilized at her lab, but that the case file 
indicated that those procedures had been 
followed with respect to the DNA profile in 
question. To reach this conclusion, the 
witness relied on the records of other 
Cellmark employees, which indicated that 
the proper procedures had been followed. 
Therefore, . although the witness did not 
perform any' of the testing, her testimony 
showed a sufficient foundation of 
Cellmark's procedures and specifications 
upon which to partially base her assessment 
and conclusion. The court stressed that the 
foundation in the case was stronger than that 
found sufficient by the appellate court in this 
case. 
Lambatos' testimony is demonstrably 
different from the testimony in either of the 
Johnson opinions. Lambatos' direct 
testimony was based on two documents 
offered into evidence by the State, which 
consisted of two shipping manifests from 
FedEx. One manifest showed that the 
victim's vaginal swabs and blood standards 
were sent to Cellmark from the Illinois State 
Police Crime Laboratory on November 28, 
2000, and were received by Cellmark on 
November 29, 2000. The second manifest 
showed that the victim's samples were "sent 
back from Celmark [sic ]" on April 3, 2001, 
along with samples from "other cases" that 
had nothing to do with the present case. 
Lambatos testified that she relied on these 
two pieces of evidence when she did the 
work in this case. I submit that these 
shipping manifests are not the kind of "facts 
or data" contemplated by this court in 
Wilson. Unlike the witnesses in the Johnson 
cases, Lambatos. was not a Cellmark 
employee. She did not rely on the detailed 
type of reports that those witnesses relied 
upon. She did not know who performed the 
tests at Cellmark nor could she testify as to 
what protocols, if any, they followed. The 
shipping manifests, which are not enough to 
even establish a proper chain of custody 
once the samples reached their destination at 
Cellmark, certainly cannot establish whether 
a laboratory was "clean" or whether 
Lambatos' protocols were actually followed. 
By accepting Lambatos' assumption that 
because Cellmark was accredited, the 
protocols she had personally developed for 
the lab to use were, in fact, used to generate 
the DNA profile, the court errs in finding 
that an adequate foundation was laid. The 
court relies on the fact that Lambatos used 
her expertise and professional judgment to 
compare the DNA profiles in this case. But 
the problem with this is that there was no 
foundation established for the DNA profile 
generated by Cellmark. Lambatos' opinion 
that the DNA profile generated there 
matched defendant's DNA profile does not 
change that fact. It is certainly the law that 
alleged infirmities in the performance of a 
test usually go to the weight of the evidence, 
not to its admissibility. Courts should not 
automatically exclude scientific evide1).ce 
whenever a forensic analyst deviates from a 
correct test protocol in minor respects; 
instead, . the deviation would have to 
materially affect the outcome in order to 
warrant exclusion. Here, however, Lambatos 
could not offer any testimony to· establish 
any protocol. Contrary to what the court 
rests its analysis upon, there is simply no 
foundational evidence to "weigh." 
Last, and of equal importance, the court 
today implies that the scientific process 
involved In DNA analysis is "not 
comparable" . to narcotics Gas 
Chromotography Mass Spectrometer 
(GCMS) testing because Lambatos did not 
"regurgitate" the results from Cellmark as 
experts do with respect to GCMS test 
results. Lambatos took on faith the DNA 
profile generated by Cellmark from the 
victim's samples, assuming that because the 
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lab was accredited all quality controls were 
in place when the profile was created. This· 
seems no different from how expert 
witnesses in drug cases view the results 
from the GeMS machine. Unfortunately, it 
has been well-documented in DNA cases 
that "[ q]uality control and quality assurances 
procedures that are followed religiously in 
some labs are ignored or followed 
intermittently in others." The failure to 
employ quality control and quality assurance 
procedures can result in DNA matches in 
criminal cases that are wrong because of 
sample contamination or misconduct on the 
part of the technician. This explains why an 
adequate foundation is as essential in DNA 
cases as it is in drug cases. Given the impact 
a DNA match has on the trier of fact, courts 
must be vigilant in ensuring that DNA 
evidence is admitted with proper foundation. 
This is particularly so in jury cases where 
lay people might not be able to appreciate 
arguments which go to weight once they 
hear of a match that is one in a billion. 
Based on the foregoing, I would hold that 
the foundation for Lamb ato s ' testimony was 
insufficient, and the circuit court abused its 
discretion in admitting it. Based on my 
resolution of defendant's foundational 
challenge, I need not reach defendant's sixth 
amendment confrontation clause argument. 
Although I believe the circuit court abused 
its discretion by admitting Lambatos' 
testimony without proper foundation, the 
error does not require a new trial. The 
testimony of a single witness, if it is positive 
and the witness credible, is sufficient to 
convict a defendant. In this case, the trial 
judge specifically found defendant guilty on 
the basis of the victim's testimony, which he 
characterized as "highly credible." The trial 
judge also commented specifically on the 
strength of the victim's lineup identification 
and her in-court identification. The judge 
found the victim to be "an outstanding 
witness" and believed her testimony "a 
hundred percent." These findings indicate to 
me that the error in admitting Lambatos' 
testimony was harmless. On that basis, I 
would affirm the convictions. 
Justice BURKE, concumng m part and 
dissenting in part: 
I join the part of Justice Freeman's special 
concurrence that concludes that the circuit 
court abused its discretion in admitting 
Lambatos' testimony. I write separately 
because I disagree with the majority's 
resolution of the consecutive-sentencing 
issue .... 
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"Two More Cases Granted" 
SCOTUSblog 
June 28, 2011 
Lyle Denniston 
The Supreme Court, in its final orders on 
Tuesday, showed its continued interest in 
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation 
Clause, taking on a new case on whether an 
expert witness can be called as a stand-in for 
a lab analyst who actually did a test on 
criminal evidence, but did not appear at the 
trial. That question was close to one that had 
been raised last week by Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor as the Court ruled in the case of 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico (09-10876) .... 
* * * 
The new Confrontation Clause case is 
Williams v. Illinois (10-8505). In that case, 
the Illinois. Supreme Court ruled that 
prosecutors could introduce the substance of 
a forensic analyst's report on a DNA test of 
evidence by putting an expert witness on the 
stand and having her analyze the results, 
which showed a DNA match in a rape and 
kidnapping case; The lab analyst was called 
to testify, and the actual lab report itself was 
not admitted. The expert witness had had no 
part in making the analysis, and no personal 
knowledge of how the test was done. The 
state Supreme Court nevertheless concluded 
that there was no violation of the suspect's 
confrontation right, because the findings of 
the lab report were being admitted not for 
their truth, but oply to explain the expert's 
opinion about the results. 
That was similar. to a scenario mentioned by 
Justice Sotomayor on June 23, in her 
concurrence in the Bullcoming case. In that 
case, the Court had ruled that a lab 
supervisor could not be a surrogate witness 
in place of a lab technician who prepared a 
report but did not appear, so the lab test was 
not admissible. Sotomayor sought to show 
that the decision was a narrow one, and 'she 
listed several factual scenarios that she said 
were not covered. One of them . was a 
situation in which "an expert witness was 
asked for his independent opinion about 
underlying testimonial reports that were not 
themselves admitted into evidence." 
In the Sotomayor suggestion, the lab report 
would not have been admitted, but she 
intimated that the expert might be allowed to 
. take the stand anyway and give an 
independent opinion about it. That appeared 
to be what had OCCUlTed in the Williams 
case. The Court apparently granted the case 
to determine whether this scenario would 
satisfy the line of cases beginning with 
Crawford v. Washington (2004). 
* * * 
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"Independence Day, Take 3: Why I Think That The 
Supreme Court Will Find No Gonfrontation Clause 
Violation in Williams v. Illinois" 
EvidenceProf Blog 
June 29, 2011 
Colin Miller 
Yesterday, I noted that the Supreme Court 
granted cert in Williams v. Illinois (10-
8505) to address a question left unanswered 
by Bullcoming v. New Mexico: Is the 
Confrontation Clause violated when an 
. expert witness for the prosecution relies 
upon a testimonial report· prepared by an 
analyst who does not' testify at trial, butthe 
report itself is not admitted into evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted? This 
was different from the question resolved by 
Bullcoming, in which the Court held that the 
Confrontation Clause is violated when such 
a testimonial report is actually admitted into 
evidence. Indeed, Justice Sotomayor made 
this distinction clear in her concurring 
opinion in Bullcoming, which I wrote about 
yesterday. In that post about Sotomayor's 
concurring opinion, I mused about whether 
the Bullcoming dissent would be able to 
create a 5-4 majority finding no 
Confrontation Clause violation in a case 
where a testimonial report is relied upon but 
not actually admitted into evidence to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted. And, based 
upon the facts of Williams v. Illinois, 939 
N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), I think the dissent 
will achieve this result. 
Williams v. Illinois 
In Williams, L.J. was allegedly sexually 
assaulted, kidnapped, and robbed by the 
defendant Sandy Williams on February 10, 
2000. Thereafter, 
Dr. Nancy Schubert conducted a 
vaginal exam of LJ. and took 
vaginal swabs, which were then 
sealed and placed into a criminal 
sexual assault evidence collection kit 
along with LJ.'s blood sample. The 
kit was sent to the Illinois State 
Police (ISP) Crime Lab for testing 
and analysis. 
On February 15, 2000, forensic 
biologist Brian Hapack with the ISp· 
Crime Lab received LJ.'s sexual 
assault evidence collection kit and 
performed tests that confirmed the 
presence of semen. Hapack placed 
the swabs in a coin envelope, sealed 
the envelope, and placed the 
evidence in a secure freezer. ... 
On August 3, 2000, police arrested 
the defendant for an unrelated 
offense and, pursuant to a court 
order, drew a blood sample from the 
defendant. On August 24, 2000, 
forensic scientist Karen Kooi 
performed an analysis on the sample 
that consisted of four quarter-sized 
bloodstains on a filter card. Kooi 
extracted a deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) profile and entered it into the 
database at the ISP Crime Lab. 
Meanwhile, the samples from L.J.'s 
sexual assault kit were sent to 
Cellmark Diagnostic Laboratory in 
Germantown, Maryland, for DNA 
analysis on November 29, 2000. 
Cellmark returned LJ.'s vaginal 
swabs and blood standard to the ISP 
Crime Lab on April 3, 2001. 
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Cellmark derived a DNA profile for 
the person whose semen was 
recovered from 1.J. According to 
ISP forensic biologist Sandra 
Lambatos, ... the DNA profile 
received from Cellmark matched the 
defendant's DNA profile from the 
blood sample in the ISP database. 
At trial, 
Lambatos began her testimony with 
a brief explanation of polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR) testing. PCR 
testing, according to Lambatos, is 
one of the most modem types of 
DNA analysis available and is 
generally accepted in the scientific 
community. Lambatos explained 
how PCR analysis can be used to 
identify a male profile from a semen 
sample. First, an analyst conducts a 
procedure that isolates and extracts 
DNA from a sample that may. 
include a mixture from a pmiicular 
defendant and the victim. The DNA 
is not lm'ge enough to test at this 
point, and requires amplification to 
form a more workable sample. After 
amplification, an analyst can 
measure the length of an individual 
specific strand through a process 
called electrophoresis. A computer 
translates this measurement onto a . 
graph called an electropherogram. 
The electropherogram is a 
representation of the individual's 
specified DNA data into a line with 
peaks representing the lengths of the 
DNA strands of the 13 STR regions. 
Reports generally also provide a 
"table of alleles" showing the DNA 
profile of each sample. She also 
stated that the statistical probability 
of a match can also be determined by 
entering the alleles into a frequency 
database to learn how common they 
are in the general popUlation. 
Lambatos further testified that it is a 
commonly accepted practice in the 
scientific community for one DNA 
expert to rely on· the records ~f 
another DNA analyst to complete her 
work. As mentioned, she used the 
DNA profile from Cellmark to match 
the DNA profile from the 
defendant's blood sample, which 
was contained in the ISP 
database .... Cellmark's testing and 
analysis methods were generally 
accepted in the scientific community 
according to Lambatos. 
When the prosecutor then asked Lambatos 
for her expert opinion regarding the DNA 
match, "[d]efense counsel objected and 
asserted that Lambatos could not rely upon 
the testing performed by another lab." The 
trial judge deferred his ruling on the issue, 
and 
Lambatos then testified that a match 
was generated of the male DNA 
profile found in the semen from 
LJ.'s. vaginal swabs to the 
defendant's male DNA profile from 
the defendant's blood standard. In 
response to' defense questioning, 
Lamb~tos restated her interpretation 
of the alleles at each of the 13 
locations. She testified about several 
locations where she visually filtered 
out spurious alleles and "background 
noise" and· distinguished the 
defendant's profile. Lambatos 
concluded that in her expert opinion, 
the semen from LJ.' s vaginal swab 
was a match to the defendant. 
Lambatos testified that the 
probability of this profile occurring 
in the general population was one in 
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8.7 quadrillion black, one in 390 
quadrillion white, and one in 109 
quadrillion Hispanic unrelated 
individuals. She did not observe any 
degradation or irregularities in the 
sample from LJ.'s vaginal swab. 
She stated that, in general, if "there 
was a question of a match, then we 
would investigate that further by 
looking at the eiectropherograms· 
from all the cases involved and do 
some more comparisons on that." 
She explained that in looking at 
Cellmark's report, she interpreted it 
and "I did review their data, . and I 
did make my own interpretations so I 
looked at what * * * they sent to me 
and did make my own determination, 
my own opinion." While Lambatos 
testified to her conclusion informed 
by Cellmark's report, Cellmark's 
report itself was not introduced into 
evidence. Also, while Lambatos 
referenced documents she reviewed 
in forming her own opinion, she did 
not read the contents of the Cellmark 
report into evidence. 
Defense counsel then repeated his objection, 
claiming, inter alia, that Lambatos' use of 
Cellmark's report violated the Confrontation 
Clause. The trial court disagreed, stating, 
"I don't think this is a Cravl'ford 
scenario, and I agree with the State 
that the evidence is-· the issue is,· 
you know, what weight do you give 
the test, not do you exclude it and 
accordingly your motion to exclude 
or strike the testimony of the last 
witness or opinions based on her 
own independent testing of the data 
received from Cellmark will be 
denied." 
After he was convicted, Williams appealed, 
claiming, inter alia, "that his sixth 
amendment right was violated by Lambatos' 
testimony concerning Cellmark's report," 
and his appeal eventually reached the 
Supreme Court of Illinois. The Illinois 
Supremes . initially noted that it "has long 
held that prohibitions against the admission 
of hearsay do not apply when an expert 
testifies to underlying facts and data, not 
admitted into evidence, for the purpose of· 
explaining the basis of his opinion." The 
court then rejected Williams' "suggestion 
that Lambatos was merely a 'conduit' for 
Cellmark's repOli and that the report was 
entirely dispositive of Lambatos' opinion," 
instead finding that 
Her testimony consisted of her 
expeli comparison of the DNA 
profile in the 1SP database with the 
DNA profile from the kit prepared 
by Cellmark. She used her own 
expeliise to compare the two profiles 
before her: the blood sample 
prepared by Kooi and the semen 
sample prepared by Cellmark. She 
also did not observe any problems in 
the chain of custody or any signs of 
contamination or degradation of the 
evidence. Lambatos ultimately 
agreed with Cellmark's results 
regarding the male DNA profile. But 
Lambatos additionally made her own 
visual and interpretive comparisons 
of the peaks on the electropherogram 
and the table of alleles to make a 
conclusion on the critical issue: that 
there was a match to the defendant's 
genetic profile. Accordingly, 
Cellmark's report was not used for 
the truth of the matter asselied and 
was not hearsay (emphasis added). 
The court also rejected Williams' contention 
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that his case was '''directly analogous' to the 
United States Supreme Court's recent 
holding of Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts," concluding that 
Lambatos testified about· her own 
expertise, judgment, and skill at 
interpretation of the specific alleles 
at the 13 loci, and confirmed her 
general knowledge of the protocols 
and procedures of Cellmark. 
Lambatos also conducted her own 
statistical analysis of the DNA 
match. She did not simply read to the 
judge, sitting as a fact finder, from 
Cellmark's report. This is in contrast 
to Cellmark's report, which did not 
include any comparative analysis of 
the electropherograms or DNA. 
profiles and was not introduced into 
evidence. Cellmark's 
electropherogram, rather, was part of 
the process used by Lambatos in 
rendering her opinion concluding 
that the profiles matched. Thus, 
Lambatos' opinion is categorically 
different from the certificate m 
Melendez-Diaz (emphasis added). 
Justice Sotomayor 
As I noted in my post yesterday, Justice 
Sotomayor held in her· Bullcoming . 
concurrence that the Court was not 
presented with four factual circumstances in 
Bullcoming, including the circumstance "in 
which an expert witness was asked for his 
independent opmlOn about underlying 
testimonial reports that were not themselves 
admitted into evidence."· I then concluded 
that based upon the language used by Justice 
Sotomator, it was likely that she would find 
no Confrontation Clause problem with an 
expert witness offering opinion testimony 
pursuant to Rule 703 based upon a 
testimonial report prepared by an analyst 
who does not testify at trial. 
My main question involved the issue of the 
circumstances under which Justice 
Sotomayor would find. that a testifying 
expert's opinion was tmly an "independent 
opinion" rather than an opinion dependent 
upon a testimonial report. For instance, I 
cited to the opinion of the Court of Appeals 
of North Carolina in State v. Hough, 2010 
WL 702458 (N.C.App. 2010), in which a 
chemist weighed dmgs and prepared a report 
but did not testify, and a second chemist 
used the report as the basis for expert 
testimony on the weight of the dmgs without 
herself testing the dmgs. I argued that under 
this circumstance, Justice Sotomayor should 
(but might not) find that the testifying 
chemist's opinion was not tmly independent, 
meaning that there was a Confrontation 
Clause violation. 
In Williams, however, Lambatos' opinion 
seemingly was tmly "independent." Indeed, 
the trial court noted that Lambatos 
conducted "independent testing." Moreover, 
as the Supreme Court of Illinois noted, 
Lamb ato s "made her own visual and 
interpretive comparisons" and "conducted 
her own statistical analysis of the DNA 
match." Given these findings, I think it is . 
clear that Justice Sotomayor will find that 
Lamb atos, opinion was tmly "independent" 
and will thus join the four Bullcoming 
dissenters to form a five Justice majority 
concluding that there was no Confrontation 
Clause violation in Williams. 
Now, will this be the conect mling, and 
what will it tell us about cases like Hough in 
which there is not independent testing by the 
testifying expeli? I'm not sure yet, but I will 
have more thoughts over the course of the 
summer .. 
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"Initial Thoughts on Williams" 
The Confrontation Blog 
July 09,2011 
Richard Friedman 
In Williams lv. Illinois], the state presented 
the testimony of a DNA expert that in her 
opinion, based on a Cellmark repOli on 
DNA found in a crime scene sample and on 
a report by the Illinois State Police on DNA 
found in a swab taken from the accused, that 
the accused. was the source of the DNA 
found in the crime scene sample. No one 
from Cellmark testified at trial. 
1. The Cellmark report was testimonial. As I 
understand it, this was a report on a crime 
scene sample refened to Cellmark by the 
Illinois State Police. I don't think that there 
is much doubt that the primary purpose of 
the repOli, however one might analyze it, 
was to create evidence for use in 
prosecution. (That is more rigorous than the 
test I think ought to be applied, but that's 
another issue.) 
I think it's important to bear in mind that the 
other issues raised by Williams come into 
play only if the underlying statement is 
testimonial. That may be obvious, but it is 
worth emphasizing for a couple of reasons. 
First, this fact should relieve much of the 
concern about costs, financial and in terms 
of lost evidence. No confrontation problem 
arises unless the repOli is made in 
anticipation of evidentiary use. For example, 
. if a lab tech does a blood test without the 
anticipation of evidentiary use, it will not be 
testimonial, and there is no confrontation 
issue. Second, if the statement is testimonial, 
then that means that the statement was made 
in anticipation of evidentiary use-and in 
fact under cunent law it would mean that it 
was made with the primary purpose of 
creating evidence for use in prosecution. 
That, I believe, should raise alarm bells for a 
court considering creation of a doctrine that 
would allow use of the statement without the 
live testimony of a competent witness. 
2. The statement was not formally admitted, 
but a crucial part of the substance was made 
known to the jury. The prosecutor asked 
Sandra Lambatos, the in-court witness, 
"Was there a computer match generated of 
the male DNA profile [repOlied by 
Cellmark] found in semen from the vaginal 
swabs of [the victim] to a male DNA profile 
[repOlied by another analyst in the state 
police lab] that had been identified as having 
originated from Sandy Williams?" She 
answered in the affirmative. The prosecutor 
.then asked whether she had compared the 
two profiles. She said she had. He asked 
what the frequency of such a match would 
be if someone other than Williams were the 
source, and she answered with very low 
numbers. Finally, the prosecutor asked, "In 
your expert opinion, can you call this a 
match to Sandy Williams?" and she 
responded simply, "Yes." 
Formal admission of an out-of-court 
statement is not necessary to invoke the 
. Confrontation Clause. When a statement is a 
writing, it is of course often admitted as an 
exhibit. When it is unrecorded, then no 
tangible exhibit of it can be offered. We 
necessarily rely on another witness's 
account of the statement-but the Clause 
. may be brought into play without that 
account being purpOliedly verbatim. It 
should be enough if the prosecution is 
effectively asking the jury to infer that the 
in-court witness is communicating some or 
all of the substance of an out-of-court 
testimonial statement, and that this 
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substance is true. See my recent post,. 
["]When is a statement presented for 
purposes of the Confrontation Clause?["] . 
In considering application of this principle 
to this case, note first that the existence of 
the statement was made clear to the jury. In 
other words, this is not a case in which an 
expert assembles information from one or 
more sources and then draws an inference 
based on that information without disclosing 
what it is or what its sources are. (I 'don't 
believe that if that were so it would per se 
render the Confrontation Clause 
inapplicable; it still might that the jury 
would likely infer that the expert's opinion 
was based on a statement to a certain effect, 
and even if not there would be a concern 
that the expert's opinion is being used to 
repackage the information contained in an 
undisclosed testimonial statement. But, 
,whatever the ramifications may be of that 
situation, the COUli need not address them in 
the Williams case.) The testimony explicitly 
referred to the Cellmark report. 
Furthermore, it was clear what the substance 
of the statement was: It indicated that the 
vaginal swab taken from the crime scene 
reflected the same DNA profile as the swab 
taken from Williams. It is as if an in-court 
witness reports, "Somebody at the scene 
described the person she saw commit the 
crime, and the description closely matched 
Williams." So far as the Confrontation 
Clause is concerned, the report was 
presented to the jury. 
3. The argument that the statement was in 
any event presented to the jury not for the 
truth of a matter that it asserted but rather in 
support of the expert's opinion seems 
willfully wrong-headed to me in this 
context. In prior posts on this blog, 
including one discussing the fine opinion in 
People v. Goldstein, 6 N.Y.3d 119, 843 
N.E.2d 727, 810 N.Y.S.2d 100 (by a former 
boss of mine, Judge Robert Smith), I have 
emphasized the simple point that if a 
statement supports the expert's opinion orily 
if it is true then it is a sham to say that it is 
being presented to support the opinion but 
not for its truth; see also The Not-for-the-
Truth End Run. And in Williams, the 
application of this principle is perfectly 
clear: If the profile revealed by the vaginal 
swab was not what the Cellmark report said 
it was, then that report provided no support 
whatsoever for the expert's opinion. . 
4. This analysis should not be affected by 
concluding that the expeli's opmlOn 
conveyed additional information not 
contained in the original report-an 
argument not available to the prosecution in 
Bullcoming, where the in-court witness did 
nothing more than transmit the information 
repOlied by the absent analyst. The question 
is not whether the in-court witness's 
testimony had added value; but whether the 
out-of-court report was presented for its 
truth. This is simply an ordinary instance of 
a prosecution case depending on multiple 
links in a chain-and each link must comply 
with the Confrontation Clause. We 
wouldn't, for example, tolerate a witness 
testifying that a given sample contained 
cocaine without the prosecution also 
presenting proper evidence tying the sample 
to the case. This is no different. If the 
expert's opmlOn does indeed convey 
additional information, that is something 
more that the prosecution has to prove; it 
does not ease the burden on the prosecution. 
Indeed, the "expert value added" theory 
would be an invitation to manipulation by 
the prosecution and its witnesses. That is, 
the prosecution would have an incentive to 
manufacture needs for its in-court witnesses 
to add value over the other information 
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presented to the jury. 
For example, suppose a lab analyst reports 
results from which a qualified chemist could 
easily infer the presence of cocaine-but 
that the report does not include this bottom 
line.. If the "expert value added" theory 
governed, a chemist could, so far as the 
Confrontation Clause is concerned, testify at 
trial against an accused, "In my opinion, 
cocaine was present in that sample." (As 
discussed below, evidence law in most 
jurisdictions would require the expert to 
satisfy the court that the information on 
which she based her opinioll was "of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts" in her 
field, but that is a standard easily met.) The 
lab analyst, who by hypothesis knew that her 
report was intended for prosecutorial use, 
would not have to corne to court, and the 
report would not even have to be introduced 
or otherwise presented to the jury. 
5. Fed. R. Evid. 703, copied by most of the 
states (now including Illinois), provides: 
If of a type reasonably relied upon 
by experts in the particular field in 
forming opinions or inferences upon 
the subject, the facts or data [on 
which a testifying expert bases an 
opinion] need not be admissible in 
evidence in order for the opinion or 
inference to be admitted .. 
A 2000 amendment to the Federal Rule 
adds: 
Facts or data that are otherwise 
inadmissible shall not be disclosed to 
the jury by the proponent of the 
opinion or inference unless the court 
determines that their probative value 
in assisting the jury to evaluate the 
expert's OpInIOn substantially 
outweighs their prejudicial effect. 
A few points. This Rule does not purport to 
state a constitutional principle. Nor does it 
state an evidentiary principle of long 
standing; it was developed and adopted in 
the third quarter of the 20th century. There 
is no constitutional problem with the Rule so 
long as the information provided to the 
expert is not a testimonial statement. But if 
the expert does base an opinion on a 
testimonial statement, then I think there are 
potential constitutional problems. 
First, if the statement is presented to the jury 
. for the truth of what it asserts-and I have 
argued above that in Williams these 
conditioris were met for purposes of the . 
Confrontation Clause-then there is a 
violation of the Clause, assuming the author 
of the statement (or someone else who can 
endorse its substance from first-hand 
knowledge) does not testify at trial. The last 
sentence of Fed. R. Evid. 703, if it were 
applicable, would relieve the statement of 
objection to admissibility under ordinary 
evidentiary rules, but of course it cannot 
provide . relief from a constitutional 
objection-and note that it is based on a set 
of considerations, a weighing of probative 
value and prejudice, having nothing to do 
with the Clause. This sentence as adopted, 
as I recall, because cOUlis were in conflict 
about how to handle the situation in which 
an expert was allowed to offer an opinion 
based in part on a statement otherwise 
inadmissible and the proponent sought to 
use the opinion as a lever to gain 
admissibility of the statement. Some courts, 
I believe, without quite recognizing the 
nature of the Confrontation Clause 
problem-this was before CraYl1ord-
nevertheless had a sense that in at least some 
cases there was something fishy. about 
letting an otherwise inadmissible statement 
in on the basis that it supported the expert's 
opinion. But the rulemakers couldn't 
atiiculate the circumstances in which this . 
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created a problem-the answer, I think, is 
that it's a problem when the statement is 
testimonial-and so they responded with a 
rather clumsy compromise, simply putting 
some extra weight on the prejudice side of 
the scale prescribed by Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
Now, what if the out of court statement is 
testimonial but it is not presented to the 
jury? Is there a Confrontation Clause 
problem with allowing the expert to give an 
opinion based in part on the undisclosed 
statement, as Fed. R. Evid. 703 purpOlis to 
allow? That, as I have said, is a question not 
presented in Williams, and there is no need 
for the Supreme Court to resolve it in 
deciding Williams. But a couple of 
comments., First, even if the statement is not 
explicitly disclosed to the jury, it may be 
that enough is disclosed that the jury will 
likely infer the substance of the statement. 
Second, even apart from that, I think there 
may be a substantial Confrontation Clause 
problem. Recall, that by hypothesis, the 
statement made to the expert is testimonial. 
The expeli therefore may essentially be 
repackaging information provided by an out-
of-court witness who does not corne to 
court. Again, an example would be a 
chemist who offers an "opinion" in court 
that a substance was cocaine, based on a lab 
report giving information that strongly 
implies that conclusion to chemists. 
In short, I worry that if the Supreme Court 
holds for the state in Williams, it will invite 
subterfuges and manipulations that will 
substantially impair the confrontation right. 
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Greene v. Fisher 
10-637 
Ruling Below: Greene v. Palakovich, 606 F.3d 85 (3rd Cir. 2010) cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1813 
(U.S. 2011). 
Defendant Eric Greene was convicted of second degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy. Before 
trial, an agreement was reached whereby statements from some of Greene's )lon-testifying 
codefendants would be redacted, replacing individual names with generic pronouns such as "we" 
or "someone." Greene filed a direct appeal with the Pennsylvania Superior Court which affirmed 
the trial court and addressed Greene's claim under Bruton v. United States on the merits on 
December 16, 1997. Greene then filed for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme 
court. While that petition was pending, the Supreme Court decided Gray v. Maryland holding 
that redactions similar to the ones at issue in Greene's case were similar enough to those at issue 
in Bruton to warrant the same legal results. The Pennsylvania first granted a limited version of 
Greene's petition· then dismissed his appeal as improvidently granted. Greene's conviction 
became final on July 28, 1999 . 
. Greene was denied post-conviCtion relief at all state court levels and he proceeded to seek federal 
habeas relief. The Magistrate Jude determined the controlling date for determining "clearly 
established federal law" was the date of Greene's last state-court decision and thus Gray did not 
apply to Greene's case. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge applied Bruton and Richardson v. 
Marsh and recommended the District Court deny Greene's petition for habeas relief. The District 
Court adopted this recommendation and the Third circuit affirmed. 
Question Presented: For purposes of adjudicating a state prisoner's petition for federal habeas 
relief, what is the temporal cutoff for whether a decision from this Court qualifies as "clearly 
established Federal law" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996? 
Eric GREENE also known as Jarmaine Q. Trice, 
v. 
John A. PALAKOVICH; The District Attorney of The Philadelphia County; The Attorney 
General of the State of Pennsylvania 
Eric Greene, Appeliant. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
Filed May 28,2010. As Amended July 22,2010. 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
SMITH, Circuit Judge .. 
Eric Greene petitioned for relief under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254 from his state court 
convictions for second degree murder, 
robbery, and conspiracy. This appeal 
requires us to resolve the thomy question of 
what the temporal cutoff is for determining 
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"clearly established Federal law" for 
purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") 
standard of review, set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(1). Based on the statute's text and 
Supreme Court precedent, we now hold that 
"clearly established Federal law" should be 
determined as of the date of the relevant 
state-court decision. Because the Supreme 
Court decision: that Greene wishes to rely 
upon in his habeas petition, Gray v. 
}vfaryland, 523' U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 
140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998), had not yet been 
decided at the time of the relevant state-
court decision, he cannot show that his state 
court proceedings resulted In an 
unreasonable application of "clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by 
the Supreme Court of the United States[.]" 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(I). Thus, we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court denying 
Greene's habeas petition. 
1. 
The Crime 
In early December of 1993, three or four 
men robbed a small family owned grocery 
'store in North Philadelphia, and its owner, 
Francisco Azcona, died after being shot at 
point-blank range .... 
The Investigation 
[Investigators collected conflicting 
. statements from Greene's codefendants that 
identified Greene and the other codefendants 
as taking part in the crime.] 
The Trial 
Greene filed a pretrial motion seeking 
severance on several grounds. In that 
motion, he argued, inter alia, that a joint 
trial with his codefendants would be . 
prejudicial because of the incriminating 
statements they had made to authorities 
During a pretrial hearing, Greene urged the 
trial court, the Court of Common Pleas of 
Philadelphia, to sever the trials because the 
statements of some of his non-testifying 
codefendants implicated him and identified 
him as the person who carried the cash 
register out of the grocery, store. The trial 
court, recognizeE ed] that the statements 
might be inadmissible at a joint trial, but 
also notE ed] that redaction might resolve any 
problem ofprejudice[.] ... ' 
. ',' The Court [determined] that "it seems to 
me ,that the fair way to redact these 
[statements] is to refer to three different 
people." Greene's counsel responded: "As 
long as I would be allowed to argue in my 
closing speech that you heard what you 
heard and you heard that there were 
different people, then I would have no 
problem with [it].'~ The prosecutor offered to 
redact the statements so that "not one 
specific person carries out the cash register." 
Greene's counsel agreed that, under Bruton, 
such a redaction would remove any 
prejudice from the statements .. , . 
* * * 
The Commonwealth also called. Detectives 
Gross and Walsh to testify about the 
statements they obtained from Finney and 
Womack. Neither Greene nor his 
codefendants objected .to the reading of 
those statements in redacted form. Detective 
Gross read FiOOey's redacted statement, 
which substituted the nicknames or proper 
names of Finney's codefendants with the 
phrases "this guy," "other guys," and "two 
guys." The redacted statement also used the 
neutral pronouns "we" or "someone" in 
certain instances .... 
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· . . During Detective Gross's reading of the 
redacted statement, the trial court instructed 
the jury that Finney's statement could only 
be considered as evidence against him and 
not as evidence against any other defendant. 
Detective Walsh, during his testimony, read 
a redacted version of Womack's statement. . 
Although the redacted statement utilized 
neutral references such as "guy," "another 
guy," "someone," "someone else," "one," 
and "others," it replaced the names of some 
of the codefendants with the word "blank" 
on three occasions. The trial court did not 
give a limiting instruction following the 
reading of Womack's redacted statement, 
and neither Greene· nor any of his 
codefendants requested such an instruction. 
After closing arguments, the trial court 
issued a limiting instruction directing the 
jurors not to consider either redacted 
statement as evidence against any defendant 
other than the declarant. The jury found 
Greene guilty of second degree murder, 
three counts of robbery, and one count of 
conspiracy. The trial court sentenced him to 
life imprisonment. 
Subsequent Procedural History 
Greene filed a direct appeal with the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court. Citing Bruton, 
Greene argued that his trial should have 
been severed from that of his codefendants 
because the statements implicating him 
"were not suitable for redaction.". On 
December 16, 1997, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court affirmed the judgment 
against Greene, addressing his Bruton claim 
on the merits. The Court observed that the 
statements that were admitted into evidence 
"were redacted to remove any reference to 
the other defendants in the case" and "[t]he 
trial court instructed the jury on more than 
one occasion that such statements could only 
be considered as evidence against the 
defendants who made them." In light of 
these observations, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court concluded that Bruton was 
not violated and that Greene was not 
deprived of his right to confrontation. 
Greene filed a timely petition for allowance 
of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court. His petition argued, inter alia, that he 
had been deprived of his rights under the 
Confrontation Clause by the introduction of 
Womack's and Finney's statements. As 
support for his position, Greene again cited 
Bruton. While Greene's petition for 
allowance of appeal was pending with the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the United 
States Supreme Court issued its decision in 
Gray. In Gray, the Supreme Court stated 
that "considered as a class, redactiops that 
replace a proper name with an obvious 
blank, the word 'delete,' a symbol, or 
similarly notify the jury that a name has 
been deleted are similar enough to Bruton's 
unredacted confessions as to warrant the 
same legal results." 523 US. at 195, 118 
S.Ct. 1151. Thereafter, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court granted Greene's petition for 
allocatur "limited to the issue of whether the 
common pleas court erred by denying the 
motion for severance thereby resulting in the 
violation of [Greene]'s Sixth Amendment 
right of confrontation upon the admission of 
statements given by his nontestifying 
codefendants." Commonwealth v. Trice, 552 
Pa. 201,. 713 A.2d 1144 (1998). After 
granting the petition for allocatur, however, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed 
Greene's appeal as improvidently granted. 
Commonwealth· v. Trice, 556 Pa. 265, 727 
A.2d 1113 (1999). Greene's conviction 
became final ninety days later, on July 28, 
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1999, when the time period for filing a 
petition for certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court expired. 
In early August of 1999, Greene sought 
relief from his conviction based on 
Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act 
("PCRA"). In his PCRA petition, Greene 
argued that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying the severance motion, 
and cited, inter alia, the prosecutor's 
summation, which allegedly improperly 
informed the jury that Finney's statement 
corroborated that the others on trial were 
implicated in the commission of the crime. 
The PCRA petition did not assert a 
Confrontation Clause claim as it failed to 
. reference the redacted statements or to cite 
the Supreme Court's decisions in Bruton, 
Marsh, or Gray. The trial court dismissed 
Greene's PCRA petition as frivolous. 
Greene, acting pro se, appealed the denial of 
his PCRA petition to the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court, asserting that the trial court 
erred by refusing to grant a severance. His 
argument cited only Pennsylvania authority 
regarding motions to sever multiple criminal 
charges. He did not refer to the 
Confrontation Clause, Bruton, Marsh or 
Gray. On December 31, 2003, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the 
dismissal of Greene's PCRA petition, noting 
that the severance claim had been finally 
litigated and could not afford him collateral 
relief. Greene filed another petition for 
allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, which denied allocatur. 
This timely § 2254 petition followed. In his 
petition, Greene asserted, inter alia, that his 
trial should have been severed "due to 
antagonistic defenses, due to the fact a 
codefendant was subjected to the death 
penalty even though petitioner was not, and 
particularly due to the fact that effective 
redaction of the codefendant's [sic l 
statements, though attempted, was polluted 
by gross prosecutorial misconduct." In a 
comprehensive report, the Magistrate Judge 
to whom the petition had been referred 
recommended that Greene's petition be 
dismissed, but that a certificate of 
appealability be granted . on the 
Confrontation Clause claim arising out of 
the introduction of Womack's and Finney's 
redacted statements at trial. 
The Magistrate Judge struggled with 
whether to determine the "clearly 
~stablished Federal law" under § 2254(d)(1) 
as of the date of the relevant state-court . 
decision, as. instructed by Justice O'Connor 
in her portion of the majority decision in 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403-412, 
120 S.Ct. 149.5, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), or 
by the date Greene's conviction became 
final, as instructed by Justice Stevens in his 
portion of the majority decision in Williams, 
id. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495. This issue was 
significant because it determined whether 
"clearly established Federal law" for 
purposes of Greene's § 2254 petition 
included the Supreme Court's decision in 
Gray. If the cutoff date was the date of the 
relevant state-court decision, i. e., the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court's December 
16, 1997 decision affirming Greene's 
convictions on direct appeal, that date 
preceded the Supreme Court's decision in 
Gray, and Gray would not be part of the 
"clearly established Federal law" applicable 
to this habeas petition. But if the date 
Greene's convictions became final, July 28, 
1999, was the pertinent cutoff date, Gray, 
which was issued more than a year earlier on 
March . 9, 1998, would be "clearly 
established Federal law." 
The Magistrate Judge ultimately determined 
. that the controlling date for ascertaining the 
"clearly established Federal law" for 
Greene's habeas petition was the date of the 
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relevant state-court decision. Accordingly, 
the Magistrate Judge applied the Supreme 
Court law existing at the time of the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court's December. 
16, 1997 decision, Bruton and Marsh, to 
determine whether Greene's § 2254 petition 
merited relief. He concluded that the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court did not 
unreasonably apply Bruton and Marsh in 
concluding that the redacted statements did 
not violate the Confrontation Clause and 
recommended that the District Court deny 
the § 2254 petition. 
The Commonwealth objected to the 
Magistrate Judge's report, arguing that 
Greene had not procedurally exhausted his 
Confrontation Clause claim. The District 
Court overruled the Commonwealth's 
objections, noting that Greene presented a 
general claim regarding the redacted 
confessions and·. relied upon relevant 
Supreme Court authority, Bruton and 
Marsh. The District Court a~opted the 
Magistrate Judge's report and 
recommendation. The Court denied the 
petition, but also granted a celiificate of 
appealability limited to Greene's 
Confrontation Clause claim. 
II. 
[Fair presentation of Confrontation Clause 
claim.] 
III. 
Having determined that Greene fairly 
presented his Confrontation Clause claim in 
. the Pennsylvania state courts, we tum to a 
vexing issue that has, for the most part, 
evaded analytical discussion by the Supreme 
COUli and the Courts of Appeals. That is, 
whether "clearly established Federal law" 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is determined 
based on the "time of the relevant state-court 
decision," Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 
S.Ct. 1495 (O'Connor, 1, for the Court), the 
"time [the] state-court conviction became 
final," id. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (Stevens, 
1, for the Court), or some combination 
thereof, e.g., Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 
272, 122 S.Ct. 2147, 153 L.Ed.2d 301 
(2002) (per curiam) (holding that "in 
addition to performing any· analysis required 
by AEDP A, a federal court considering a 
habeas petition must conduct a threshold 
Teague [v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 
1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989),] analysis 
when the issue is properly raised by the 
state"). The Supreme Court, until recently, 
appeared to have settled on the date of the 
relevant state-court decision. But the use of 
the date the petitioner's conviction became 
final has refused to quietly exit the stage. In 
recent months, the Supreme Court has noted 
the "uncertainty" surrounding the meaning 
of "clearly established Federal law" for the 
purposes of § 2254( d) (1 ). 
After careful consideration of the divergent 
approaches to determining what constitutes 
"clearly established Federal law" under § 
2254( d)(l), we now hold that the date of the 
relevant state-court decision is the 
controlling date. After surveying the 
questions that arise from the Supreme 
Court's Williams decision, and considering 
the statutory text and post-Williams 
Supreme Court precedent, our view is that 
using the date of the relevant state-court 
decision to determine "clearly established 
Federal law" is the most logical approach to 
applying § 2254( d) (1 ). 
A. 
It is understandable that confusion surrounds 
what constitutes "clearly established Federal 
law." In discussing the meaning of the 
AEDP A amendments, the Supreme Court 
has held that the "statutory phrase ['clearly 
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established Federal law'] refer[red] to the 
holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [its] 
decisions as of the time of the relevant state-
court decision." . It has also held that all 
Supreme Court jurisprudence that would 
"qualify as an old rule under [its] Teague 
jurisprudence w[ ould] constitute 'clearly 
established Federal law . . .' under § 
2254( d)(l)." 
These statements from Justice O'Connor 
present the first area of confusion in 
Williams. The most logical meaning for the 
term "old rule," a term that lacks any 
meaningful discussion post-Williams, is any 
rule which is not "new" under Teague. If 
that is the case, then an "old rule" is any rule 
that was "dictated by the governing 
precedent existing at the time when [the 
petitioner's] conviction became final[.]"In 
that event, the inclusion of old rules under 
Teague as "clearly established Federal law" 
would include Supreme Court decisions 
issued after the relevant state-court decision 
but before the petitioner's conviction 
became final. Such an outcome, in our view, 
contradicts Justice 0' Connor's initial 
declaration that "clearly established Federal 
law" should be determined based on the date 
of the relevant state-court decision. 
To further complicate Williams, the 
Supreme Court also held that the "threshold 
question under AEDPA is whether [a 
petitioner] seeks to apply a rule of law that 
was clearly established at the time his state-
court conviction became final." Williams, 
529 U.S. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (Stevens, J., 
for the Court) (emphasis added). Thus, the 
maj ority opinions of the Court, on their 
faces, offered differing interpretations of the 
"clearly established Federal law" language. 
Supreme Court precedent after Williams has 
also raised questions. At least some post-
Williams authority suggests that the Teague 
test and § 2254( d)(l) are distinct inquiries. 
The instances where both tests must be met, 
however, are unclear. More importantly, it is 
.also unclear whether the distinct nature of 
the two inquiries has any impact on how we 
approach the meaning of "clearly 
established Federal law" for the purposes of 
. § 2254( d) (1 ). 
In sum, we have (1) Justice O'Connor's 
majority opinion in Williams, which seems 
to contradict itself by stating that the date of 
the relevant state-court decision is the 
operative date for determining "clearly 
established Federal . law" while 
simultaneously stating that Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that would qualify as "old 
rules" under Teague (which relies on the 
date the petitioner's conviction became 
final) is also "clearly established Federal 
law," (2) Justice Stevens's majority opinion 
in Williams, which contradicts Justice 
O'Connor's directive that we should look to 
the date of the relevant state-court decision, 
and (3) post-Williams Supreme Court 
authority suggesting that Teague and § 
2254( d)(l) are distinct inquiries subject to 
independent analysis under certain 
circumstances. 
While many courts have managed to avoid 
confronting these issues, this case presents 
us with the inescapable obligation to decide 
the cutoff date for determining "clearly 
established Federal law." Greene's petition 
turns on whether he may invoke Gray; 
without that decision he cannot obtain relief. 
See infra Section IV. Gray was decided on 
March 9, 1998. Thus, using the date of the 
relevant state-court decision, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court's December 
16, 1997 decision, Gray would not be 
"clearly established Federal law." But using 
the date Greene's conviction became final, 
July 28, 1999, Gray would be "clearly 
established Federal law." Indeed, Greene's 
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case is the perfect storm of facts for 
resolving the issue of which date-the date of 
the relevant state-court decision or the date 
the state-coUli conviction became final-
should be used for determining "clearly 
established Federal law" for the purposes of 
§ 2254( d)(I). 
B. 
The text of § 2254( d)(I) supports using the 
date of the relevant state-coUli decision for 
determining "clearly established Federal 
law." Section 2254(d)(I) is concerned with 
"decision[s]" that were "contrary to" or 
"umeasonable application [ s]" of "clearly 
established Federal law": 
fd. 
An application for a writ of habeas 
corpus on behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of 
a State court. shall not be granted 
with respect to any claim that was 
adjudicated on the merits in State . 
court proceedings unless the 
adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an 
umeasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of 
the United States[.] 
The statute indicates that a "decision" results 
from a state court's adjudication "on the 
merits" of a claim. In other words, the 
decision occurs when the state court has 
acted on the substance of a petitioner's 
claim. Thus, it is the state court's resolution 
of the petitioner's claim that must be 
"contrary to" or an "umeasonable 
application" of existing Federal law to 
justify granting habeas relief. 
Given that AEDP A is concerned with the 
review of the state court's decision on the 
merits of the petitioner's claim, the statute, 
read in the most straightforward fashion, 
requires that the relevant Federal law be 
"clearly established" at the time of that 
state-court decision. Reading the language 
plainly, "clearly established" contemplates 
that the law or precedent existed at the time 
of the state court's substantive resolution of 
the petitioner's claim. A state court cannot 
umeasonably apply a Supreme Court 
decision that did not exist at the time of its 
decision. The same is true for the "contrary 
to" prong of the statute. 
C. 
Supreme Court decisions after Williams 
further bolster our conclusion. In Lockyer v. 
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 
L.Ed.2d 144 (2003), the Supreme Court 
stated unequivocally that "'clearly 
establlshedFederal Law' under § 2254(d)(I) 
is the governing legal principle or principles 
set forth by the Supreme Court at the time 
the state court renders its decision." ... 
The date .the conviction became final, on the 
other hand, has not gained much traction in 
the Supreme Court. Aside from stating that 
Teague and § 2254( d)(I) are distinct 
inquiries, and that in certain circumstances 
both Teague and § 2254(d)(1) must be 
satisfied, the Supreme Court has not 
suggested that the date the conviction 
became final has any import in determining 
"clearly established Federal law" for the 
purposes of § 2254(d)(1). In fact, it appears 
that Justice Stevens's majority opinion 
language from Williams stating that the 
"threshold question". is whether the 
petitioner seeks to apply a rule that was 
clearly established at the time his state-coUli 
conviction became final, has been 
supplanted by Lockyer, where the Supreme 
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Court agreed that the "threshold matter" was 
to decide what constituted "clearly 
established Federal law," but then used the 
relevant state-comi decision date to 
determine that law. The most telling 
observation regarding the use of the date the 
conviction became final is that the strongest 
authorities we have found for that approach 
are the recent Supreme Court opinions 
expressing uncertainty on which date is 
appropriate. Mere uncertainty cannot 
counterbalance the numerous Supreme 
Court decisions that have unequivocally, 
albeit without analysis, taken the other 
approach. As an inferior federal court, we 
are not free to ignore the numerosity of these 
pronouncements. 
Moreover, it appears that Justice Stevens's 
primary concern with Justice O'Connor's 
formulation of the "clearly established 
Federal law" inquiry is her view that the 
phrase "refers to the holdings, as opposed to 
the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] 
decisions[.]" In Carey, Justice Stevens 
explained that he took· issue with Justice 
O'Connor's formulation because it 
discouraged state courts from seeking 
guidance from the Supreme Court's decision 
on the grounds that such guidance was dicta: 
Virtually everyone of the Court's 
opinions announcing a new 
application of a constitutional 
principle contains some explanatory 
language that is intended to provide 
guidance to lawyers and judges in 
future cases. It is quite wrong to 
invite state court judges to discount 
the impOliance of such guidance on 
the ground that it may not have been 
strictly necessary as an explanation 
of the Court's specific holding in the 
case. The text of [AEDPA] itself 
provides sufficient obstacles .to 
obtaining habeas relief without 
placing a judicial thumb on the 
warden's side of the scales. 
Carey, 549 U.S. at 79, 127 S.Ct. 649 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
This concern exists independent of the date 
upon which "clearly established Federal 
law" is determined and is not implicated in 
the issue we decide today. The decisions 
preceding Gray-Bruton and Marsh-
explicitly refused to provide guidance on 
whether the teachings of Bruton applied to 
redactions like the ones made in this case. 
See infra Section IV. 
In conclusion, we hold that the cutoff date 
for determining "clearly established Federal 
law" for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) is the date 
of the relevant state-court decision. Both the 
natural reading of the statutory text and 
post-Williams Supreme Court precedent 
support this conclusion. As such, Gray was 
not "clearly established Federal law" for the 
purposes of Greene's habeas petition. 
D. 
Before applying our holding to the facts in 
this case, a brief segue is needed to address 
our dissenting colleague's spirited defense 
of the use of the date the petitioner's 
conviction became final to determine 
"clearly established Federal law." While we 
recognize that the issue confronted today is 
one over which reasonable jurists may 
disagree, there are some notable deficiencies 
in the dissent's proposed adjudication of this 
case. The dissent (1) would sub silentio 
codify Teague, including its retroactivity 
exceptions, as pali of § 2254 without any 
reasoned justification for doing so,. (2) 
elToneously asserts that Griffith v. Kentucky, 
479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 
649 (1987), applies to cases on collateral 
review, and (3) incorrectly asserts that our 
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approach to § 2254( d) (1 ) creates a "twilight 
zone," preventing a petitioner from relying 
on Supreme. Court decisions issued after the 
date of his last relevant state-court decision, 
but before his conviction becomes final. 
1. 
As already explained in Section III(A), there 
is direct Supreme Court precedent 
supporting the view that "whatever would 
qualify as an old rule under [the Supreme 
Court's] Teague jurisprudence will 
constitute 'clearly established Federal law, . 
. .' under § 2254(d)(1)." But the dissent 
appears to go one step fmiher. It alludes, at 
times, to the retroactive application of new 
rules that fall within the Teague exceptions 
for retroactivity as "clearly established 
Federal law" for purposes of § 2254. 
As a preliminary observation, this case does 
not raise a Teague new rules retroactivity 
issue. Under Teague, Gray would be an old 
rule since it was issued before Greene's 
conviction became final. Thus, comments on 
the supposed benefits of Teague's new rule 
retroactivity exceptions would be dicta even 
if we were to take the dissent's approach. 
That being said, we caution that the use of 
Teague's new rule retroactivity exceptions 
for purposes of § 2254, while not 
implausible, has yet to gain support from the 
Supreme Court. In fact, in Horn, the 
Supreme Court explained that the "AEDP A 
and Teague inquiries are distinct." As 
distinct inquiries, it is unclear whether 
Teague's new rule retroactivity exceptions 
should be incorporated into § 2254 even if 
we were to adopt the use of the date the 
petitioner's conviction became final for. 
determining "clearly established Federal 
law." 
Indeed, the Horn decision recognized that 
satisfaction of § 2254( d) is the minimum 
required for a petitioner to receive habeas 
relief: 
While it is of course a necessary 
prerequisite to federal habeas relief 
. that a prisoner satisfy the AEDPA 
standard of review set forth in 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d) ("an application ... 
shall not be granted ... unless " the 
AEDP A standard of review is 
satisfied (emphasis added)), none of . 
our post-AEDPA cases have 
suggested that a writ of habeas 
corpus should automatically issue if 
a prisoner satisfies the AEDPA 
standard, or that AEDP A relieves 
courts from the responsibility of 
addressing properly raised Teague 
arguments. 
ld. 
Thus, under Horn, if Teague is in play at all, 
it is as an additional concern on top of 
AEDPA's requirements codified in § 
2254( d). As such, it seems a leap to assume 
that new rules that are deemed retroactive 
under Teague would be automatically 
deemed "clearly established Federal law" 
. for purposes of § 2254(d)(1). 
2. 
The dissent's assertion that Griffith applies 
on collateral review cannot be reconciled 
with that decision's holding. In Griffith, the 
Supreme Court considered whether a certain 
decision "applie[ d] retroactively to a federal 
conviction then pending on direct review." It 
held that a newly declared rule "for the 
conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be 
applied retroactively to all cases, state or 
federal, pending on direct review or not yet 
final[.]" The principles animating Griffith 
were the ideas that "failure to apply a newly 
declared constitutional rule to criminal cases 
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pending on direct review violates basic 
· norms of constitutional adjudication," and 
that courts should treat like cases alike, 
The dissent, citing· Whorton, seeks to take 
Griffith, a· decision animated by 
constitutional principles pertaining to 
treating like cases alike on direct review, 
and apply it to collateral review. It sees 
Whorton as "explicitly" recognizing that 
Griffith applies to collateral review. Neither 
Whorton nor subsequent Supreme Court 
precedent support this view. 
The language from Whorton upon which the 
dissent relies is far from explicit. The sole 
citation of Griffith was for the proposition 
that under the "Teague framework, an old 
rule applies both on direct and collateral 
review, but a new rule is generally 
applicable only to cases that are still on 
direct review." Before assuming that the 
Supreme Court sought, without any 
additional discussion, to extend Griffith to . 
collateral review, as the dissent suggests, a 
less novel understanding of the Whorton 
Court's reliance on Griffith should be 
considered. Namely, that Griffith was 
probably .cited as general support for the 
propositions that "an old rule applies . . . on 
direct ... review [and that] a new rule is 
generally applicable only to cases that are 
still on direct review." The sentence 
following . the Griffith citation in the 
Whorton decision further confirms this 
understanding by explaining how new rules 
apply in collateral proceedings through 
citation to Teague, not Griffith. 
Subsequent Supreme Court precedent also 
belies the dissent's view that Griffith applies 
on collateral review. Approximately a year 
after Whorton, the Supreme Court, in 
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 128 
S.Ct. 1029, 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008), stated 
that Griffith "defined the scope of 
constitutional violations that would be 
remedied on direct appeaL" It did so in the 
context of determining whether "Teague 
constrains the authority of state courts to 
give broader effect to new rules of criminal 
procedure than is required by that opinion." 
Rather than holding that Teague applied to 
the state courts; like Griffith, 479 U.S. at 
328, 107 S.Ct. 708, the Supreme Court 
reached the opposite conclusion. It held that 
the Teague decision did not control a state 
court's decisions on retroactivity. According 
to the Danforth Court, the Teague decision 
"limits the kinds of constitutional violations 
. that will entitle an individual to relief· on 
federal habeas, but does not in any way limit 
the authority of a state court, when 
reviewing its own state criminal convictions, 
to provide a remedy for a violation that is 
deemed 'nometroactive' under Teague." 
The Supreme Court emphasized that 
Teague, unlike Griffith, was based on the 
Court's "power to interpret the federal 
habeas statute." Because "Teague is based 
on statutory authority that extends only to 
federal courts applying a federal statute; it 
cannot be read as imposing a binding 
obligation on state courts." While Griffith is 
concerned with affording individuals on 
direct review their right to adjudication in 
accord with the Constitution, Teague is 
derived from language in the habeas statute 
pemitting disposal of habeas petitions "as 
law and justice require[.]" Because their 
sources of authority are different-Griffith, 
the Constitution, and Teague, 28 U.S.C. § 
2243-and their motivations are different, 
Griffith cannot be imported wholesale into 
Teague without discussion. In short, we do 
not dispute that Griffith may somehow 
inform the Supreme Court's approach in 
applying Teague. We also do not dispute 
that a § 2254 petition may invoke Griffith 
where a petitioner was denied the 
application of relevant Supreme Court 
precedent on direct review. But Griffith, 
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independently, does not control retroactivity 
for cases on collateral review. 
3. 
The dissent also asserts that our approach 
creates a twilight zone for any petitioner 
who seeks to invoke Supreme Court 
decisions that fall between the date of the. 
last relevant state-court decision and the date 
the petitioner's conviction became final. 
This assertion is incorrect. Our holding does 
not create a categorical bar to a petitioner's 
reliance on Supreme Court decisions issued 
during any twilight zone period. Instead, we 
set fOlih a simple rule: the universe of 
"clearly established Federal· law" that may 
be applied to a particular petitioner's § 2254 
appeal is tied to the date of his last relevant 
state-court decision. 
In this case, it was Greene's decision not to 
rais~ the Confrontation Clause claim in his 
PCRA petition that established December 
16, 1997, as the date of the last relevant 
state-court decision on the. merits: This, in 
tum, shrank the universe of "clearly 
established Federal law" available to him for 
his § 2254 petition, relative to what that 
universe would have been had he pursued 
the Confrontation Clause claim at the PCRA 
stage and obtained a later, post-Gray state-
court decision on the merits. It is unfortunate 
for Greene that the body of "clearly 
established Federal law" as ofD"ecember 16, 
1997, did not include the Gray decision. Yet 
this is an outcome he could easily have 
avoided by raising the Confrontation Clause 
claim in his PCRA petition. Doing so would 
have pushed the date of the last relevant 
state-court decision on the merits forward, 
thereby expanding the universe of "clearly 
established Federal law" to include Gray. 
U sing the date of the last relevant state-court 
decision to determine" "clearly established 
Federal law" gives defendants incentive to 
pursue all colorable claims based on 
"Federal law" as far as possible in the state 
courts because doing so will give them the 
best chance of success in federal habeas 
proceedings, not to mention the underlying 
state proceedings. This is a salutary effect 
that serves Congress's goals in passing" 
AEDPA. 
IV. 
[The Court discussed and applied Bruton 
and Marsh holding they were reasonably" 
applied by the state courts.] 
V. 
This case presents a vexing conundrum that 
cannot, no matter how one views the facts or 
law, be avoided. While we cannot predict 
with absolute certainty what date the 
Supreme Comi would use to determine 
"clearly established Federal law" for 
purposes of § 2254( d) (1 ), our decision today 
represents a careful consideration of the 
pertinent, conflicting authorities, and we 
believe that we have reached the best 
conclusion given the guidance we have to 
date. Ultimately, only the Supreme Court 
can resolve such uncertainty as exists. For 
now, we hold that "clearly established 
Federal law"" for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) 
should be determined as of the date of the 
relevant state-court decision. In this case, 
because the Pennsylvania Superior Court's 
December 16, 1997 decision did not 
unreasonably apply the "clearly established 
Federal law" that existed at that time, Bruton 
and Marsh, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part. 
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Although I agree with my colleagues that 
Greene's claim is not proceduraUy defaulted 
and join Part II of the majority opinion in 
full, I respectfully disagree with their 
determination of the controlling date for 
"clearly established Federal law" under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As my colleagues 
recognize, the. authority on this question is 
conflicting and, save for a First Circuit 
Court opinion, unreasoned. But choosing the 
date of the relevant state-court decision, as 
our Court does today, leaves a twilight zone 
between the cutoff set by the majority here 
and the retroactivity analysis of the Supreme 
Court's decisions in Griffith v. Kentucky, 
479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct.. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 
649 (1987), and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 
288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 
(1989) (plurality). The consequence of the 
majority's opinion today is that a criminal 
defendant who is denied the right under 
Griffith to apply a new constitutional rule to 
his or her· case on direct appeal is left 
without later recourse to federal habeas 
review to correct that error. 
I. Background 
* * * 
II. Analysis 
This is not a situation where Greene is 
seeking to take belated advantage of a rule 
to which he is not entitled. He is asking us to 
apply a case that should have been applied 
on direct review. Under the Supreme 
Court's Griffith jurisprudence, he was 
entitled to the benefit of Gray. It is only 
because the Pennsylvania state courts failed 
to apply it to his case that we are evaluating 
it in the first instance on habeas review. 
My analysis differs from that of the 
majority. In a nutshell, subsection 
2254(d)(1) does not choosy any cutoff date. 
Thus, we are left with the retroactivity 
jurisprudence of Griffith and Teague. 
Because Gray was decided prior to the date 
Greene's conviction became final, I believe 
Griffith requires its application to this case. I 
would therefore reverse the judgment of the 
District Comi and remand for. consideration 
of Gray. 
A. As noted, the question of whether § 
2254( d)(l) sets a cutoff date is unresolved. 
I agree with the majority that "clearly 
established Federal law" did not have any 
special meaning prior to AEDP A and. the 
text of28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Maj. Op. 
at 98 n. 10. Nor does the text of 28 U.S.C. § 
2254( d)(l) have an express time cutoff for 
"clearly established Federal law." My 
colleagues read the· statute implicitly to 
require that any Supreme Court decision 
handed down after the relevant state-comi 
decision on the merits is to be ignored for 
purposes of habeas relief. I disagree that 
"[r]eading the language plainly," or in a 
"straightforward" way, as my colleagues 
suggest, requires that the Supreme Court 
decision exist at the time of the state court's 
substantive resolution. If § 2254(d)(1) were 
so plain or straightforward, why does the 
Supreme Court say it is uncertain? And why 
are my colleagues of the view that "there is 
no clear answer to the issue we face"? Maj. 
. Op. at 96 n. 7. In the face of such 
uncertainty, I find it difficult to conclude 
that there is a "natural reading" of § 
2254( d)(l) dictating a cutoff date. 
A primary reason for the Supreme Court's 
unceliainty as to whether the text of § 
2254( d)(l) provides a clear cutoff date is its 
own decision in Williams v. Taylor, 529 
U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 
(2000). Inadvertently (no doubt), the Court 
had two different majorities identifying two 
different cutoffs. Justice Stevens, writing for 
six members of the Court in Part III of his 
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opmlOn, stated that the applicable date for 
purposes of determining whether federal law 
is established is "the time [the habeas 
petitioner's] state-court conviction became 
fina1." Justice O'Connor, writing for five 
members of the Court in Part II of her 
opinion, stated that "'clearly established 
Federal law' ... refers to the holdings, as 
opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] 
Court's decisions as of the time of the 
relevant state-court decision." Neither 
Justice Stevens nor Justice O'Connor 
appears to have chosen a cutoff based on the 
text of the statute, and they did not 
acknowledge the discrepancy in their 
respective opinions. Indeed, in Williams the 
choice of cutoff would not have mattered . 
because the case focused on Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), a case decided prior 
to both the 1985 crime and the 1986 
conviction in Williams, making the 
discussion of cutoff dicta because under 
both cutoffs Strickland was undoubtedly 
"clearly established Federal law." 
Our task is to reconcile the conflicting 
majorities in Williams regarding the cutoff 
for "clearly established Federal law" under 
AEDPA while maintaining consistency with 
the Court's controlling decisions in Griffith 
and Teague. Recently, the Supreme Court 
recognized the "uncertainty" in temporal 
cutoff for "clearly established Federal law," 
and declined to resolve it at that time. 
Recognizing the Court's statement in Spisak 
as the "most telling observation regarding 
the use of the date the conviction became 
final," my colleagues dismiss it in a single 
sentence as "mere uncertainty [that] cannot 
counterbalance" the cases that select the date 
of the relevant state-court decision. Maj. Op. 
at 99. Moreover, they do so even though we 
agree that Supreme Court has never 
conducted a thorough analysis of the 
"clearly established" cutoff for AEbP A. Id. 
at 96-97. Though the Supreme Court has 
used the relevant state-comi decision as the 
temporal cutoff in cases after Williams, I do 
not find this dispositive. Like our own 
checkered jurisprudence, it is not clear from 
the Supreme Court's cases whether it 
recognized these divergent approaches 
inasmuch as it was not required in those 
cases to resolve whether the cutoff date was 
the relevant state-comi decision date or the 
date the conviction became fina1. 
If, as the maj ority suggests, the clear answer 
is the date of the relevant state-court 
decision, the Spisak Court would not have 
noted the uncertainty, nor would it have 
assumed the date of finality. The Court is 
not in the business of offering advisory 
opinions, and if it were clear that its prior 
cases had selected the .date of the relevant 
state-court decision, it would not have 
issued the opinion in Spisak. It would have 
held instead that, because Mills was decided 
after the final state-court decision on the 
merits, AEDP A did not permit consideration 
of the case.· It would have stopped its 
analysis there instead of going on at great 
length to evaluate the Mills claim on the 
merits. Thus, post-Williams Supreme Court 
precedent offers little to clarify the temporal 
cutoff for "clearly established Federal law" 
under AEDPA. 
B. The Supreme Court has not abandoned its 
retroactivity jurisprudence post-AEDP A. 
AEDPA's concern over whether a state 
court ruling in a criminal case was contrary 
to, or an umeasonable application of, 
"clearly established Federal law" sterns from 
the desire to avoid disturbing final criminal 
jUdgments through collateral review. In 
particular, the use of the past tense 
("established") means that AEDP A is 
concerned with the law that should have 
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been applied at the' time of the state court 
proceedings. Where I diverge from my 
colleagues is how we determine what that 
body of law is. 
Even though at first it seems conceptually 
difficult to say that a court unreasonably 
applied Supreme Court precedent that did 
not yet exist, retroactivity analysis becomes 
the tool for deciding. When a Supreme 
Court holding is retroactively applied to a 
prior proceeding, it is as if it existed at the 
time ofthat prior proceeding. The majority's 
view ignores controlling Supreme Court 
precedent that allows, in cetiain 
circmnstances, for the retroactive 
application of constitutional rules to 
criminal cases even' though they are 
announced after a state court ruling on the 
merits. 
Paramount to understanding the Supreme 
Court's retroactivity jurisprudence is 
discerning its decisions in Griffith and 
Teague. They provide a distinction between 
"old rules" and "new rules" terms that have 
. , 
a clear. meaning only when used in relation 
to a given criminal conviction. Unhelpfully, 
the Supreme Court has used "new rule" to 
rriean different things in the Griffith and 
Teague context. 
A "new rule" for Griffith' is one that is 
announced after a state court ruling on the 
merits. A "new rule" for Teague is one that 
is announced after a conviction becomes 
final. This means that in the application of 
Gray to Greene's conviction, Gray is a "new 
rule" for Griffith pmlJoses but is an "old 
rule" for Teague purposes. We are 
principally concerned with the Teague 
distinction between "old rules" and "new 
rules." ... 
[Table provided for clarity omitted.] 
C. The Supreme Court has a developed 
jurisprudence governing the application to 
cases on collateral review of its cases 
decided pre-finality' and those decided post-
finality. 
The retroactive application of newly 
announced constitutional rules in criminal 
cases has long troubled the Supreme Court. 
As noted, retroactivity takes that rule and 
transports it back in time to a proceeding 
that pre-dated the announcement of the rule, 
treating the rule as if it existed at the time of 
the prior proceeding. Because this fiction 
has the potential to upset settled 
proceedings, especially in the criminal 
context, over the years the Court came to 
adopt a bright line that splits the application 
of these rules into two domains of review. 
Whether a new rule applies retroactively 
depends on whether a criminal conviction is 
on direct review or collateral review at the 
time of the Supreme Court decision 
announcing the new rule. If the conviction is 
on direct review when the new rule is 
announced, Griffith allows the retroactive 
application of the new rule to all criminal 
cases pending on direct review as a "basic 
norm [ ] of constitutional adjudication." If 
the conviction is on collateral review when 
the new rule is announced (i.e., convictions 
that became final before the new rule is 
announced), Teague restricts the application 
of that new rule to nan-ow exceptions 
discussed below. This bright-line distinction 
was made due to the differing considerations 
between the two domains of review. 
1. Griffith 
The Griffith Court held that the "failure to 
apply a newly declared constitutional rule to 
criminal cases pending on direct review 
. violates basic norms of constitutional 
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adjudication." It was the very "integrity of 
judicial review" that required application of 
a new constitutional rule "to all similar cases 
pending on direct review." Two principles 
guided this decision. First, the· Court 
. recognized that 
[a]s a practical matter, of course, we 
cannot hear each case pending on 
direct review and apply the new rule. 
But we fulfill our judicial 
responsibility by instructing the 
lower courts to apply the new rule 
retroactively to cases not yet fina1. 
Thus, it is the nature of judicial 
review that precludes us from 
"[s]imply fishing one case from the 
stream of appellate review, using it 
as a vehicle for pronouncing new 
constitutional standards, and then 
permitting a stream of similar cases 
subsequently to flow by unaffected 
by that new rule." 
Id. (citation omitted). 
Second, the Court recognized that 
selective application of new rules 
violates the principle of treating 
similarly situated defendants the 
same. As we pointed out in United 
States v. Johnson, [457 U.S. 537, 
102 S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 
(1982) ] the problem with not 
applying new rules to cases pending 
on direct review is "the actual 
inequity that results .when the Court 
chooses which of many similarly 
situated defendants should be the 
chance beneficimy" of a new rule. 
Although the Court had tolerated this 
inequity for a time by not applying 
new rules retroactively to cases on 
direct review, we noted: "The time 
for toleration has come to an end." 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
The Court therefore held "that a new rule for 
the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be 
applied retroactively to all cases, state or 
federal, pending on direct review or not yet 
final, with no exception for cases in which 
the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with 
the past." I note that "pending on direct 
review" is slightly different from "not yet 
fina1." A case that has already exhausted the 
direct appeal as of right resulting in a state-
court decision on the merits, but is not yet 
final, is still within the purview of Griffith. 
Finality is the key date. 
The Griffith Court "instruct [ ed] the lower 
courts," state and federal, "to apply the new 
rule retroactively to cases not yet final." It 
did not merely advise those courts to 
consider applying the rule subject to their 
discretion, but mandated application of the 
new rule. It was only through this mandate 
that "actual inequity " between "many 
similarly situated defendants" would be 
avoided. 
2. Teague 
In Teague, the Supreme Court dealt with the 
other side of the retroactivity question. 
Collateral attacks such as habeas corpus are 
not meant to be a substitute for direct 
review, and the Court has recognized an 
interest in leaving concluded litigation in a 
state of repose. Quoting the second Justice 
Harlan, the Court noted that it was 
'''sounder, in adjudicating habeas petitions, 
generally to apply the law prevailing at the 
time a conviction became final than it is to 
seek to dispose of [habeas] cases on the 
basis of intervening changes in 
constitutional interpretation. '" The Court 
identified only two exceptions to the general 
prohibition against the retroactive 
application of new post-finalIty rules to 
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cases on collateral review: (1) new rules that 
place certain kinds of primary, private 
individual conduct beyond the power of the 
criminal law-making authority to proscribe; 
and (2) new "watershed rules of ·criminal 
procedure ... [that] 'alter our understanding 
of the bedrock procedural elements that 
must be found to vitiate the fairness of a 
particular conviction[.]'" 
In deciding Griffith and Teague, the 
Supreme Court has carefully set out the 
different concerns in the pre-finality (direct 
appeal) and post-finality (collateral attack) 
application of new rules. In the context of 
retroactivity for federal habeas review, the 
Teague Court focused on the distinction 
between intermediate judgments subject to 
appeal and final judgments subject only to 
. collateral attack: 
Application of constitutional rules 
not in existence at the time a 
conviction became final seriously 
undermines the principle of finality 
which is essential to the operation of 
our criminal justice system. Without 
finality, the criminal law is deprived 
of much of its deterrent effect. The 
fact that life and liberty are at stake 
in criminal prosecutions "shows only 
that' conventional notions of finality' 
should not have as much place in 
criminal as in civil litigation, not that 
they should have none." 
Id. at 309, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (emphases III 
original) (citation omitted). 
With this view of finality, the Court held 
that "[u]nless they fall within an exception 
to the general rule, new constitutional rules 
of criminal procedure will not be applicable 
to those cases which have become final 
before the new rules are announced," using 
finality, not the date of the relevant state-
court decision, as the inflection point 
between Griffith and Teague. 
D. Section 2254(d)(1) does not discard 
Griffith and Teague. 
In a unanimous post-AEDPA and post-
Williams decision, Whorton v. Bockting, 549 
U.S. 406, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 167 L.Ed.2d 1 
(2007), the Supreme Court held that Griffith 
and Teague 
laid out the framework to be used in 
determining whether a rule 
announced in one of [the Comi's] 
opIlllOns should be . applied 
retroactively to judgments in 
criminal cases that are already final 
on direct review. Under the Teague 
framework, an old· rule applies both 
on direct and collateral review, but a 
new rule is generally applicable only 
to cases that are still on direct 
review. See Griffith, 479 U.S. 314 
[107 S.Ct. 708]. A new rule applies 
retroactively in a collateral 
proceeding only if [the Teague 
requirements are met]. 
549 U.S. at 416,127 S.Ct. 1173. 
Though Whorton dealt with an application 
of Teague, it explicitly recognized that 
Griffith requires that "old rules" be applied 
both on direct and collateral.review. To me 
this means . that the Whorton Court 
unanimously endorsed Griffith and the idea 
that a Supreme Court decision handed down 
. after the last state court ruling on the merits, 
but before finality, is an old rule that is 
applicable even under AEDPA and even if it 
is not a "watershed" ruling or does not place 
conduct beyond the power of the state to 
proscribe. 
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Given the Court's retroactivity concerns, I 
believe the better reading of § 2254(d)(1) is 
that it does not set a definitive cutoff date 
for "clearly established Federal law." It is 
the Supreme Court's retroactivity 
jurisprudence of Griffith or Teague that 
determines applicability on collateral 
review, not AEDP A. 
My colleagues' reading of § 2254(d)(1) 
conflicts with Whorton. They refuse to 
include all "old rules" as "clearly established 
Federal law." This reading contradicts the 
unanimous holding in Williams that all "old 
rules" for Teague purposes are "clearly 
established Federal law." My colleagues 
recognize this contradiction, but they choose 
to ignore Griffith and Teague and adopt 
Justice O'Connor's initial unreasoned 
declaration (that chose the date of the 
relevant state-court decision and cited no 
case) and not her later reasoned one (that 
referred to "old rules" under Teague . and 
cited Supreme Court precedent). It is unclear 
to me why we would choose her statement 
of the law (a dictum, no less) in conflict with 
the Supreme Court's decisions in Griffith 
and Teague instead of her statement of the 
law in harmony with those Supreme Court 
holdings and Whorton (and that actually 
invokes the controlling Supreme Court 
precedent of Teague ). 
E. The majority's cutoff creates a twilight 
zone 
If the relevant cutoff date is the date of the 
last state-court decision on the merits, we 
would create a twilight zone for criminal 
defendants. Consider the possible times 
relative to a state court conviction when a 
decision by the Supreme Court is 
announced: (1) prior to the last state-court 
decision on the merits; (2) between the last 
state-court decision on the merits and 
finality; and (3) after the conviction is final. 
If it were decided in the first period (prior to 
the last state-court decision on the merits), a 
state court would have to apply it to be 
consistent with Griffith. If it were decided in 
the third period (after finality)? habeas relief 
would be available as a "new rule" under 
Teague if the decision announced· a 
"watershed" rule or placed certain conduct 
beyond the power of the state to proscribe. 
However, if it were decided in the second 
period (the twilight zone between the last 
state-court decision on the merits and before 
finality), the majority's time cutoff would 
nonetheless consider it not to be "clearly 
established Federal law" and would bar 
habeas relief because the rule did not exist 
at the time of the last state-court decision on 
the merits. The majority reaches this 
conclusion even though, as discussed above, 
a rule announced pre-finality is an "old rule" 
for Teague purposes and Griffith requires its 
application on direct and collateral review. 
So inflexible is the "plain reading" the 
majority adopts that even "new rules" that 
pass the Teague test for retroactive 
application would not entitle a petitioner to 
habeas relief. "New rules" for Teague 
purposes are always decided after the date of 
the relevant. state-court decision, as they 
come into being after finality. Yet the 
majority would not consider the "new rule" 
to be "clearly established Federal law" 
because the "new rule" did not yet exist, and 
no relief could be granted. Such a Catch-22 
reading of· § 2254( d) (1 ) effectively 
disregards Griffith and Teague even as the 
Supreme Court has maintained that both 
decisions remain viable. 
As discussed above, even though at first it 
seems conceptually difficult to say that a 
state court unreasonably applied Supreme 
Court precedent that did not· yet exist, the 
Supreme COUli's retroactivity analysis treats 
the precedent as if it existed at the time of 
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that prior state court proceeding. Under 
Griffith, . Supreme Court decisions are 
retroactively applied to those convictions 
not yet final at the time of the decision. 
Furthermore, if the state court neglects to 
apply the rule retroactively to convictions 
not yet final, this can be still corrected after 
finality on collateral review. Under Teague, 
Supreme Court decisions are retroactively 
applicable even to convictions that were 
already final at the time of the decision if it 
announces a "watershed" rule or places 
certain conduct beyond the power of the 
state to proscribe. We know from Whorton 
that § 2254( d) (1 ) does not overrule Griffith 
and Teague, but by deeming irrelevant any 
case that post-dates the relevant state-court 
decision, the majority implicitly disregards 
both Griffith and Teague. 
While another Circuit Court.has rejected the 
majority's cutoff on fears of the potential for 
"state court ... subver[sion] ... by the 
simple expedient of summarily affirming a 
lower court's decision," its reasoning does 
not depend on a distrust of the judicial 
integrity of state courts. A well-meaning 
state court system could innocently neglect 
to apply Griffith after its final decision on 
the merits, but before the conviction 
becomes final. If a state court were to ignore 
the mandate to apply the new rule to all 
cases still pending. on direct appeal or not 
yet final, it would similarly undermine the 
integrity of judicial review. That would 
leave collateral review by habeas C01pUS as 
the only remedy to correct the mistake. 
Surely a criminal defendant is entitled to 
recourse if the state courts simply forget to 
check for new, relevant Supreme Court 
precedent prior to finality. This helps to 
avoid the situatiqn where similarly situated 
defendants receive disparate treatment based 
on the happenstance of state court attention 
(or inattention). 
Yet, under the majority's selection of 
temporal cutoff, even that remedy would be 
foreclosed whenever the state courts 
declined to apply the rule without 
explanation. This would leave affected 
habeas petitioners as unfairly treated 
relative to other similarly situated 
individuals who were lucky enough to have 
the state courts apply the new rule. 
It is not our place to second-guess the 
Supreme Court when it has held that: (1) 
Supreme Court decisions handed down prior 
to finality must be applied on both direct and 
collateral review under Griffith; (2) Teague 
and Griffith have continuing vitality after 
AEDP A; (3) all nine Justices in Williams 
agreed that an "old rule" under Teague 
qualifies as "clearly established Federal 
law"; and (4) its decisions since Williams 
have not definitively set a temporal cutoff. 
In the absence of an express statement to the 
contrary by the Supreme Court (and there is 
none), we are bound to apply the clearly 
expressed (and still controlling) 
jurisprudence of Griffith and Teague. The 
Court may wish, in the AEDPA context, to 
cut back on Griffith and Teague, but it, not 
us, possesses the power to overrule its 
precedent. 
I would hold that the cutoff date for "clearly 
established Federal law" is not prescribed by 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The retroactive 
application of constitutional rules to 
criminal cases is governed by Griffith and 
Teague, and I would look first to whether 
Gray was decided before or after finality to 
determine which rule applies. As here Gray 
was decided prior to finality, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court should have 
considered it in the course of fulfilling its 
responsibilities under Griffith. When it did 
not do so, the District Court on habeas 
review needed to correct this failure to 
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consider Gray. Accordingly, I would vacate 
its judgment and remand for application of 
Gray to Greene's Confrontation Clause 
claim. For these reasons, I respectfully 
dissent from all but Part II of the majority 
opinion. 
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"Supreme Court Grants Two Clinic Cert Petitions" 
Stanford Law School Blog 
AprilS, 2011 
Jeffrey Fisher 
On April 4, 2011, the Supl:eme Court 
grap.ted only two certiorari petitions, and 
both are from the Supreme Court Litigation 
Clinic's docket. 
In ... Greene v. Fishel', the clinic represents 
a state prisoner arguing that he may obtain 
federal habeas corpus relief based on a 
violation of a United States Supreme Court 
decision announced after the last state-court 
decision on the merits of his direct appeal 
but before that appeal became final. In other 
words, petitioner argues that the retroactivi~y 
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regime that the Supreme Court announced in 
1989 in Teague v. Lane remains good law 
after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDP A). Clinic law students Thomas Scott 
('11), Andrew Zahn ('11), and Kathryn 
McCann (' 12) prepared the petition under 
the supervision of the clinic's co-director, 
Jeffrey Fisher. 
The clinic will now proceed to brief both 
cases on the merits and to present oral 
argument next fall. 
"Thorny Habeas Rule Will Get 
High Court Road Map" 
Courthouse News Service 
Apri14, 2011 
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to 
review the appeal of a man sentenced to life 
in prison for second-degree murder and 
other charges. 
Its decision of the case is expected to shed 
light on a disputed. element of habeas 
procedure: whether judges can consider 
Supreme COUli decisions' as "clearly 
established Federal law" under the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 if the decision was published 
before a state prisoner's conviction becomes 
final but after his last state-court decision on 
the merits .. 
In March 1998, the Supreme Court decided 
in KevinD. Gray v. Maryland that 
prosecutors cannot use redactions to ~kirt a 
law that forbids' them from using one 
defendant's confession as evidence if it 
implicates a co-conspirator. 
This case was decided while Eric Greene 
(aka Jarmalne Q. Trice) was appealing his 
conviction of second-degree murder, 
robbery and conspiracy. Greene had been 
tried alongside four co-conspirators, one of 
whom was facing first-degree murder 
. charges. At trial, prosecutors read the 
confessions of the co-conspirators who 
spoke with police when they were arrested 
but would not be testifying in the trial. 
The jury was instructed not to consider the 
confessions as evidence against any of the 
other defendants. 
When Gray was decided, Greene argued that 
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his trial had been' prejudiced by the. 
admission of his alleged co-conspirators' 
redacted statements. Under the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act (AEDP A), federal courts may grant 
. habeas relief if a . state court's consideration 
of a federal constitutional claim "resulted in . 
a decision that was contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court." 
Greene's conviction became final in 1999, 
but the last state-court decision on the merits 
of his case predated Gray. A magistrate 
judge and federal judge decided that Gray 
was not "clearly established Federal law" for 
Greene and dismissed his appeals. A divided 
3rd Circuit panel affirmed in May 2010. 
"As the Third Circuit itself strongly 
suggested in this very case, this Court 
should resolve this conflict of authority," 
. Greene's attorneys in their brief to the 
Supreme COUli. "This basic procedural issue 
has already confronted numerous federal 
courts, and it will continue to arise in the 
context of an array of substantive 
constitutional claims. The question is 
outcome determinative in this case. Finally, 
the Third Circuit's holding that AEDPA 
changed longstanding retroactivity law is 
incorrect. " 
Greene is represented by Jeffrey Fisher of 
the Stanford Law School Supreme Court 
Litigation Clinic, Isabel McGinty of 
Highstown, N.J., and Goldstein, Howe & 
Russell of Bethesda, Md. 
"Clearly Established Federal Law is Determined as of 
the Date of the Relevant State-Court Decision 
SUbject to Habeas Review" 
Third Circuit Blog 
June 2, 2010 
Melinda Ghilardi 
A split panel of the Third Circuit held that 
for purposes of the standard of review for a 
federal habeas claim set forth in AEDP A,28 
U.S.C. §2254(d)(1),' "clearly established 
Federal law" should be determined as of the 
date of the relevant state-court decision 
subject to habeas review. Greene was 
convicted of second degree murder, robbery 
and conspiracy and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. On appeal to the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court, Green argued, 
inter alia, that the admission at trial of 
redacted statements of his co-defendants 
violated the Confrontation Clause. The 
Superior Court rejected that claim in a 
decision dated December 16, 1997. That 
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decision became the final state cOUli 
decision for purposes of habeas review. 
Greene's conviction became final on July 
28, 1999. In the meantime, however, the 
Supreme Court decided Gray v. Maryland, 
523 U.S. 185 (1998), on March 9, 1998, 
which supported Greene's claim. The issue 
befote the Third Circuit was whether the 
Gray case was to be considered "clearly 
established Federal law." The court held that 
it was not because the relevant state court 
decision was issued before Gray. One judge 
dissented opining that the relevant time 
frame should be the time that the conviction 
became final. 
